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Abstract 
This thesis provides a configuration of the public 
sphere in Shanghai and the various structural factors led 
to its formation and degeneration in the late imperial and 
the early Republican period, according to the model 
suggests by Jurgen Habermas. 
The opening of Shanghai as a treaty port led to a 
number of structural changes, the prominent one was the 
formation of a self-regulating market which witnessed a 
civil society was taking shape in there. Meanwhile, the 
traditional merchant organizations shifted their 
orientation towards more inclusiveness in nature and 
extended their services towards coininunity-wide, thus helped 
to integrate Shanghai as an urban community with the 
sojourners developed an identity as "Shanghai men". The 
New Policies reforms launched by the Qing regime from 1901 
initiated a number of institutional changes in the Shanghai 
city. They formalized and legitimated the power of a group 
of urban reformist elite and resulted in the expansion of 
an autonomous domain. A public sphere was said to emerge. 
Then two nationally-wide mobilizations initiated by the 
Shanghai elite are chosen to illustrate the structure and 
characteristics of the public sphere in Shanghai: one was 
the Anti-American Boycott in 1905 against the imperialism, 
another one was the Constitutional Movement in 1910 against 
the Qing regime. The methods the reformist elite used 
during the mobilizations - such as petition, boycott, mass 
demonstration, collecting signatories and appeal to 
rational-critical arguments— and their political demands, 
represented a new type of political discourse and a high 
level of political consciousness that were unprecedented in 
Chinese history and also shared a sufficient number of 
�basic features with their Western counterparts as portrays 
by Habermas. But the once flourished political experiment 
of public sphere finally declined. I propose that because 
of the internal tension between the public sphere and 
nationalism, resulted in the public sphere could not take 
root in modern China. Nevertheless, the development of 
democratic rule in China cannot be seemed as impossible. 
« 
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Chapter One. Introduction 
A. The Problems of Civil Society 
The problems of how to develop democracy and establish 
democratic institutions in China have preoccupied the 
concern of most Chinese intellectuals from the beginning of 
this century. A variety of answers, though not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, have been proposed. Some of them, 
especially the Chinese Marxist historians, stressed the 
constraints of some social and economic factors such as 
foreign invasion to China (imperialism) , the poverty of 
peasant economy or the impotence of the Chinese government 
to launch and implement modernization programmes. Other 
scholars attributed to China's traditional cultural values 
and patterns of behaviour as inhospitable to democracy.^ 
Since the mid-1980s, especially in the wake of pro-
democracy movement in Beijing and other major cities in the 
spring of 1989, some fled intellectuals and students 
started to rethink their own experience, tried to give 
account for their failure and suggested any possible avenue 
for further movement. Among 七heir suggestions, one is the 
so-called "Civil Society Project" which ascribes the 
founding of civil society as a key determinant factor to 
1. For example, Pye 1992. 
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develop democracy in China.^ Meanwhile, some conferences 
were held on the questions of civil society in China. For 
example, a special panel on "civil Society in People's 
China" was organized at the annual meeting of the Associ-
ation for Asian Studies in New Orleans during April 1991. 
In November 1991, a forum was held at the Wilson Centre in 
Washington to discuss the question: "Did China Ever Enjoy 
a Civil Society?" The issue continued to be the subject of 
intense debate at the Berkeley-Fudan conference on China's 
efforts at modernization held in Shanghai in May-June 
1992.3 Therefore civil society becomes one of the hottest 
controversial topics among the Chinese intellectual 
circles, "many have come to see it as the 'missing link, 
between Western and non-Western political experiences. 
Against the assertion that Asian political cultures are 
general inimical to Western-liberal-democratic norms, the 
argument is now heard that civil society, which has 
recently emerged under communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
is currently appearing in somewhat similar guise in China, 
bringing in its train 'democracy'“ / 
Actually, their insights were indebted to the efforts 
of intellectuals in Central and Eastern European who revive 
and reconstruct the concept of 'civil society' as the salv-
ation of their nations in the crisis of socialism. It was 
2. See Lu Dequan 1990. 
Wakeman 1993: 108. See also Jing Yuejin 1993. 
Chamberlian 1993: 199-200. 
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above all the rise of Solidarity and the Catholic church in 
Poland that appeared to offer institutional forms of ass-
ociations for social movements and led to the collapse of 
party-state in there in 1989. This sparked off the 
enthusiasm on this concept. Civil society thus becomes a 
panacea for all those desired in the making of a democratic 
society. "The concept of civil society is proffered as a 
piece of ‘lost treasure' which will bring a much-needed 
lustre to contemporary political t h i n k i n g . W h a t they 
implicitly imply in the concept of civil society is an 
arena of independent associational activities in the 
society, free from state interference and directed against 
the state's monopoly of political activity. However, when 
we examine the history of this concept, we will find that 
we are dealing with many levels and layers of meanings, and 
sometimes with contrasting meanings. Moreover, it is 
fraught with theoretical and moral implications. This is 
sprang from its various different past and present usages 
in European tradition. 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the term 
'civil society' was synonymous with the state and 
contrasted with the "uncivilized condition of humanity."^ 
But hereafter there was a decisive innovation that broke 
the historic equation of civil society and the state. In 
5. Kumer 1993： 383. 
6. The discussion on this part is adopted from Kumer 
1993, 1.994, Bryant 1993 and Taylor 1990. 
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Hegel sense, or the more extreme form in Marxist tradition, 
it means a sphere of society that tied with the growth of 
capitalism with an unprecedented degree of autonomy and 
independent from the state. Civil society in this sense 
was more and less synonymous with ,economy,. For example, 
Shlomo Avineri says civil society in Hegel "is nothing else 
more than the market m e c h a n i s m . I n this materialist 
interpretation, "the social structures of civil society 
were dissolved in the economic base; the economic dimension 
of society was expanded until it became coterminous with 
society itself.Then in a more recent usage by Gramsci, 
civil society is again found in the state. But in contrast 
with merely ruled by coercion, civil society is the arena 
where hegemony is exercised. 
As we have seen, in some usage, civil society is 
equivalent to state or a component of it. This is departed 
too far from its usage as an organization of society 
against the state. In another usage, it means a separate 
sphere of society distinct from the state and with forms 
and principles of its own, that is the economic sphere. 
But the presence of this separate sphere may not directly 
relate to the development of democracy as implied in the 
prevailing Eastern European and Chinese interpretations. 
As a result of the complex history of the concept of 
\ Quoted in Kumer 1993: 378. 
8. Kumer 1993: 380. 
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civil society, its usage will usually lead to multiple 
ambiguities and confusions. We do not mean to abandon its 
usage any further, but we must clarify the precise meanings 
we want to adopt from this amorphous catch-all concept and 
"situate it in some definite tradition of use that gives it 
a place and a meaning. In fact, it is this reason why 
Arif Dirlik criticizes that the discussions on civil 
society in China "have been highly ideological in thrust, 
using civil society as an excuse to attack socialism, 
without any elaborate considerations either of the concept 
or of its supposed manifestations in Chinese politics. 
Meanwhile, there is another broader movement in the 
academic circles to hold upon the idea of 'public sphere' 
as a critical element to identify the distinctive feature 
about our society. This is sprang from the work of the 
German social philosopher Jurgen Habermas, especially his 
pivotal book: The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. 
It originated as a thesis for the post-doctoral qualific-
ations required of German professors and is published in 
1962 as Haberinas,s first book, but only was translated in 
English by Thomas Burger in 1989, In the following 
sections, we will first examine the concept of public 
sphere as developed by Habermas, before we proceed into 
9. Kumer 1993: 390. 
10. Dirlik 1993: 13. 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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explanation of why this concept is a better analytic device 
than the concept of civil society. 
B. What does Habermas say? 
Jurgen Habermas is the chief second—generation repre-
sentative of the "Frankfurt School", among whose first-
generation members were Max Horkheiitier, Theodor Adorno and 
Herbert Marcuse. They built their enterprise upon the so-
called "critical theory", and the School is often described 
as a strand of the "Western Marxism". However, they reject 
Marxist economic determinism and take consciousness 
seriously to critical inquiry, rather than dismissing it as 
a projection of socio-economic structure. Among Frankfurt 
School's work, Habermas's work on public sphere is the less 
speculative and more historical one, but is still aligned 
with the spirit of critical theory. 
Habermas's book can be divided into two parts.^^ In 
the first half, Habermas traces the historical emergence of 
a bourgeoisie public sphere in the eighteenth century of 
Western Europe. In the second half, he describes the 
structural transformation or the breakdown of the public 
sphere since the early nineteenth century. The main theme 
of the book is to ask when and under what condition a 
rational-critical debate about public issues conducted by 
12. The following account on public sphere is mainly 
adopted from Habermas 1989, with reference to Habermas 
1974, Calhoun 1992a, Rowe 1990: 309-14 and Held 1980: 
Ch.10. 
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private persons could become authoritative bases for 
political action. As Habermas shows, this question is 
important for democratic theory and is an inquiry at once 
into normative ideals and actual history. It is this 
mixture of historical account and theoretical ideals that 
attracts the attention of both historians and critical 
theorists, but also lead to a number of comments, as we 
will shown later. 
From the very beginning, Habermas emphasizes the 
historical specifity of the public sphere. It is: 
a category that is typical of an epoch. It 
cannot be abstracted from the unique develop-
mental history of that 'civil society' origin-
ating in the European High Middle Ages； nor can 
it be transferred, ideal—typically generalized, 
to any number of historical situations that 
represent formally similar constellations. ^^ 
This stress on the distinctiveness of this category may 
limit any attempt to apply it to other periods or cultures, 
and so reduce its possible critical force as a universal 
theme. In fact, those apply this category often violate 
Habermasorigin intent and give it normative, universal 
values so as to further the critical contemporary implic-
ations of his work. 
Moreover, it was class-specific, a creation of the 
bourgeoisie class which was then in the process of imposing 
its liberal ideology on the culture as a whole. But the 
social ascendance of the bourgeoisie made this notion a 
13. Habermas 1989: xvii. 
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valid representation of its particular time and place. In 
its emergent period: 
the liberal model sufficiently approximated 
reality so that the interest of the bourgeois 
class could be identified with the general 
interest and the third estate could be set up as 
the nation -- during that phase of capitalism, 
the public sphere as the organizational principle 
of the bourgeois constitutional state had credibility • 14 
By public sphere, Habermas refers to: 
a sphere which mediates between society and 
state, in which the public organizes itself as 
the bearer or public opinion, accords with the 
principle of the public sphere^^-- that principle 
of public information which once had to be fought 
for against the arcane policies of monarchies and 
which since that time has made possible the demo-
cratic control of state activities. ^^ 
In this realm, the citizens ( or bourgeoisie) can "confer 
in an unrestricted fashion -- that is, with the guarantee 
of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to 
express and publish their opinions about matters of 
general interest"•口 The matters they discuss are objects 
connected to activity of the state, and the debates 
proceeds in accordance with the standards of critical 
reason and not by simply appeal to traditional dogmas and 
authorities. The procedures and presuppositions of free 
14. Habermas 1989: 87. 
15 The principle of public sphere includes: a) 
elimination of all privileges; b) presupposed the 
problematization of areas that until then had not been 
Questioned; c) general accessibility and d) rational 
argument was the sole arbiter of any issue. See Habermas 
1989： 3 6 - 7 . 
16. Habermas 1974: 50. 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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argument are the basis for the justification of opinions. 
It is these conditions of argument that lend public opinion 
its legitimizing power and the exercise of political 
control by state authority is effectively subordinated to 
its demand. Then the political public sphere is said to be 
institutionally guaranteed. 
In a detailed historical account, Habermas traces the 
emergence of public sphere from a wide variety of struc-
turally change since the sixteenth century. It developed 
alongside the rise and transformation of the modern state, 
as well as on the basis of capitalist economic activity. 
Economically, there was a qualitative increase in the 
volume of trade, especially the long-distance trade, which 
increasingly commoditized the Western European economy. 
Along with this arose the new, larger scale economic insti-
tutions of ,finance and trade capitalism� such as modern 
banks, joint-stock enterprises and stock exchanges. This 
broke with the traditional family firm and caused the 
‘intimate sphere' of the bourgeois household divorced from 
a more public, extra-familial economic life. 
Long-distance trade also meant merchants needed imme-
diate information about prices and demand, but the original 
newsletters that supplied those needs very quickly began to 
carry other sorts of information as well. This helped to 
engender both a more widespread literacy and an approach to 
9 
the printed word as a source of public information. 
Socially and culturally, a variety of new institutions 
arose to serve the needs of this new commercial public. 
These included coffee houses, salons, theatres, literary 
societies and public libraries. The printed word also 
expanded into the novel and other new genres of popular 
literature, journals of popular taste offering art and 
literary criticism and social commentary, and above all, 
the daily press. Altogether, these composed institutions 
of sociability and discourse and a civil society was so 
developed as the genuine domain of private autonomy which 
stand apart from the state, with the capitalist market 
economics formed its basis. 
On the side of government, these changes were matched 
by a rapid expansion of the state apparatus and an accom-
panying separation of this apparatus from the person and 
household of the ruler. The development of the state 
bureaucracies as agents of permanent administration, 
buttressed by standing armies, created a new sphere of 
public authority which asserted their independence from the 
privatized sphere of the princely court. This cost of 
modern state formation was met by a range of policies which 
penetrated and regulated the economy to an unprecedented 
degree, justified under the state's increasingly advanced 
claim to guardianship of the public welfare. The zone in 
which public authority maintained contact with private 
10 
people thus became problematic. 
To represent the newly conceptualized interests of 
civil society over and against this expanding state 
apparatus, the bourgeoisie gradually came, through its new 
media for articulation and discussion, to postulate the 
existence of a 'public' or public opinion, as the abstract 
counterpart of public authority. 
Because, on the one hand, the society now con-
fronting the state clearly separated a private 
domain from public authority and because, on the 
other hand, it turned the reproduction of life 
into something transcending the confines of 
private domestic authority and becoming a subject 
of public interest, that zone of continuous 
administrative contact became 'critical' also in 
the sense that it provoked the critical judgement 
of a public making use of its reason.^^ 
In order to institutionalize such practice of 
rational-critical discourse on political matters, the 
bourgeois claimed for the right to engage in free debate 
with public authority and even the right to regulate the 
authority from above. In practical terms, this resulted in 
the successive passage of anti-censorship laws and other 
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties. 工deolo-
gically, as seen in the work of enlightenment thinkers, 
these claims were justified by the postulation of ,natural 
l a w� Therefore, "the constitutional state as a bourgeois 
state established the public sphere in the political realm 
as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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the connection between law and public opinion. 
The second half of Habermas's book is devoted to 
discussion of the structural transformation, that is the 
process of which the public sphere after the eighteenth 
century was gradually degenerated so that today it remains 
only empty content and lacks any critical substance. 
Haberitias proceeds this transformation along two lines. 
The first is sprang from the internal contradiction of the 
public sphere or the transformation by 'massification'• A 
public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends upon 
both quality of discourse and quantity of participation. 
Although entitled as 'public� the public sphere was 
actually class-based. Education and property ownership 
were its two criteria for admission. These qualifications 
defined only the full capable and autonomous person 
competent to enter into the rational-critical discourse 
about the general interest. This ensured the quality of 
discourse but attributed the public sphere with some nature 
of elitism. 
However, "the public sphere of civil society stood or 
fell with the principle of universal access. A public 
sphere which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was 
less than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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a l l A c c o r d i n g l y , through continued expansion of 
literacy, education and the franchise, the public sphere 
included more and more participants. This principle of 
inclusivity inevitably brought degeneration in the quality 
of discourse. But Habermas "contends that both the 
requirements of democracy and the nature of contemporary 
large-scale organization mean that it is impossible to 
progress today by going back to an elitist public 
sphere. "21 
The second reason for the structural transformation of 
public sphere is resulted from a process of both societal 
change and state change. This leads to a kind of 
'refeudalization' of the public sphere. "The model of the 
bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separation of 
the public from the private realm in such a way that the 
public sphere, made up of private people gathered together 
as a public and articulating the needs of society with the 
state, was itself considered part of the private realm."22 
However, with the coining of the welfare state and of 
mass society and advertising, the public sphere underwent 
a structural transformation. State and society inter-
penetrated, blurring the lines between the public and 
private realms. Hence: 
20. Habermas 1989: 85. 
21. Calhoun 1992a: 3. 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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state intervention in the sphere of society found 
its counterpart in the transfer of public 
functions to private corporate bodies. Likewise, 
the opposite process of a substitution of state 
authority by the power of society was connected 
to the extension of public authority over sectors 
of the private realm. Only this dialectic of a 
progressive 'societalization' of the state sim-
ultaneously with an increasing ,state—ification, 
of society gradually destroyed the basis of the 
bourgeois public sphere — the separation of 
state and society. Between the two and out of 
the two, as it were, a repoliticized social 
sphere emerged to which the distinction between 
'public' and 'private' could not be usefully 
applied .23 
The press gradually became less and less involved in 
political struggles: journalism altered from an occupation 
motivated by conviction to one stimulated primarily by 
commerce. This general commercialization of the media led 
to its evolution into corporate-owned, all-powerful molders 
of bogus 'public opinion'. Accompany with the development 
of advertising as a manipulator of consumer culture and the 
sharper of a bogus ,public taste� these resulted in 
replacing the shared, critical activity of public discourse 
by a more passive culture consumption on the one hand and 
an apolitical sociability on the other. 
Meanwhile, the development of highly organized 
interest-group politics fragments the public and so the 
notion of an objective general interest was replaced by one 
of a fairly negotiated compromise among interests. The 
functioning of the public sphere thus shifted from 
rational-critical debate to negotiation. "The process of 
22. Habermas 1989: 175-6. 
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the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of 
power now takes place directly between the private bureau-
cracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public 
administration. The public as such is included only 
sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is 
brought in only to contribute its acclamation. "24 
Moreover, the interest groups in civil society used 
the public sphere to demand the services or protection from 
the state. In other words, attempts were made to transfer 
to a political level those conflicts, for example, between 
workers and employers, that were not resolvable in the 
private sphere alone. This process marked the beginning of 
the movement toward the welfare state. As an increasing 
intervention of the state into the daily life of the popu-
lation, demarcations such as public and private, state and 
society, have become increasingly meaningless. 
Following these depoliticization of the public sphere 
and its impoverishment by removal of critical discourse: 
the golden age of active 'criticism' carried out 
by a public sphere of enlightened citizens has 
passed; in this context, Habermas and his 
Frankfurt School colleagues have taken up the 
crusade to keep the critical spirit alive. 
C. Criticism on Habermasconcept 
From the title of his book, we know that the primary 
24. Habermas 1989: 176. 
25. Rowe 1990: 314. 
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concern of Habermas is on the problems of the structural 
transformation of the public sphere in advanced capitalist 
societies, while in the first half of the book he recovers 
a valuable ideal from the classical bourgeois public sphere 
in which the element of truth and emancipatory potential 
that it contained provided a solution to the crises in 
advanced capitalism. His critique of mass culture and 
extensive state intervention led to the degeneration of 
public sphere actually echoes the works of the Frankfurt 
School's members. Moreover, renewal of public sphere 
becomes his life-long preoccupation. But he shifted his 
attention from the historically specific institutional 
construction of a public sphere as the basis for democratic 
political practice to the reliance on a transhistorical 
capacity of human communication that stresses the 
potentials implicit in all speech• This is the main focus 
of his prominent two-volume works: The Theory of 
Communicative Action. Thus Habermas's work has changed 
more in strategy than in overall goal • 26 
Of course, Habermas's category of public sphere 
received quite a number of -critiques and these critiques 
are mainly proceeded along two lines. The first involved 
problems of underdevelopment or omission of certain signi-
ficant issues or elements in his account of the public 
sphere. For example, Habermas posited the existence of 
"the plebeian public sphere" as opposed to "the liberal 
气 See Calhoun 1992a: 29-33. 
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model" of the bourgeois public sphere, is hinting at a 
typology of public sphere. He suggests that plebeian 
public sphere was not only derivative but also "a variant 
suppressed in the historical process"27 and so he 
does not pay attention to it. Then this was accused by 
some commentators as •丨 a failure to describe adequately the 
full field of force impinging on the bourgeois public 
sphere."28 The feminist critique shows that Habermas 
failed to incorporate the element of 'gender' in the public 
sphere as this will lead to the whole rethinking of the 
boundary between public and private. ^^ The remarkable 
absence of nationalism from Habermasdiscussion of the 
public sphere reflects his inattention to national or other 
cultural specificity.30 Habermasneglect of social move-
ments which are important to reorienting the agenda of 
public discourse and democratic politics also reflects his 
inattention to the struggles by which both the public 
sphere and its participants actively made and remade. ^^  
These numerous weaknesses inherited in the account of 
public sphere are in different extent responded by Habermas 
and he also gives a modified theoretical framework to try 
to incorporate these significant issues.^ ^ 
27. Habermas 1989: xviii 
28. Calhoun 1992a: 39. 
29. For more detail, see Ryan 1992. 
气 For more detail, see Eley 1992. 
31. For more detail, see Postone 1992 and Eley 1992. 
32. See Habermas 1992. 
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The second line of critique, which is more serious, is 
to what extent Habermas discusses theoretical ideals versus 
practical actualities of the bourgeois public sphere. This 
is clearly important as a matter of historical description. 
For example, Philip Kuhn comments that: "'Public sphere' 
for Habermas is like ,Protestant Ethics, for Weber: it is 
a social philosopher's ideal type, not a social historian's 
description of r e a l i t y . "33 This is sprang from the ambi-
guity inherited in Habermastendency to use the category 
'public sphere' as both a description of historical reality 
and a normative ideal. It also leads to the problem that 
whether the category should be taken as a historically 
specific theme to guide historical research or as a norm-
ative, critical and universe theme for criticism of contem-
porary politics. Because of these confusions and other 
complex baggage that comes with this term, some scholars 
even advocate to reject its further use and propose others 
more value-neutral categories such as the "third realm" a 
However, in our view, in comparison with the confusion 
and ambiguous bear by the concept of civil society, this 
category of public sphere is nevertheless more concrete and 
coherent in meanings, as we will elaborate below. More-
over, the role of sociologists, especially the historical 
sociologists, is to typologize actual historical experi-
ences into models or the so-called ideal-types and adopted 
Kuhn 1992: 81. 
For example, see Huang 1993. 
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as abstract standards against which contemporary society or 
even society in various culture can be judged. For 
instance, even some historians are painstakingly showing 
that there is no any affinity between the Protestant ethics 
and the rise of capitalism in Europe, it is still not 
hindered some sociologists in adopting Weber's Protestant 
Ethics thesis as an analytic and comparative model to 
investigate the economic success of East Asian. Actually, 
in developing the political functions of the public sphere, 
Habermas claims that Britain serves as the model case while 
France and German only serves as the continental 
variantsTherefore, we can view Habermas's work as a 
historical reconstruction of normative ideal: 
for this not only enables his recovery of the 
ideal from flawed material practice, it enables 
the identification of the social foundations on 
which the ideal can be partially realized (and 
whose change must mean the structural trans-
formation of the public sphere) 
Then, why do we prefer using the term 'public sphere' 
instead of 'civil society' to address the problem of 
democratic development? Apart from its decidedly con-
trasting usages in the European tradition of political 
philosophers, civil society generally refers to an arena of 
independent, autonomous associational activity, free from 
state interference and even counterpose to the state. It 
is usually rooted in business, educational institutions and 
the media. But the problem is that: through what mechanism 
See Habermas 1989: 57-73. 
36. Calhoun 1992a: 39-40. 
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this independent associational activity can uphold their 
cieinands against the state? Or what is the relationship 
between these autonomous institutions or activities and the 
democratic development of a society? This is the gap 
usually inherited in the concept of civil society. This 
gap can be filled by the concept of public sphere in some 
extent: 
Indeed, the importance of the concept of public 
，ghere is largely to go beyond general appeals to 
the nature of civil society in attempts to 
explain the social foundations of democracy, and 
yo introduce a discussion of the specific organ-
ization within civil society of social and 
cultural bases for the development of an 
effective rational-critical discourse aimed at 
the resolution of political disputes. 
In fact, the concept of public sphere incorporates 
civil society as its important element and go beyond this 
to consider the relationship between patterns of social 
organizations or societal integration and the emergence of 
a certain kind of discourse and political participation, 
based on rational-critical arguments rather than the 
statuses of actors. This is done by the expansion of the 
public realm of life in which the citizens or bourgeoisie 
can assert their civic power in checking state power. In 
this way, the shifting state-societal relationships in 
times of fundamental reorientations in both can be under-
stood in term of a space or realm in between state and 
society in where the simultaneous influence of both can be 
acknowledging instead of reducing to any zero-sum game. 
37, Calhoun 1992b: 2. 
20 
Although its development is depended on both societal and 
state actions, it has distinct characteristics and its own 
logic of operation over and above the influence of state 
and society which cannot be collapsed into either or 
both .38 
D. Public sphere in recent historiography of china 
In the past decade, Western historians of modern China 
have become increasingly attractive to the concept of 
,public sphere' as an useful analytic tool to understand 
state-societal relationship of China during the late Qing 
and early Republican periods. Among them, the prominent 
works are Mary Backus Rankin's book on late imperial 
Zhejiang, William T. Rowe's book on late imperial Hankou 
and David Strand's book on Beijing in the 1920s.^ ^ 
In Mary Backus Rankin's book. Elite Activism and 
Political Transformation in China, public sphere: 
refers more specifically to the institution-
alized, extra-bureaucratic management of matters 
considered important by both the community and 
the state. Public management by elites thus 
contrasted with official administration (guan), 
and with private (si) activities of individuals, 
families, religions, business, and organizations 
that were not identified with the whole community • 40 
She points out that this sphere of community-centred, 
extra-bureaucratic elite activism grew during the mid-Qing, 
气 See Huang 1993: 223-6. 
39. Rankin 1986; Rowe 1989 and Strand 1989. 
40. Rankin 1986: 15. 
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existed between the sphere of government's activities and 
an expanded sub-bureaucracy of clerks and runners. it 
focused initially upon local services such as water 
control, educational, welfare and relief activities. But 
it experienced tremendous expansion and assumed new 
dimensions in the post-Taiping period of reconstruction, in 
which elite activists accumulated organizational experience 
and network resources linking local, provincial and region 
structures. This locally based activism became a potential 
political threat when the elites became dissatisfy with the 
management of affairs by the official sphere (guan), 
especially in the area of foreign relations. A patriot 
political consciousness increasingly linked local and 
national issues. This resulted in the 1911 Revolution 
which overthrew the imperial system. 
William T. Rowe‘ s book on Hankou focuses on an area 
more strictly urban and less coastal than Rankin's Zhejiang 
during the same late Qing period: 
The nineteenth century in Hankow saw the gradual 
expansion, in the area of urban services as well 
as of social welfare, of what may be termed an 
extra-bureaucratic 'civic, or 'public, sphere. 
To a certain extent this was the result of the 
cyclical and secular withdrawal of direct state 
initiative in the provision of social needs； to 
a greater degree it was simply that, faced with 
the newly identified needs of a large densely 
populated, and socially complex urban metropolis, 
societal forces responded more adroitly than did 
bureaucratic ones/i 
The proliferation of a wide range of philanthropic and 
4� Rowe 1989: 183. 22 
public-service institutions led to an incipient urban 
autonomy. This resulted in the steady development of 
organized, corporate-style civic action and accompanied by 
an increasing politicization of the guardians of this 
expanding public sphere. 
The common thread in these two works is that the 
public sphere refers to that realm of essentially local 
community-centred activities, without governmental super-
vision, requiring the cooperation and coordination of 
private individuals and groups for their accomplishment: 
areas of extra-bureaucratic community interests, "in which 
consensual decisions were articulated by community leaders 
and services were managed by local inen"42 it grew tremend-
ously during the post-Taiping reconstruction period. How-
ever, this notion of extra-bureaucratic apolitical public 
activity of local elites is strictly incompatible with 
Habermasmeaning of an arena of political debate and 
political action. Moreover, their notion of public sphere 
"is completely local in operation -- consisting in such 
activities as the charitable and public works provisions of 
local elites and clan organizations. It bypasses or treats 
as puzzling Habermas,s insistence on orientation to the 
state."43 The development of these civil public associ-
ations actually supplemented the inadequate administrative 
capacity of the bureaucracy, but little in the way of 
42. Rankin 1986: 15. 
Calhoun 1992b: 11. 
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assertion of civic power against the state. Therefore what 
they portrayed are not the Chinese variety of public 
sphere 广 but in fact are not the public sphere in 
Habermas‘s sense at all. This can be illustrated in the 
following two comments: 
When we substitute segmented and largely usual 
local communities for Habermasintegrated and 
urban public sphere, as Rankin tries to do, just 
what is left of the concept of public sphere to 
warrant retention of the term?*; 
Indeed, it might be expected that Habermas would 
view the expanding application of ^public/'gong' 
to managerial or proprietary concerns ( in the 
sense of 'public utilities') as not only 
extraneous, but injurious to the proper develop-
ment of the public sphere, diluting it and 
robbing it of its normative-critical punch.^^ 
David Strand's book, Rickshaw Beijing, discusses the 
expansion of the public sphere in a major urban centre, 
Beijing, in the 1920s and is more strictly attached to 
Habermasnotion of public sphere: 
This new political arena or public sphere was a 
synthesis of old and new practices and attitudes. 
The high value tradition placed on the public 
realm (gong) of gentry and merchant leadership 
reinforced the modern notion of public opinion as 
a vastly expanded sphere of discussion and debate 
In China the dependence of gentry and 
merchant opinion on political power (guan) was 
loosed during the late Qing and then broken under 
the Republic. Urban elites never gathered the 
strength and the will to support a fully auto-
nomous public sphere. But the trembling of the 
state in the 1920s, the weak legitimacy of 
private interests (si), and the positive moral 
and political evolution of gong as a zone of 
discussion and concern encouraged newspaper 
See Rankin 1993. 
Huang 1993: 222. 
Rowe 1990: 324. 
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editors, new and old civic leaders and ordinary 
citizens to improvise tactics and strategies for 
expressing political views in public. Thus 
constituted, city politics took on a life and 
logic of its own as opportunities to engage in 
political discussion and action expanded/? 
His work concentrated primarily to concrete des-
cription of institutional framework for this new emerging 
public sphere ( the press, the chamber of commerce, 
citizens' groups, places for public discussion), of the 
variety of public activities performed by the citizens, and 
of the various local and national political events ( such 
as the May Thirtieth Movement) which catalyzed and legiti-
mated citizens' actions. However, during that warlord era, 
Beijing was a governmentless or government-poor city. 
"While governmental institutions trembled and fell, local 
elites and the organizations they captained strove to 
cushion the impact of invading armies and collapsing 
regimes."48 since a strong, centralized state was absence, 
Beijing politics could be characterised as a form of ad hoc 
and informal elite representation. Instead of performing 
the function of assertion of civic power against the state, 
this elite representation was on the contrast became the 
target of attack by others unrepresented or under-
represented strata, such as students, workers and women, in 
order to win a modicum of power for themselves. As a 
result, the public sphere represented by the elite was not 
functioned in the way as portrayed by Habermas. 
47. strand 1989: 168. 
strand 1989: 18. 
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It should be clear from the above discussions that, 
while some brand-new types of public activities and 
institutions had emerged in modern China, but whether these 
could be characterized as the public sphere in Habermas 
sense remain puzzled. This haziness is, of course, in part 
a reflection of the difficulty in applying a Western 
concept with historically specific meanings in the very 
different Chinese historical contexts. Despite this 
ambiguity, we still insist that the concept of public 
sphere is a useful tool to analyze the shifting state-
societal relationship in a non-Western setting, so as to 
examine for any indication of coining democracy and its 
failure. 
E. The Conceptual Framework of this study 
In order to avoid wrenching the concept from its 
theoretical context, we recognize that the complete 
discourse of public sphere should address the following 
seven basic issues: 
1)What contributes to the rise of self-regulating markets? 
2)What knits society together, or provides for integration? 
3)What counts as self-conscious social actors and identity 
formation? 
4) How do the processes of modern state-making bear upon the 
society? 
5)What composes the institutional bases of the public 
sphere? 
6)To what extent can the opinions guiding political action 
» 
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be formed on the basis of rational-critical discourse? 
7)What structural factors led to the transformation or 
degeneration of public sphere? 
The first three questions actually refers to the 
formation of civil society. In here, we adopt Charles 
Taylor's second definition of civil society: 
In a stronger sense, civil society exists only 
where society as a whole can structure itself and 
co-ordinate its actions through such associations 
which are free of state tutelage/^ 
A public sphere cannot exist in traditional society where 
there was only a single united authority and lordship was 
represented "not for but 'before' the people. "5� A 
successful public sphere depends on a favourable organiz-
ation of society which can organize itself independent of 
the specific direction of state power. Such capacity 
mainly come from the rise of self-regulating markets. 
"Whether or not free markets are necessary to political 
freedom, the crucial early contribution of markets to the 
idea of civil society was a demonstration of the poss-
ibility of self-organization. Markets showed that the 
activity of ordinary people could regulate itself without 
the intervention of government • "51 
Apart from economic organizations and relations, the 
49. Taylor 1990: 98. 
50. Habermas 1989: 8. 
Calhoun 1992b: 4-5• 
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self-regulating markets also led to the formation of a 
variety of social organizations which provide for social 
integration of people, rather than exist merely as 
�aggregate of subjects. This also paths the way for a 
degree of autonomous or voluntary social involvement. But 
any appeal to autonomous or voluntary social action depends 
on the existence of self-conscious social actors and some 
account must be given on how such actors are formed and 
sustained. For instance, Habermas‘s account of the avail-
ability of free actors for participation in the public 
sphere turns on the development of a 'private, realm that 
provides individuals with the identity and support to 
constitute such free actors.52 The above elements compose 
what Habermas come to call the public sphere of civil 
society. 
The fourth question addresses the effect of modern 
state formation on the society, so as to create the 
"tension-charged field between state and society". 
Although most Western historians of modern China seem to 
have assumed that the expansion of the public sphere in the 
late imperial era occurred in the space provided by the 
withdrawal of the formal state apparatus, it is worth 
noting that in Habermas,s model of European development, 
the public sphere was expanding at the same time that state 
was undergoing its first phase of rapid modern growth. 
Thus both state and society worked together to define the 
52. Calhoun 1992b: 6, see also Habermas 1989: 43-51. 
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content and boundary of the public sphere. 
The fifth and sixth questions deal with the structure 
’ of public sphere as formed by the interaction between the 
civil society and the modern state. For a public sphere to 
manifest its political function, some institutional 
structure must present as forum for public discourse. In 
Habermas‘s model, these included coffee houses in British, 
salon in France and table societies in germany. These 
public institutions played a crucial role in bridging the 
private realm with the emergent bourgeois political public 
sphere. Therefore, private people came together as a 
public and public's rational-critical debate of political 
matters could take place with public opinions formed. 
But one of the main problem is how to judge whether 
the opinion was formed on the basis of rational-critical 
discourse. This can be proceeded through analyzing its 
content ( whether it is based on a legitimizing idea of 
common good) , the way the public arriving at their 
consensus ( general accessible and setting aside status 
differences) and its impact on state's action or policy. 
The final question addresses the mechanism led to the 
structural transformation of the public sphere, so that it 
became an empty shell deprived of its rational content. 
Most literature on China which we have reviewed neglect 
this aspect in favour of the more attractive process of 
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public sphere's formation and expansion. But for a 
complete discourse on public sphere, this aspect is 
indispensable. 
F. Justification of this study 
Then why do we think that Habermas ‘ s concept of public 
sphere can be applied to the study of changes in state-
societal relationships in Shanghai during the late imperial 
era? 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
oppositionist political movements arose with remarkable 
strength and rapidity. These developments led to the 1911 
Revolution against the Qing Dynasty and ended the imperial 
state in China. Most past literature devoted their 
attention to the activities of revolutionaries and regarded 
the successful revolution as the result of their strenuous 
efforts. However, some recent historians are now turning 
their attention to two interlocking themes: state-building 
and social mobilization that started from the second half 
of the nineteenth century.^^ Thus the politics of the last 
Qing decade and also the 1911 Revolution can be viewed as 
the clashes between the continuing mobilization of some 
reformist elites and a new attempt at aggressive state-
building by the Qing government. A closer look at the 
political movements in the last Qing decade also revealed 
that some new types of political contestations and rela-
53, For example Esherick 1976; Rankin 1986. 
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tionships had started emerge. These ranged from boycott, 
political demonstration and expressing political opinions 
in new media. Violence was no longer the only mean of 
�confrontation to the government. The centre of activities 
also shifted to some new urban centres which became 
prominent only after the commercial expansion in the late 
imperial period. The actors were the merchants, reform-
minded gentry-scholars and new intellectuals whom could be 
regarded as proto-bourgeoisie. Their initiative in action 
was the demands for political participation and represent-
ation in order to direct national policy since the 
government failed to repulse the Western invaders. All 
these incidents indicated the existence of a public sphere 
with similar nature to Habermasmodel in Europe. 
Actually, the social mobilization and state-building 
that resulted in new state-societal relationships were 
sprang from responses to both foreign challenges and 
domestic rebellions in the nineteenth century. Apart from 
military invasions, Western imperialism also introduced new 
commercial firms, organizations and technology. These 
brought about parts of the Chinese economy tying to 
Western-dominated international markets, stimulated a 
number of social changes and provided examples of news 
kinds of political institutions and relationships. The 
prominent impact was the progressive commercialization and 
urbanization of some tradition social elites. A new class 
formed by the fusion of merchants and gentry thus emerged 
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which was more cosmopolitan oriented and reform-minded. 
Another consequence was the proliferation of native place 
associations and trade guilds in the cities that increased 
�the organizational capacity within existing elite society• 
The Taiping Rebellion brought a decisive shift in the 
state-societal relationship. The post-rebellion recons-
truction fostered a permanent expansion of elite-managed, 
semi-governmental local activities. This helped to expand 
elite's roles and power in public affairs and stimulated 
their initiatives of mobilization. 
Meanwhile the Qing government also launched a number 
of reform programmes to cope with these challenges. The 
"Self-Strengthen" or "Western Affairs" Movement represented 
their initial attempts ^  but failed because of immense 
official corruption and lacking resources to implement 
their plans. This was followed by a more sweeping reform 
known as the New Policies at the beginning of this century 
which was similar to state-making in early modern Europe. 
It aimed at mobilizing societal forces to support the 
reform through the establishment of numerous new institu-
tions to utilize their energies. Public arena and 
political power of the social elite expanded rapidly during 
this period and a public sphere was asserted to be formed. 
But the different aspirations between the central officials 
and the social elites resulted in intense state-societal 
conflict took place in the public sphere and the apolitical 
32 
elite activism changed to a politicized challenge to the 
government. The elite became lost confidence to the 
legitimacy of the political system that led to their 
�cooperation with the revolutionaries and overthrew the 
regime. 
Investigations of how Chinese elite organized 
activities outside the governmental structure, mobilized a 
following, demanded a constitutional government and finally 
took action against the Qing state actually lend into 
questions of incipient democratic development in China. 
The vigour and talent manifested in their political 
behaviours challenge that it may be too early to say 
whether Chinese traditions yield less readily to demo-
cratization than those of the West did. Therefore, how the 
process took place and why it finally degenerated into a 
failure attempt are worth exploring on a solid ground. 
6. Why Shanghai? 
In the following chapters we will trace these 
developments in Shanghai only. It is not because Shanghai 
was a typical case among other Chinese cities, but because 
of its special characteristics that made the public sphere 
in there developed with the fullest sense, as Britain 
served Habermas as the model case of the development of the 
public sphere in Europe. 
Firstly, although Shanghai's history as commercial 
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city could be traced back to the thirteenth century, it was 
only after the imperialist encroachment, brought with 
foreign trade, that Shanghai experienced a dramatic change 
� i n social structure and organizations. So, it only started 
a new life since it became a treaty port. Compare with 
Canton, Shanghai's history in foreign trade was much 
shorter. But since Shanghai was an immigrant city, it was 
inore tolerable and even eager to learn new culture and 
habit, plus with the presence of foreign settlements as 
both institutional model and as safety enclave, the full 
force of foreign influence could be manifested in there. 
Secondly, the military and administrative situations 
in Shanghai had special features. Compare with the capital 
Beijing or other provincial capitals such as Naijing, the 
hand of the central administration seemed overly weak in 
Shanghai. In fact, according to Skinner's conceptualiz-
ation of central-place hierarchy, Shanghai "occupied a 
position in the marketing hierarchy far higher than it held 
in the administrative hierarchy.Therefore, influence 
arising from trade did not have to compete seriously with 
military power and administrative control. The vigorous 
elite of Shanghai had a freer hand than their counterparts 
elsewhere. 
This study basically covers the periods from 1843 to 
1914. We choose to begin from 1843 because Shanghai was 
See Rowe 1984: 9. 
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formally opening up as a treaty port in that year and 
started its new life. This study ends with the suppression 
of local representative institutions by Yuan Shikai in 
�1914, marked the end of an exceptional experience of 
elite's democracy and they became retreated from the 
political forum.^ ^ 
The following chapters will proceed in according with 
the conceptual framework laid in the previous section. 
Chapter two will deal with the issue of how the rise of 
foreign trade contributed to the formation of a civil 
society in Shanghai. In chapter three we will address how 
some local organizations and activities helped to integrate 
the society into a community with the formation of an 
identity as "Shanghai citizen". Chapter four will deal 
with the impact of the "New Policies" on Shanghai society, 
and also how the institutional bases and actors of the 
public sphere could be formed as a result. In chapter five 
and six, we chose two societal- and even nationally-wide 
mobilizations to illustrate the structure and character-
istics of the public sphere: one was the anti-American 
Boycott in 1905 against the foreign imperialism, another 
one was the constitutional movement in 1910 against the 
Qing state. Chapter seven will show how the 1911 
Revolution led to both the golden age and the end of the 
public sphere simultaneously. The conclusion in chapter 
55. More detail will be elaborated on this point in 
Chapter Seven. 
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eight will discuss briefly the structural factors led to 
the early closure of the public sphere in Shanghai. 
H. A Methodological Note 
This study is based primarily on secondary sources of 
material, instead of primary research into historical 
documents. It is because our aim is to apply a Western 
concept of public sphere in Chinese context where trans-
formations in state-societal relationships are examined for 
any insight of democratic development, instead of reevalu-
ating the nature of some eminent historical events such as 
the Self-Strengthen Movement or the 1911 Revolution. 
Moreover, Shanghai had been the economic, political 
and even cultural centre in modern China. Its pivot role 
had attracted attentions of both Chinese and Western 
scholars. Rhoad Murphey, Mark Elvin and Marie-Claire 
Bergere are the eminent Western representatives, though 
with different concerns. In recent decade, the Chinese 
government adopts open-door policy and economic reforms. 
Shanghai's past successful experience became a model to 
learn about and so the Chinese historians devoted much 
attention to the study of history of Shanghai, instead of 
despising it as a typical "parasitic city" only. Two 
fruitful works, with over one-thousand pages respectively, 
have been published recently.^' Along with other 
气 These are Tang Zhencheng 1989 and Zhang Zhongli 
1990. 
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“ specializing studies in various topics, these historical 
literatures compose reliable secondary sources for further 
investigation. 
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Chapter Two. Shanghai: Citv and Ppnplp 
A. Shanghai Before the Arrival of Foreigners 
Shanghai was not a cluster of remote villages even 
before its' opening up as a treaty port by the Western 
power in 1843. It's proximity to the Yangtze River and 
open sea, together with the presence of extensive water 
routes, provide favourable condition to develop into a 
flourishing market town. The elevation of Shanghai to the 
level of county at the end of the thirteenth century 
reflected its significance as a port of commerce in inland 
as well as coastal trade.^ 
The saline nature of soil (because of its closeness to 
sea) made it more suitable to produce cash crops, especi-
ally cotton, instead of others agricultural foodstuffs. 
A 
The proliferation of cotton led to the development of 
cottage industry of cotton textiles (spinning and weaving) 
as the populace sought to supplement their income by making 
and selling handicrafts. With a efficient system of 
waterways, the transportation of foodstuffs to Shanghai 
area and carried away cotton textiles made in there, 
resulted in merchants accumulated huge of wealth. Most of 
merchants were not local in origin and came from various 
provinces, especially from Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong. 
See Tang Zhenchang 1989: 30-40• 
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These could be evidenced from the thriving native place 
associations in Shanghai, with the eldest one (Guan 
Shandong Gongsuo 丄象么所）could be traced back to the 
seventeenth century.2 In this aspect, Shanghai was 
composed of a large portion of immigrants, even before the 
arrival of foreigners. 
In the interpretation of modern Western civilization, 
the city has became the fount of many of the most admired 
forms of changes, especially the development of capitalism 
and the locus for the newly dominant class of bourgeoisie. 
Historians frequently evoke Western urban life as being 
critical to the evolution of modern nation-state, the 
elaboration of modern culture and the definition of modern 
conception of the individual 
In contrary, Chinese cities have been accused of 
failure to achieve the role as its Western counterpart, and 
so led to China's bumpy road toward modernization. This is 
the typical Weberian account. It includes: the city in 
China has had a strong association with political authority 
than with commerce, served important political and adminis-
trative functions through the imperial officials and their 
staffs who operated from the city. "According to this 
view, urban places in China had failed to perform the 
catalytic function necessary to bring about the sorts of 
2. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 512. 
3. Buck 1988: 563. 
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social, economic, and political change that had transformed 
the West since medieval times"* and provided the basis for 
a tradition of urban autonomy from established political 
authority. 
Weber,s notion of the nature of Chinese cities 
immensely influenced scholars in the fields of Chinese 
history and social science from the 1920through the 
1 9 6 0 T h e n a new generation of scholars began to 
criticize the cultural self—satisfaction and other 
conceptual problems of these model, grounded on empirical 
research.5 Their main argument is that: Chinese cities, 
especially in late imperial era, could be adequately 
defined as centre of changes and the sense of "urban 
passivity" is no longer acceptable. 
It is not our main focus to address this debate in 
here, but only want to propose that one of Weber ian 
models's problem is its insensitive to differentiation of 
possible specialization among types of Chinese cities. The 
major commercial revolution of the Sung Dynasty led to a 
new type of city for which trade rather than administration 
was its chief function. These economic cities, arose from 
the informal, often periodic markets, were less well 
planned and their morphology displayed the typical sprawl 
of settlement based on convenience and commercial 
4. Rowe 1984: 1. 
5. One of the pathbreaking work is Rowe: 1984• 
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advantage. Such cities were found near transportation 
breakpoints or centres of mineral extraction. The subject 
of the present study, Shanghai, is a well-known example. 
As portrayed by Lynn T. White III, "Shanghai was founded, 
grew, and prospered on the semi-legal and independent 
bases, without planning by any national government•"6 
Shanghai has never been attained any administrative 
function or political significance, in comparison with its 
neighbour, such as Nanjing or Hangzhou, before 1840. It 
was formally governed as a 'large-sized' market town. As 
a result of this bureaucratic neglect, Shanghai before 1840 
was able to attain a substantial degree of urban autonomy. 
Although Shanghai was established as an economic city from 
the beginning, its status in the whole hierarchy of cities 
in imperial China could not be overscored before the nine-
teenth century. At that time, foreign trade was only 
confirmed in Canton in accordance with legal decrees. 
Shanghai's trade was mainly domestic. Its status also 
could not be compared with other cities in same district of 
Jiangnan, such as Hangzhou and Suzhou, which are famous 
commercial and cultural cities even dated back to the Sung 
Dynasty, not to mention Nanjing — the prime imperial 
capital. Then, what is the main reason that Shanghai could 
surpass other cities and treaty ports and becoming the 
leading foreign trade centre , as well as financial, 
industrial and cultural centre in modern China. The 
6. White III 1981: 19. 
41 
presence of foreign settlements might be attributed a lot. 
B. The Political Significance of the Settlements 
The political significance of the foreign settle今ments 
could be revealed in the report of Hon. Mr. Richard 
Feetham, a judge invited by the Shanghai Municipal Council 
in 1927 to appraise the main causes which have led to the 
concentration of business interest in there, so as to weigh 
whether it was appropriate returning to Chinese full sover-
eign rights over the entire city, including the abandonment 
of extra-territoriality. 
The replies from foreign businessmen, as consulted by 
Feetham, were almost unanimous in stressing that the 
political status of the foreign settlements had been the 
only factor of importance in the growth of a c i t y ? Their 
replies might be somewhat biased, but their argument was 
quite convincing. They pointed out that trade and invest-
ment could prosper only under orderly conditions, and that 
the security offered to business by the foreign settlements 
was not only physical but legal, as embodied in courts of 
laws free from political interference. Even the Chinese 
enterprises outside the settlements profited from the 
7. Murphey 1953: 81. 
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special rights of foreigners by sharing the protection of 
foreign troops against threatened attack or occupation of 
these areas by Chinese forces in times of rebellion. Thus, 
the sobriquet "states within the states" could then be 
justified. 
Shanghai was opened as a treaty port by the Treaty of 
Nanjing in 1842. With the arrival of the British Consul 
and the commencement of the foreign trade at the port, many 
important questions remained unresolved. The prominent one 
was that a foreign settlement, with its own facilities of 
all kinds, should be established as quickly as possible. 
Through intense debate and compromise with the local 
Chinese officer (the Circuit Intendent or Daotai遣各），it 
led to an agreement that foreigners, while not permitted to 
buy land because of territorial sovereignty, could nego-
tiate perpetual leases directly with Chinese landowners, 
report them through their consuls, and receive titles 
directly from the Daotai. The foreigners eventually built 
their own community within a specific area of mudflat, 
north of the walled Chinese city and known as the British 
Settlement of Shanghai.8 
Subsequently, the Americans and the French followed 
the precedent created by the British and gained the right 
for their nationals to trade and reside in the treaty port. 
8. White I工工 1981: 21-22. 
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The American Settlement and the French Concession were 
established in 1844. The British and American settlements 
then became incorporated into the International Settlement 
in 1863. So, by 1860s, Shanghai had seen the beginning of 
three communities in its midst. (See Fig. i and Map 1 
below) 
Fig. 1 
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the settlements the Chinese territorial 
I 1 (mainly the walled city) 
International French 
Settlement Concession 
Map 1: The Growth of Shanghai 
(Source: Fairbanks John K. (ed.), 1978. 
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From 1843 to 1853, the settlement areas generally 
excluded Chinese residents except as servants or in service 
trades. Chinese residents in early 1853 were estimated at 
only 500 in there.^ But the mid-nineteenth century rebel-
lions, especially the Taiping rebellion (1850-64) and the 
localized revolt staged by the Small Sword Society (Xiaodao 
in Shanghai in 1853, caused tremendous distur-
bances in South China and the Yangtze Valley, affected the 
direction of Shanghai's growth. Because of the official 
declarations of neutrality by the foreign authorities and 
the foreign military and naval presence in the settlements, 
it led to a flood of refugees seeking protection in there. 
Thousands of homeless Chinese were soon camped along the 
Bund (H'y^) or in boats off the jetties; mat sheds and new 
streets of cheap housing proliferated to accommodate them. 
This greatly altered the character of the settlements, from 
a pure foreign enclave to a hybrid one, and helped to 
integrate the settlements more with the old Chinese city. 
Moreover, the refugees included not only commoners but 
also imperial officials, literally elite and landlords from 
nearby Jiangnan region. The wealth accompanied with them, 
both as investors and consumers, coupled with the abundance 
cheap labour forces provided by the refugees, helped to 
bring about economic blooming in the settlements, 
especially in the real estate sector. Land rent per acre 
9. Zou Yiren 1981: 90. Table one. 
10. Wei 1987: Ch. 4. 
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inflated from fifty pound in 1852 to over ten-thousand 
pounds in 1862.11 And so Westerners who had leased land at 
Shanghai now profited by sub-letting it to Chinese real 
estates operators and builders. Later, as attracted by the 
political security of the settlements, more merchants 
established or transferred their business to safety 
enclave.12 one of the discernible structural change was 
the commercial centre of the Shanghai, then shifted from 
the old Chinese city into the settlement areas. This could 
be shown in the distribution of Chinese native banks (or 
qianzhuang產I在),which played pivot role in providing 
funds for local merchants. Before the opening of Shanghai, 
all these native banks were concentrated in the Chinese 
city, but after the Taiping Rebellion, they were out-
numbered by those situated in the settlements.^^ Thus 
Rhoads Murphey summarized that: 
the security provided by foreign control was an 
important stimulus to economic development at a 
critical time, during the early years of foreign 
settlements when capital began to concentrate 
there 
In addition, the temporary withdrawal of the Chinese 
bureaucratic authority from the city, as occupied by the 
rebels, created an opportunity for the foreigners' 
assumption of the responsibility once performed by the 
11. Dai Angang 1991: 206. 
12. Ding Richu: 1988; 1994: 93-4. 
13. Dai Angang 1991: 208-9. 
14. Murphey 1953: 84. 
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Chinese authorities, for instance, the collection of custom 
duties and the maintenance of local security. After the 
Battle, the foreign community felt that they needed a legal 
entity in order to protect their lives and property. The 
enormous influx of refugees also accumulated all the urban 
ills in the city. Protection against fire and disease and 
maintenance of local order became equally pressing. Agreed 
by the Shanghai Daotai, the Municipal Council, elected by 
ratepayers, was created in 1854. It was in theory sub-
ordinate to the consuls, but "was much like a voluntary 
association or a club"^^ as the consuls seldom gave any 
guidance. In this way, the foreign community gained the 
power to legislate, to tax, and to have its own police 
force. Then the foreign settlements of Shanghai evolved 
into municipalities in China under the control of foreign 
merchants, with authority even over the Chinese 
p o p u l a t i o n . 16 The lost Chinese sovereignty could not be 
resumed again. The settlements was becoming a commercial 
Utopia, with very little control or direction from the 
Chinese or foreign governments. 
Before the Anglo-Chinese War of 1841-2, foreign trade 
was originally confined in Canton, with numerous restric-
tions. Most cramping of them was that requiring all 
foreigners to trade only through the Canton merchants' 
guild (Cohong 态 竹 ） ， a s the principal instrument for 
White 工工工 1981: 23. 
16. Wei 1987: 62-4. 
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controlling the foreigners, as well as the monopoly of 
trade with the foreigners under conditions which yielded 
the Chinese merchants with enormous profits. ^^ 
These foreign merchants, whom uphold the business 
principle of laissez faire, had long been discontented with 
the arbitrary government regulations, dues and fines, 
official and unofficial "squeeze", extortion and illegal 
practices, which are linked in certain extent with the 
monopolised Cohong system. This system still existed in 
veiled form at Canton into the 1850s. Compare with Canton, 
trade at Shanghai was able to develop on a Western pattern 
instead of being regulated by semi-official Chinese mer-
chants . Foreign merchants were now free to deal with any 
Chinese merchant they wished, and could employ their own 
Chinese agents for buying and selling in the h i n t e r l a n d s • ！尽 
This free trade, together with others Western business 
practises, was later offered in legal form: 
which provided entrepreneurs with security of 
investments and freedom from bureaucratic control 
for the first time in the history of C h i n a .19 
C. The Favourable Location of Shanghai 
Since settlements were also established in other 
treaty ports later, we might forecast economic prosperity 
would soon be happened in there, which would compete with 
17. Murphey 1953: 58. 
18. Murphey 1953: 60-3; Zhang Zhongli 1990: 117-8. 




Shanghai. But this was not the picture. 
Then, something other than the presence of settl-
ements' was equally important in determining Shanghai's 
prime role. This is its favourable geographical location. 
Situated at the apex of the lower Yangtze Basin, access-
ible to efficient waterways of the entire Yangtze and to 
the major ocean lanes of world commerce gave Shanghai a 
decisive advantage, since in the mainly pre—industrial 
economy of China, the great majority of goods moving beyond 
local markets by water. But the prominent factor is the 
presence of a good harbour. "The trade of the Yangtze 
basin requires a major outlet to the sea, and Shanghai 
offers the only practicable deep-water harbour near 
the mouth of China's greatest trade highways, the Yangtze 
River."20 of the other major cities of the lower Yangtze 
basin, Hangzhou, Suzhou and Nanjing were all once 
flourished commercial centres and larger than Shanghai 
before the opening of China to foreign trade. However, 
"all three cities have been happened in their modern 
development by the lack of harbours adequate for ocean 
ships"2i and so they were quickly outstripped by Shanghai 
under the new economic conditions. 
Moreover, the trade in tea and silk was the two 
dominant staples of China's export trade until the end of 
20. Murphey 1953: 42. 
21. Murphey 1953: 47. 
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the nineteenth century. The Yangtze River itself runs 
through both the best quality teas and silks producing 
regions, which are the hinterland of Shanghai. Under the 
Cohong system, goods for export from central China were 
obliged to move across country in order to reach the only 
port where foreigners were permitted to trade. Thus the 
transport costs for tea and silk by overland routes were 
inevitably high in comparison with water transport. 
After the opening up of Shanghai, and especially 
after the effective opening of the Yangtze in 1862, it 
allowed this trade to drain by its natural channels to 
Shanghai for export .22 As a result, Shanghai's water 
connection was a vital advantage in securing for it the 
lion's share of foreign trade in these two leading commo-
dities and then successfully surpassed Canton as the 
largest port of external trade since 1860s. In 1870, 
Shanghai took a share of 64% in total amount of foreign 
trade in China, while Canton dropped to only 13%.^ ^ 
Throughout the period we study, commerce, especially the 
foreign trade, was the dynamic or motive force of the city 
life, even though it was also an industrial and financial 
centre later. 
22. Murphey 1953: 100. 
23. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 123. 
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I 
D. Structural Changes 
As we have portrayed the factors contributed to the 
elevation of Shanghai in modern China, we now turn to the 
more rundamental structural changes undergone since it was 
opened up. As stated above, the basic stimulus to these 
changes was the increase in long-distance foreign trade. 
Although Shanghai was a commercial city at the outset, its 
trade was primarily domestic, and only small numbers of 
junks from abroad (for example, Japan and 工ndo-China) .24 
However, the expanded scale of long-distance coitimerce with 
the coining of foreigners, induced basic changes in the 
economic and social structure of the city, as well as in 
nearby areas. 
It led a number of nearby regions to specialize in 
production or plantation of certain goods to meet the 
demands of distant markets. For example, "the coinmeircial 
sale of agricultural goods and the tenancy rate were both 
significantly greater within a twenty- or thirty miles 
radius than elsewhere in the country. There was 
also a degree of satellite urban development in the Yangtze 
delta hinterland of Shanghai: Wuxi ( • 錄 ） ， N a n t o n g ( / | ( 也 ) ， 
and Changzhou ( 津 y六），with an increased commercial and 
light-industrial base. Whereas much of this regionalized' 
export-oriented production actually took place in rural 
setting and satellite towns, such functions as transport 
24. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 100. 
25. Murphey 1974: 57. 
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coordination, processing and capitalization took place in 
the city of Shanghai. 
The number of foreign firms established in settle-
ments, as bases for foreign trade, flourished from 11 in 
1844 to over 200 in 1876.^ ^ This reflected not only an 
increase in the volume of trade or amount of foreigners 
worked and resided in Shanghai, but also a demand for more 
Chinese served for them, both in business and their lives. 
Thus, some new occupations, such as compradors, employees 
of foreign firms, servants or maids of foreigners, families 
emerged. These products of Western contact, especially the 
compradors: 
[They] were indispensable as interinediairies 
between foreign firms and a market where language 
barriers, and the complexity of the monetary 
system, commercial institutions and customs, all 
opposed direct transactions. [The 
compradors] hires and managed the native 
personnel, he was the treasurer, comptroller, 
financial officers, salesman and market 
researcher, and he assisted his foreign 
colleagues in all their dealings with the 
Chinese .27 
Their importance lay not only on their person wealth, which 
elevated their social position, but also on their life 
style and mentality. Because they were in such close 
contact with foreigners, they gradually abandoned 
traditional values and to define the notions of profit and 
economic development. In some cases, such as Zheng 
Guanying (鈔f^J^ ' they were also able to become advocates 
26. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 127. 
27. Bastid-Bruguiere 1980: 550. 
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of institutional reform.^^ 
Traditional Chinese occupational structure also 
undergone changes. Many wholesale merchants, shifted their 
nature of business, acted as brokers or agents to help 
purchased the exported goods ( mainly tea and silk) from 
the nearby rural hinterlands or to sell or distribute the 
imported commodities ( mainly opium, cotton textiles and 
other consumer goods)• Some retail merchants started to 
sell the imported foreign goods. For example, shops 
specialized in selling foreign cotton textiles, known as 
qing yangpu dian (;�着 洋 和Shop for Imported Textiles 
Only) were established, and slowly outrun those selling 
native cotton textiles.^^ Later, some department stores 
for selling imported consumer goods also emerged, since 
these newfangled gadget such as soap, socks and kerosene 
lamps were most welcomed by the educated elite. 
With respect to manufacturing, the greatest con-
centration of this activity in Shanghai lay in areas 
directly related to commerce and shipping. Processing 
industries, especially those for cotton and ramie textiles, 
milling of rices and grains, the pressing of tung and other 
vegetable oils were thrived. Transport vehicles for long-
distance trade, mainly the foreign owned steamships, and 
28. More detail will be elaborated in Chapter Four, on 
the part of "Urban Reformist Elite". 




several large shipyards (for example, Nicholson & Boyd 
Company, Farnharm Company) clustered around the Bund, were 
all depended upon the city's central role as entrepot.^^ 
The manufacturing industries engendered the growth of 
industrial workers but they were smaller in size compared 
with those worked in commercial sectors. They only took 
shape as a class and manifested their class interests 
(especially in strike) in the second decade of the 
twentieth century 
As changes in occupational structure provided huge 
vacancies to be filled in, the demographic consequences 
could then be forecasted. These consequence might owned to 
the "push" of local rebellions or to the "pull" of urban 
economic opportunity. However, refugees and sojourners 
seeking for opportunity were not the same groups of people. 
The former usually returned to their homelands after the 
upheavals. This could be revealed in the sudden decline of 
population in the settlements,32 after the Taiping Rebel-
lions were surpassed. Nevertheless, the overall trend was 
boosting, with settlement regions shared the most, and so 
气 Tang Zhenchang 1989: 223-30; Zhang Zhongli 1990: 
59-66. 
31. For more detail, see Zhang Zhongli 1990: 789-840. 
32. The population dropped severely from 330000 in 1863 
to 137000 in 1865. See Dai Angang 1991: 212. 
33. Table 1: Population in Shanghai 
Year Settlements Chinese regions overall 
1852 —— 544413 544413 
1865 148809 543110 691919 
1895 543546 no data 
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those sojourners seeking for opportunities stayed for 
longer periods or even lived in Shanghai permanently, 
rather than the refugees or natural birthrate attributed to 
the drastic growth in population size. Thus Shanghai could 
be typified as an immigrant city. 
Indeed people in Shanghai came from all parts of 
China, and even all corners of the globe. In this way, the 
non-native greatly outnumbered the small group of the 
native Shanghai, whom remained no more than twenty percent 
of the city's population at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 34 
The resulting urban populations were more hetero-
geneous both ethnically and occupationally. For the 
former, Jiangsu and Zhejiang took a great share because of 
their proximity to Shanghai. The new arrivals from these 
two provinces were in general younger and less settled, 
and, in unprecedentedly large percentages, poor. They were 
predominantly destitute peasants and found regular work 
along the docks as coolies or in the textile miles. Many 
of them even could not afford a rented room and made their 
homes on boats. Guangdong ranked the third in the list. 
They were predominantly from the Canton region. Having 
served for many years as China's only port of foreign 
1910 617787 671866 1289353 
source: Zou Yiren 1980: 90 , table 1. 
Zou Yiren 1980: 112, table 19. 
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trade, Canton had engendered a large work force acquainted 
with the practices of foreign business. Thus most Canton-
ese immigrants were adroit merchants, compradors or 
brokers, arrived even before the opening up of Shanghai and 
so represented the strongest native group in Shanghai in 
the early phase, both in wealth and power.^^ Sojourners 
from these three provinces composed over 9 0 percent of 
those non-native. 
Although Westerners were the most powerful and 
prestige group in Shanghai, their size never reached over 
20000, or two percent of the total population, before 1910. 
They came from more than thirty countries. British, the 
pioneer adventurers, were the largest and dominated the 
life of the foreign comimnity. But their prominent 
position was slowly outnumbered by the Japanese immigrants 
toward the end of the century, as the latter represented 
the new rising force in Asia, especially after the sino-
Japanese War in 1894, sharing the same rights and 
privileges as other Western countries in China.^^ 
In this world of commerce, it was not surprised that 
most foreigners are merchants, either worked for trading 
firms or individually. Counsels and sailors were ranked 
next. Missionaries, mainly American and French, were also 
played important roles in Shanghai. Many modern institu-
Yue Zheng 1991: 169. 
36. wu Zhenyi 1978: 2-4. 
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tions, such as hospitals, new-style schools and even press, 
established by them, were partly responsible for Shanghai 
as the cultural centre in China.^^ 
As we have seen, commerce as a motive force brought 
about various changes in Shanghai. Actually, there were 
also some long-term secular trends happened in late 
traditional China: the increasing differentiation of 
economy from the polity and the rising social status of 
merchants. 
Chinese government has long been portrayed as adopted 
an anti-mercantile ideology: "encouraging agriculture and 
restraining commerce" (zhongben yimo ) , with 
various policies to restrict the activities and status of 
merchants (for example, not allowed to enter officialdom) 
and the growth of their capital (for example, subjected to 
extra heavy taxes), in order to prevent the formation of 
alternative sources of political power. These were also 
supplemented by state monopoly over certain profitable and 
key commodities. Thus, activities in economic sphere 
became inseparable from the political sphere, in which the 
former were only regarded as a branch of the latter. 
In addition, in contrast with the profession of 
37. Examples of the Western institutional influences on 
Shanghai society will be illustrated in the next chapter, 
on the part of "Western influences and the rise of civic 
consciousness". 
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farmers, which was considered as basic ), the 
occupation Of merchants was secondary or even non-essential 
(/卞永丨.They are ranked at the bottom in the traditional 
quadripartite division of society: scholars, farmers, 
artisans and merchants. However wealthy the might have 
been, their position remained inferior to that of 
scholars 
During late Ming and early Qing period, some 
organizational tendencies, including the changing character 
of private property relative to state property, the 
dynamism of private sector and the rationalization of tax 
procedures effected through the "single—whip" reforms, 
contributed to the "increasing institutional autonomy of 
the economy or of its increasing differentiation from the 
polity."39 Thus, the role played by the public authorities 
over economic activities appeared to have been weakened, 
and occasionally even favourable to the growth of private 
sector. For example, when the bureaucracy intervened in 
the production and sale of salt in mid-Qing era (which were 
public monopolies in traditional China), it usually 
cooperated with a number of large-scale private entre-
preneurs/^ The evolution of the economic and social 
structures that accompanied this growth of private sector--
the privatization and commercialization of cultivated land, 
气 Shi Yuankang 1991. 
39. Metzger 1977: 38. 
40. See Rowe 1984: 90-121. 
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the decline of privilege, the contractualization of 
leasehold farming, and the progress of literacy— also 
resulted in an environment prone to the rise of merchant 
communities. 41 
The merchants also adopted some strategies to enhance 
their upward social mobility. For example, the wealthy 
merchants led their sons to seek imperial diplomas and 
official functions, or different members within a family 
choose different careers (scholars and merchants) depending 
on their t a l e n t s A n o t h e r important channel for 
merchants to acquire honour and even official posts was the 
system of purchasing offices and titles by contribution 
(juanna身同(内）• This system reached climax in late Qing era 
and was a major source of revenue of the government• 43 
There were numerous evidence indicated the rise of 
merchants‘ social status in the late imperial period, 
included an increased cooperation between the merchants and 
the imperial bureaucracy on local affairs or the juxta-
position of the names of scholars and merchants in some 
imperial decree."^ In this manner, differences of status 
between scholars and merchants tended to become blurred and 
41. Bergere 1989: 16. 
42. Ho Ping-ti 1954. 
Yang Lien-sheng 1982: 31-2. 
拟 .More evidence can be found in Yu Yingshi: 1987' 
especially p.97-166. 
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the society was asserted to be more fluid. There were no 
restrictions that the merchants could assume more important 
roles in their local community, and even perforin official 
functions .45 
The point we want to make in here is that although 
some incipient elements of changes were perceived for 
several centuries within traditional China, the full force 
of these new tendencies , that are, the increasing autonomy 
of commerce from state control and the rising social status 
of merchants, were manifested in the full extent during the 
second half of the nineteenth century in Shanghai, through 
reinforcing with the structural changes brought along with 
the arrival of foreigners in there. Neither of doinestic 
nor Western influences could claim itself as the sole 
factor contributes to the rise of Shanghai in modern China, 
though we should not neglect Shanghai's own favourable 
conditions, as we have mentioned in the previous sections. 
E. Concluding Remarks 
With reference to Habermas's account of the public 
sphere, the notion of civil society is basic to it. Civil 
society, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
developed as “ the genuine domain of private autonomy 
[that] stood opposed to the state" 
45^  This point will be further elaborate in next 
chapter. 
46. Habermas 1989: 12. 
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takes on political functions ？二二�oiJ 二iSf teento century, but the kind of 
S ttat 二二.^can be grasped only in relation 
histort phase in the developmental 
二 二 c i ^ i l society as a whole in which 
？ a T e l v " ^ exchan 严 and social labour became 
^�ffct/ves.4^ 腕 ncipated from governmental 
only in the sphere of civil society, private people, came 
together to form a public, through institutions of 
sociability and discourse, readied themselves to compel 
public authority to legitimate itself before public 
opinion. Thus, the political function of public sphere was 
enacted. 
Capitalist market economies, especially those in long— 
distance trade, formed the important base of this civil 
society, since it created new commercial relationship: the 
traffic in commodities and news, in the era of meircan— 
tilism. These, in turn, manifested theii: revolutionary 
power by triggering structural change in society which were 
conducive to the later establishment of the public sphere. 
But the more important point is that the presence of self-
regulating markets demonstrated the capacity of society to 
undergo self-organization and regulation, even without the 
intervention of government. 
As stated above, long—distance trade also triggered 
structural changes in Shanghai, though in different manner. 
However, its significance must be gone beyond these when we 
47. Habermas 1989: 73-4. 
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appreciate its role in the formation of the civil society, 
in Shanghai, the low level of bureaucratic restraints (in 
comparison with other administrative cities such as Nanjing 
and canton) and the existence of islands of relative 
security and order— the settlements— helped to release 
the energies of the merchants. Foreign influence was also 
discernible in the introduction of a number of Western 
business practices into local commerce. Shanghai merchants 
were allowed to pursue, free from legal and bureaucratic 
encumbrances, the rationalization of business practices. 
These included the greater use of contractual instruments 
and guarantees, new forms of partnership and expanded 
banking and credit facilities. For example, in the 
selection of compradors for foreign firms in Shanghai, in 
addition to experience in foreign business practices, the 
latter usually required a huge amount of cash deposit 
(about 100000 taels) for guarantee, to avoid their any 
unfaithful acts towards the firms.48 
The social relationship between people, also trans-
formed from one of affective and cooperative, to utili-
tarian and contractual. They treated each other as owners 
of commodities and engaged only for profit-seeking purpose. 
Network of horizontal economic relationship replaced those 
of vertical relationship of dependence. For example, Wu 
Yanren ( 夏 戶 人 ） ，a famous writer in Shanghai, recorded 
that a hoodlum from Jiangsu, went to Shanghai and gathered 
48. Yue Zheng 1991: 92-3. 
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with a group of people, whom were unknown to each other 
before, and established an empty-shell company. They 
earned more than 20000 taels within three months through 
various trickery. When they were finally seen through by 
the officials, they divided the money cheated and ran away. 
This story showed not only most people came to Shanghai for 
economic interests' but also illustrated the utilitarian 
and fragile social relationship among Shanghai people 
Some might regarded these phenomena as a degeneration in 
morality. But only under these circumstance, can people 
act as free individual. They pursued their affairs with 
one another free from impositions by state or other 
authorities. One's subjectivity, personal right and even 
particularity can be assured and recognised. The role of 
government should be reduced to minimuin, with protecting 
citizen's private assets and personal right through legal 
means only. 
Although Shanghai was still far from a perfect self-
regulating market in the nineteenth century in strict sense 
(as most foreigners usually enjoyed various privileges in 
competitions with Chinese merchants) , the cooperation 
between Chinese merchants, the linkage men (for example, 
the compradors) and the foreign merchants, with little help 
or control from their governments, led to the growth of 
Shanghai into a cosmopolitan city, within relative short 
period. Their initiatives, energies and ability should be 
49. Quoted in Yue Zheng 1991: 86-7. 
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appreciated. 
But the base of civil society included a great deal 
more than these. It also consists of institutions and 
mentality that helped to integrate society together. This 
is the issue we will deal with in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three. Shanghai mmrnnnity 
In traditional China, the dominance of the state over 
* 
society meant that the state could mould society in accord-
ance with the moral order, mainly through the pedagogical 
function of the government, with a variety of institutional 
arrangements and administrative practices. The bureau-
cracy, though monopolized legitimate political action, only 
had a low degree of penetration into the society. The 
lowest division of the administration only reached at the 
county level. In addition of using growing number of 
members of the sub-bureaucracy, included yamen clerks and 
runners, for actual administration and tax collection, the 
ample political space left on the local level "was filled 
by voluntary and ascriptive associations of one type or 
another: clan, secret society, guild and so on. Such 
extra-bureaucratic private associations existed with 
precarious legitimacy"• i Although these voluntary organiz — 
ations of local societies performed some regulatory-
functions beyond the normal reach of the bureaucracy, the 
state hesitated to recognise the autonomy of these associ-
ations, not to mention their role as representing the 
interests their constituents to the state. 
�Fewsmith 1983: 619. 
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Nevertheless, as we will reveal in this chapter, the 
voluntary organizations in Shanghai not only showed their 
prominence in carrying some activities originally belonged 
to the role of the bureaucrated administration, but also 
through some local and macroregional social mobilizations, 
these organizations helped to integrate the immigrants city 
into an urban community, with immigrants from wherever 
developed a sense of communal identity at the level of the 
city as a whole, as 'Shanghai citizens,, instead of 
upholding their respective native-place identities. 
A. Traditional Merchant Organizations in Shanghai 
In urban setting, traditional Chinese merchants tended 
to cluster into kinds of voluntary associations or cliques 
(bang ^ ) , on the basis of common place of birth or 
ancestral home, and on the basis of common occupations or 
common trade. The formers are known as native place 
associations and the latter are occupational associations. 
The native place associations, or Landsmannschaften or 
the so-called huiguan (脅養玄),are associations of persons 
of common geographic background in a place away from their 
home territory. They were initially formed by officials in 
Beijing in the late Ming period in order to provide lodge 
for candidates from the same native place taking the 
examinations for the civil service.2 Gradually, merchant 
sojourners borrowed this institutional format and became 
2. He Bingdi 1966: Ch. 2. 
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flourished, especially in the commercially active lower 
Yangtze region. Such organizations started existing in 
Shanghai at the early Qing period and reached about ten 
before the opening of Shanghai as treaty port. It was only 
after the arrival of foreigners, it experienced dramatic 
growth and there were more than sixty native place organiz-
ations existed in Shanghai in 1909.3 Among them, those 
formed by Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong represented the 
most. since those with small number of sojourners were 
joined together at the level of province to form a native 
place club (for example, Hunan Huiguan ;itfI ~-t1~ and 
Shandong Huiguan LLtJ&ii; ), while those with larger number 
were usually grouped at a lower level of administrative 
units, such as prefecture or county. For example, 
sojourners from Guangdong formed into Chaozhou Huiguan (j~ 
Hit i!~ ), Shunde Huiguan (JI(~{~,-tff): Nanhai Huiguan (~~ 
J,.~b1) and Guangzhao Gongsuo (/!f:.. tJ t pk ) separately. (~ [;.vI;) '-1 I 1 
Coupled with occupational associations, these merchant 
organizations were good indicators of the level of economic 
prosperity of a city. 
since "next to family and kinship, common geographic 
origin provided a most important basis for voluntary 
associations in traditional China", 4 this type of identity 
and particularistic relationship helped rural migrants to 
soften their adjustment to the sharpness of urban life and 
3 Gao Hongxing 1990: 117. 
4. He Bingdi 1966: 1. 
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even further their individual interests as a source of jobs 
and welfare. For example, native place tie of Ningbo was 
used as basis for recruitment in selection of compradors 
for foreign firms in Shanghai.^ 
In addition to as common ground in religion and 
ritual, these organizations also acted as mutual aid 
societies for the protection of its own members of the 
various classes, through providing social services and 
works of philanthropy. Among them the most important one 
was to manage a temporary or permanent "charitable buryina 
ground" (yizhang惠 豕)for fellow-provincials died in the 
city during their sojourn. The Ningbo Guild^, for example, 
had founded four burying grounds in various areas in 
Shanghai to accommodate the increasing coffins 
Another type, occupational associations, or the so-
called gongsuo {^ l^ yj \ ) , were organized on a common trade, 
and included members from more than one place of origin. 
They "regulated business practices, including weights and 
measures, standard of packaging, terms of storage and for 
the settlement of credit, rates of comitiission. Their 
function and nature were similar to those guilds in the 
See Jones 1974: 82-3. 
6. Although named as guild, it was actually a native 
place organization. See below. 
Shanghai Tongshe 1939: 304. 
8. Liu, 1988:19. 
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late Middle Age of Europe, which were characterised as 
protectionism and exclusiveness. Merchants engaged in a 
given trade were required to join the associations and 
adhered to its regulations. These associations thus 
monopolized and maintained a high degree of control over 
its own trade and members. Their vigorous growth in 
Shanghai during the second half of the nineteenth century% 
in addition as an indication of an increase in variety and 
volume of trade, also helped to curb intra-trade 
competition. 
However, these two different types of merchant 
associations had better been regarded as two extreme modes, 
as most had a mixed characteristic of common native place 
and common trade. It is because the trade of any one 
commodity was often monopolized by merchant sojourners from 
one area, make use of specific products ( h ) or 
occupational skills cultivated in their native place. For 
example, in Shanghai, most Ningbo merchants engaged in 
banking business, the porcelain dealers were from Jiangxi, 
the opium traders from Canton, the tea and cloth merchants 
from Anhui. This kind of economic specialization by native 
place was reflected in the structure of their organiz-
ations. Siming Gongsuo (^ ？项么戶广） 
or the Ningbo Guild, 
for example, though entitled as gongsuo (occupational 
association), were actually organized by a group of Ningbo 
A total of 87 occupational associations were 
recorded in 1911. See Zhang Zhongli 1990: 519-22. 
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merchant sojourners (or bang) in 1797, and were usually 
regarded as a typical native place organization. it was 
also highly internal differentiated and incorporated many 
small-scale occupational groups within it, ranged from 
timber trade to medical herbs trade.- Although their 
CO丽on characteristic was the same native place, economic 
orientation also played substantial role. Because of the 
proximity of Ningbo to Shanghai, when the opening of 
Shanghai stimulated coastal as well as international trade, 
the local financiers of the tea and silk trades were 
largely Ningbo men who could rely on the accumulated 
resources of old merchant families of the Ningbo region. 
Thus the Ningbo merchant banks ( q i a n z h u a n g凌 ) grew up 
in there and by the 18 6 0 " a reference to the Ningbo bang 
implied not only a common native-place group, but a common 
occupational bond as well: native banking. 
William T. Rowe nominated these types of complex 
organizations as "multiplex guilds", in differentiation 
from those organized along either lines of common trade or 
of common native place only. ^^ In addition to the Ningbo 
"Guild", Guangdong "Guild" (Guangzhao Gongsuo ) 
and Shandong "Guild" (Shandong Gongsuo 山 聚 么 S ^� ) a l s o had 
similar nature. 
10. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 515. 
11. Jones 1974: 80. 
12. Rowe 1984: 264. 
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The level of organl'zatl'onal 't ' ln egrlty of these 
multiplex guilds might be· lower than 't 't 1 S ln ernal subunit, 
but their authority or socl'etal 'fl ln uence were much 
remarkable. with respect to the size of members, financial 
resource and wide range of social network, they , could 
protect their group interests by employing collective 
action against rival power groups. These might be the 
economic competitions of other merchant bangs, the actions 
of foreigners, or even against the financial demands of 
officials. 
The two related cases in 1873 and 1898, are often 
mentioned by historians as classical illustrations showing 
the effectiveness of guild action. The mourning hall and 
the cemetery for local members of the Ningbo Guild occupied 
land that had been incorporated into the French Concession 
in 1849. Claiming that this induced a public health 
hazard, the French authorities in the 1860's sought to 
lease the area and proposed to construct a school and 
hospital there. This was rejected by the guild directors 
and induced a bloody crash between the French troops and 
the Ningbo community, first in 1873 and more serious one in 
1898. The later one led to Ningbo community responded in 
unison. Ningbo merchants closed their shops and Ningbo 
workers employed by the French walked off their jobs. A 
boycott on goods and services was then extended to the 
entire western community in shanghai, and pressure on the 
French forced them to withdraw the proposals. The boycott 
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lasted six months and is now viewed as the first political 
strike against a foreign power in the history of modern 
China. 13 . 
The strike and its success, though owned much to the 
significance number of Ningbo people worked in Shanghai and 
an already established network of Ningbo community, the 
pivot role of the guild in facilitating group cohesion and 
social mobilization could not be left alone. 
B. From exclusiveness to inclusiveness 
It is generally assumed that the presence of native 
place associations and "guilds", which seek for sectional 
interests, instead of the interest of the whole community, 
suggested strong localism among merchant groups, that in 
turn inhibited social and economic integration. This 
condemnation is invalid when we examine the developmental 
trend and functional role contributed to the city by these 
merchant associations. 
Firstly, we should not understand the guilds as static 
whole without any development. Actually, with the passage 
of time, the differences between migrants from different 
regions tended to disappear. Occupation or economic 
position was more salient in deterinining one's status. 
13. The two affairs are known as the Incident of Ningbo 
Guild (Siming Gongsuo shi j ian t^织局么)• More detailed 
account can be found in Su Zhiliang 1991; Jones 1974: 86-8; 
Shanghai Tongshe 1939: 296-7. 
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Accordingly, common trade tended to displace common native 
place as a determinant of membership in the merchant 
organizations. Thus, the periods from 1843 to 1911 showed 
a large majority (about eighty percent) of guild founding 
to be along lines of trade alone. In particular, as 
imported foreign goods became more diverse, guilds 
organized on these new business such as the Guild of 
Imported Cotton Textiles (;f1f1i;P1); the Guild of Foreign 
JGrOCeries (it~i,*i;Pfl) and the Guild of Five Metals (1/i 
l~jJ~) also developed and occupied almost half of the 
newly-established guilds. 14 
This process of deparochialization was clearly derived 
from utilitarian concerns based on market principle. The 
goal of pursuing individual's interests would slowly erode 
the importance of the narrowest native place tie, when the 
latter's utility in enhancing one's economic position was 
diminished. Increased cooperation among merchant groups 
following the same trade routes as trade volume expanded 
also contributed to this process. This changing criteria 
in membership as a process of organizational rational-
ization, resulted in the organizational growth and a shift 
from an orientation toward exclusiveness to an ever-
greater inclusiveness. 
c. Toward community-wide Leadership 
14. Zhang Zhongli 1990: 517-35. 
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secondly, the functions of the guilds expanded from 
serving their members to serving the whole community. m 
this aspect, we should turn to another type of prevalent 
institution in urban China: the benevolent halls (shantan 
if). 
Most of the functions of benevolent halls are well-
known. They took care the poor, the abandoned children, 
old people and widows. They buried corpses left in the 
roads, sold coffins on credit or gave them away free. They 
also maintained a number of free schools and provided free 
medicines. 
The first benevolent hall established in Shanghai was 
the Hall of Infant Care (Yuying Tang 备雙复 )in 1710. 
There were five in the city by 1850.15 Initially, all of 
these halls are managed by gentry, with received official 
subventions. They "represented a modest form of 
institutionalized gentry power in the domain of public 
affairs. "16 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Taiping 
Rebellion brought about the outpour of refugees from the 
nearby Jiangnan region into Shanghai. While the rich 
landlords and officials could afford living in houses built 
by the foreigners in the settlements, the poor one only 
Gaoqiao Xiaozhu 1988: 822. Table 3. 
16. Elvin 1974: 241. 
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Slept along the road or in boats, without adequate food, 
clothing, money and shelter supply. Providing popular 
welfare services to them become an urgent need. One 
i雇ediate result was the blooming of newly founded 
benevolent halls within this period (during the 1850s and 
1860S)• This was illustrated by a contemporary observer, 
with exaggeration, that "the foreign settlement region was 
crowded with benevolent halls."i? Among them, Guoyu Tang 
)' Baoying Tang • 堂 ） a n d Qingjie Tang (Jj 纷 
)were the famous and known as the "Three Big Benevolent 
Halls" .18 
These newly established benevolent halls, in contrast 
with their antecedent (which were usually government-
sponsored) ,were more exclusively the product of local 
societal initiative. Their capital for activities were 
mainly funded by the guilds, which in turn were collected 
from their members as 'commercial donation, (shangjuan�f]扣 
I nI j \ 
)for the purpose of guilds' reserve.^^ Therefore, though 
guilds and benevolent halls were basically different sorts 
of institutions, their activities were in some way related. 
The importance of benevolent halls, as revealed by William 
T. Rowe, was that: 
The Shan-tang's [benevolent hall] emergence 
represented a dramatic change in attitudes and assumptions about responsibility for community 
17. Quoted in Li Wenhai 1993: 30. 
18. Gaoqiao Xiaozhu 1988: 825. 
19. Peng Zeyi 1965: 189-92. 
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• Another more profound structural change was many 
merchant showing great enthusiasm in participating these 
philanthropy activities. of course, the weakening of 
imperial power and the withering of financial resource 
provided opportunities for these projects founded on local 
societal initiative. But the more important factor was the 
commercial prosperity in Shanghai led to the growth of 
nouveau riche, especially the compradors, merchant leaders 
and guild directors. They usually purchased official title 
and were referred to as shen-shang ( 绅 翁 ） • Even as 
individuals, they had some political influence with local 
affairs. However, unless they had begun as gentry or 
officials, such influence rested on no legitimate basis. 
When they engaged in activities or institutions which had 
a communal purpose, they quickly used them to claim 
legitimate leadership• 21 This contributed to the 
increasing cooperation among merchants, local gentry and 
officials. 
Moreover, in addition to the benevolent halls, most 
merchants engaged in these activities were through the 
guilds as organizational means, since the guilds, 
especially the native place organizations, had begun as 
mutual aid society for protection and providing services 
气 Rowe 1989: 92. 
2� Chan 1975: 35. 
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for its own members. The guild directors and leaders thus 
acquired the experience, organizational know-how and 
material capability to provide relief and other social 
services, then ultimately extended their patronage to the 
ci ty as a whole. For example, Tang Tingshu (lfJJ4".jEo>, a 
famous comprador, was also the founder and director of the 
silk Guild and Tea Guild -- the two most influential guilds 
in Shanghai. Through these guilds, he actively engaged in 
various local relief activities and was honoured by the 
\/ Qing court with the title of 'char i table man' (shanshi 11-
1:1 
) · Hereafter, he was respected not only because of his 
wealth, but also his status as social activist. 22 
From caring for guild members to performing 
philanthropic works for the urban neighbourhood within 
which the guild was located was a significant step. It 
revealed a shift in merchant organizations away from 
emphasis on sectional interests to an identification with 
the interests of the community as a whole. Hence these 
;; 
organizations ·which established for pursuing si (~), now 
gradually acquired a new character of gong They 
gradually emerged as main foci of neighbourhood solidarity 
and self-help. 
Another factor also contr ibuted to the merchants' 
enhanced positions in the local community. After the 
Taiping Rebellion, the local officials became increasingly 
22. Gaoqiao Xiaozhou 1988: 829-31. 
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reliance upon the guild leaders to help collect tax and 
organize contributions in money and labour towards the 
reconstruction of public building and roads destroyed. For 
exainple, the collection of likin on crepe (a type of silk) 
came to be farmed by the Guild, which undertook to produce 
lump sums for the officials. Collaboration with the 
officials gave these merchant leaders a greater voice over 
taxation and other local public affairs.23 
All these occasions resulted in the merchants assumed 
a leadership role based on wide community support. 
Nevertheless, we should not neglect the local gentry who 
had already acquired wide social prestige through directive 
roles in philanthropy and community service in Shanghai, 
grounded in the traditional Confucian moral imperative of 
paternalist social responsibility. Of course, in respect 
to financial strength and organizational capability, they 
were slowly shadowed by the merchants. But we should 
understand the relationship between merchants and local 
gentry as cooperative one, rather than competitive. This 
could be shown in their joint effort in undertaking 
charitable works. Moreover, the actual distinction between 
them became vague, as more gentry and even officials 
engaged in business activities. A well known example is 
Zhang Jian (涨秦)• Born in a gentry family in Jiangsu, 
he gained first place among Jinshi graduate (Zhuangyuan ^ ^ 
一 t 
TQ) in the competitive Imperial Palace Examination. 
Peng Zeyi 1965: 210. 
78 
However, he left his official career and established his 
industrial enterprise in Shanghai. Therefore his status as 
gentry, official and merchant could not be easily 
separated .24 As more gentry and officials became 
merchants, and merchants could acquire gentry status 
through purchasing official titles, then the two groups 
were fused. 
If one may puzzle that these group of elite activists 
with only concerns in localistic contexts, while lacking 
any characteristic of cosmopolitanism, then when existing 
forms of local activism pulled into wider areas as public 
welfare expanded into a inacroregional, nationally oriented 
organization for north China famine relief, the elite 
started to move beyond localism. 
D. The North China Famine Relief and Macroregional 
Mobilizations 
The famine created by severe drought in Henan, Shenxi 
and Shanxi from 1876 to 1879, was portrayed as the greatest 
diaster during the Qing Dynasty.^^ Traditional official 
relief was proved inadequate and ineffective because of 
imperial financial withering. Thus welfare leaders in 
major cities, especially in Shanghai, raised funds and 
distributed in the famine areas. Shanghai emerged as a 
24. For more detail on his life, see Chan 1977: 52-5. 
25. More detail about the famine and related relief can 
be found in He Hanwei (n.d.)； Rankin 1986: 142-7 and Li 
Wenhai 1993. 
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centre for relief and a special relief office (Xiezhen 
Gongsuo f 明 所 ) w a s founded in 1878. Contributions 
from individuals, business and public institutions in 
nearby provinces were sent to Shanghai. By using the 
existing elite-run welfare organizations and past 
experiences on local relief, the elites or famine relief 
managers were proved to be successful in dealing with so 
widespread a diaster, with minimum or even no official 
guidance. About thirty-thousand taels were collected 
within few months and effectively sent to the famine areas 
without any case of corruption being reported. 
They considered autonomy to be one of the virtue of 
their relief effort and this type of voluntary, independent 
relief was known as yizhen , as against guanzhen 
( ^ ^ ) , appeared first in such macroregional scale in 
Chinese history. Such extra-bureaucratic management was a 
definite step beyond the localized activism of the elite 
group in Shanghai. The leaders of the relief, including 
Jing Yuanshan ( 經 ^ ^ ) , Zheng Guanying ( 努 ) and 
Shang Xuanhuai ( 俊 ) , because of their outstanding 
performance in the mobilization, were admired by Li 
H o n g z h a n g 、 良 番 ) 一 一 a prominent self-strengthening 
Governor-General at that time -- and promoted them as 
managers or supervisors of various official—sponsored 
industrial enterprises. ^^ 
26. Li Wenhai 1993: 33-4. 
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some major developments and in^plication elicited by 
the famine relief were deserved attention. Firstly, 
through cooperation in intense fund-raising and distri-
bution programs, horizontal networks of personal relation-
ship linking managerial elite of separate localities were 
fostered. These managerial elite included scholars, gentry 
and merchants in status. Although commercial relationship 
had already formed between merchants of separate regions, 
but this could not be comparable to the former one, as the 
former networks were less utilitarian and more permanent in 
nature, involved wider strata of elite (scholars and 
officials)• These macroregional horizontal networks would 
manifest significant power when elite activism expanded in 
political directions at the beginning of twentieth century. 
Moreover, the deliberate support from the press was 
also an striking innovation in the mobilization. Shen bao 
(£緯/1) , established in 1872, was the first major Shanghai 
daily press aimed at a general audience. It was not only 
a treaty port newspaper, but was also the spokesman of the 
Yangtze Valley elite. "Its propensity to criticize 
officials and its ability to place events in wider frame-
works drawn from both Chinese and Western experience 
fostered conceptual changes and nurtured public opinion. 
It began to carry reports and editorials about the famine 
in 1878 and constantly covered activities of the relief-
collections. Through this medium, the severity of the 
27. Rankin 1986: 142. 
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fainine and elite's activities were known to the literate 
public. This, in turn, enhanced wider level of xnobiliz-
ation in different social strata. The profound influence 
of the press then was recognized and later employed by the 
elite as their "political weapon". 
But the prominent implication was that: the successful 
mobilizations revealed a sense of community solidarity had 
already engendered among the residents in Shanghai. since 
the famine was not occurred in nearby areas and the North-
ern provinces were not the native-place of most Shanghai 
residents (most of them came from the Southern provinces), 
it was unexpected that the relief elicited a broad 
response. As shows by Mary B. Rankin: 
Lists of donors printed in Shen bao typically 
started with a few gifts of two hundred taels or 
more and ended up with contributions of about a 
yuan 一一 with a considerable number falling 
between ten and fifty taels. As in the case of 
local welfare, a few contributors were women.^^ 
Such societal-wide supports from the Shanghai residents 
demonstrated that they had recognised the elite group 
(guild leaders, merchants and gentry) as their legitimate 
leaders. In fact, their supports were the motive force 
behind these currents of elite activism and we can assert 
that an urban community was emerging in Shanghai. 
E. Western Influence and the Rise of Civic Consciousness 
28. Rankin 1986: 144. 
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The guilds, benevolent halls and elite activism in 
extra-bureaucratic management, described as above, though 
. acquired new characteristics, could all be traced back in 
China's "premodern" context. B t th u e presence of Western 
elements and the1' r l' nfl h Id uence s ou not be neg~ected, 
especially in Shanghai. They also played prominent roles 
in the formation of Shanghai as an urban community. 
The municipal institution of the settlements, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, was elected by rate-
payers of foreigners, with little guidance from their 
consuls. It was founded completely on Western model with 
given legislative and administrative powers over taxation, 
finance, security, as well as other routine responsi-
bilities of municipal administration.~ It gradually 
introduced Western urban facilities into the settlements. 
Some of these, such as building macadamized roads, were 
welcomed by the Chinese residents, as they also shared the 
convenience brought by the new facilities. While others, 
for example, erecting of electric street lamps and supply 
of piped purified drinking water, initially provoked fear 
and doubt among the Chinese residents. They puzzled that 
the lighting of street lamps might dim the underground fire 
(dihuo .:tt$!< ) and burn those walking on the streets, or the 
piped drinking water had been poisoned by the foreigners so 
as to kill the Chinese living in the settlements. However, 
when these were proved harmless, they finally adopted and 
~ Zhang Zhongli 1990: 602-28. 
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even praised the advanced Western market culture.3o As a 
result, within twenty years, the settlement regions were 
transformed from a place of wilderness into an urbanized 
enclave. The achievement of the Municipal Council were 
impressive. 
Seen against this background, the condition in the 
once prosperous Chinese city was terrible. By the 1880's, 
the growth of the Chinese city had led to increasing 
difficulty in meeting such urban problems as fire hazards, 
rubbish disposal, traffic circulation on waterways and 
streets, public order, and the supply of drinking water. 
Editorials of the newspaper Shen bao indicated that in the 
Chinese city, the canals were silting up; the garbage-
removal service run by the charities was breaking down; 
drinking water cost several hundred copper cash a load; 
traffic was being obstructed by stalls; and crimes was 
spreading. "If the Chinese area is compared to the settle-
ment, the difference is no less than that between the sky-
above and the sea below. 
These contrast stimulated the self-respect of the 
residents living in Chinese area. Some local gentry and 
merchants, in one way, advocated to the local officials in 
providing municipal services and facilities similar to 
those in the settlements. On the other way, they actively 
气 Zhang Zhongli 1990: 897-900. 
31. Quoted in Elvin 1974: 246-7. 
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raised fund from the public and accounted for the manage-
inent. In addition, municipal regulations and rules were 
set Which the residents must obey. For example, garbage 
should be collected in particular sites and not allowed to 
throw away everywhere. Pedestrians, carriages and rick-
shaws should walked along the left side of the streets. 
Particularly, people were not allowed to spit, urinate or 
defecate on the streets. Otherwise, they would receive 
punishment. 
Then the gentry and merchants gradually recognized 
that a permanent institution, instead of in ad hoc fashion, 
should be launched in responsible for management of munici-
pal services. The South City Roadworks Board (Nanshi malu 
gongcheng ju 齒 , 爲 絡 X ^ 遊 , the precursor of the city 
Council, was founded in 1895, with official sponsor, to 
build a road along part of the bank of the Huangpu River ( 
雙；着；V) lying south of the boundary of the French Concess-
ion. Shortly afterward, this board imitated the settle-
ments by establishing a police force and setting up a fire-
fighting brigade.32 From the point of view of the services 
it performed, the new City Council established by local 
gentry in 1905 could be seen as an expanded version of the 
Roadworks Board, which in turn imitated the Municipal 
Council of the International Settlement. Mark Elvin 
. - i . 
Jiang Shenwu 1935: 1213-22. 
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comments poignantly that "there was conscious institutional 
plagiarism" .33 
one of the consequence in the development of municipal 
service as influenced by the Western counterpart, was the 
rise of civic consciousness among the Shanghai residents. 
In traditional China, most civil construction and public 
works were initiated by government or government-sponsored. 
But their main purpose, for example, building road, rather 
than providing convenience to the nearby residents, was to 
facilitate communication among officials. The civil 
construction performed by some private organizations, in 
turn, was also aimed to facilitate their own members, 
rather than serving for the whole community. Though both 
of them pretended they were gong ( 么 ） ， t h e i r actual 
intent were guan ( ) and si (冰respectively. In this 
light, the cooperation among gentry, merchants and 
officials to provide municipal service and facilities to 
the whole community was a break through in the city. But 
the more important implication is the original Shanghai 
sojourners ——merchants or workers-- from whatever native 
place, did develop a "locational identity" as inhabitants 
of the city. 
The upper stratum, either through the guilds or 
individually, took action on their initiative in response 
Elvin 1974: 246. Details on the City Council and 
the related local self-government movement in Shanghai will 
be mentioned in the next chapter. 
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to perceived co職unity needs. Numerous civil constructions 
such as building bridges across various junctions of the 
Huangpu River, and municipal services such as supplying 
electricity and piped purified water were launched to 
improve living standards of the urban community as a whole. 
The lower stratum, recognized their responsibility to obey 
the municipal regulations, such as not to spit, urinate or 
defecate in the streets, not to destroy the public 
facilities and take care of one's own conduct in public 
areas. In this way, we can assert that civic consciousness 
was developed and the Shanghai sojourners were now worth 
labelled as " c i t i z e n s " .^4 Similar to the case in Hankou as 
depicts by William T. Rowe, such civic consciousness 
penetrated the broader urban society largely by diffusion: 
� diffusion achieved less through systematic 
indoctrination than through the incremental 
cp:rea’ion of a wide range of municipal 
institutions, responding to a variety of threats 
and needs collectively faced by the urban 
population as a whole.^^ 
F. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have seen that the guilds, 
merchant leaders and sojourners in Shanghai, which 
initially established or went to here in order to pursue 
sectional or private interests, gradually developed strong 
roots in this cominunity. These developments sprang from 
several occasions of organizational-based local and 
34. Tang Zhenchang 1992 . 
Rowe 1989: 91. 
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macroregional mobilizations. These elite activism entailed 
was originated both in traditional habits of gentry 
philanthropy and in imitating Western institutions. For 
this reason the analytical separation of indigenous and 
Western elements is difficult. 
Their activities thus constituted a public domain, as 
separated from both official authority and private domain. 
Some scholars, such as William T. Rowe and Mary B. Rankin, 
identified this domain as ,public sphere'Actually it 
is a misunderstanding of the concept, since "it bypasses or 
treats as puzzling Habermasinsistence on orientations to 
the state" .37 工打 my opinion, this public domain, can only 
be regarded as a component of 'civil society' in Habermas 
notion. Though the formation of civil society is a 
necessary and significant steps towards the 
institutionalization of the public sphere, it is not 
identical to the public sphere. 
The guild leaders, prominent merchants and compradors, 
in cooperation with local gentry, asserted their role in 
city-wide leadership through these activities. A self-
consciousness resident population was also formed as long-
time Shanghai residents and the second generation of 
sojourners developed an identity as 'Shanghairen' (J^^/v 
)and also a 'locational solidarity' with fellow urbanites. 
36. Rowe 1989: 183 — 6 and Rankin 1986: Ch. 3 and 4. 
37. See criticism in Calhoun 1992: 11. 
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Beginning from the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, Shanghai could be recognized as an urban community 
or even civil society in Habermas's sense. This paved the 
way for subsequently political mobilizations of the 
Shanghai elite as provoked by domestic as well as foreign 
events. This will be dealt with in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Four. Public Sphere in Shanghai ， 
Institutions and Actors 
A. Moving toward Constitutional Government 
In the late Qing period, a succession of military 
defeat encountered with the armed forces of the foreigners, 
plus the internal crisis associated with local rebellions 
proved the ineffective of remedies provided by traditional 
statecraft to these threats. Some higher level officials 
with reformist mind gradually recognized "learning from the 
West" represented a new way led to national strength. 
Through a series of struggle with the resistance of con-
servatives ,the "Western Affairs" Movement (yangwu yundong 
：到赛•？貪）was finally launched between 1860s to 1890s. 
Modernization in China, from the very outset, was not 
only an economic problem, but also took on the aspect of a 
political problem concerning with how to ensure the 
survival of the state and then how to achieve a wealth and 
strong nation. 
At this stage, most officials and reformers simply 
regarded modernization as industrialization. Military and 
industrial sectors were their primary concern. Numerous 
arsenals were established at first and then developed 
publicly owned enterprises (guanban 哲 辦 ） • However, 
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without any fiscal reform, state revenues were not 
sufficient for it to adopt a strategy of direct industrial 
investment. Therefore the government cooperated with some 
private investors and administrators, utilized their skills 
and capital to promote modern industries, but the indus— 
tries were still under strictly bureaucratic control. This 
system was known as "merchant management and official 
supervision" or "guandu shangban" 智 高 
Nevertheless, as many merchants found them lacking any 
power to control economic processes in the enterprises, and 
the preferential treatment given to official credit in 
cases of bankrupt, these made for their growing dis-
appointment. Moreover, until 1895, there was still no 
institution capable of organizing and coordinating modern-
ization efforts at different provinces. And so, less and 
less private capital went into officially sponsored modern 
industry. As a result, the achievements of the Chinese 
modern sector, as compare with the modern sector developed 广cent【说七c义. . by foreigners in China (mainly eofioe^ f^ted in Shanghai), 
appeared to have been limited and disparate until the end 
of the nineteenth century. This first phase of modern-
ization only enhanced the regional bases of some provincial 
governors, own power, as they dominated the modern enter-
prises and controlled over other burgeoning local taxes. 
The serious military and diplomatic setbacks suffered 
by the Chinese government during the Sino—:Tapanese War 
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(1894-5) and the Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901) proved the 
failure of the first phase of modernization. This brought 
about a radical change on the modernization policies. A 
consensus was finally reached among the imperial courts and 
officials on the need for the government to assume greater 
responsibility upon the path of reform. The objective was 
to restore imperial power by building a modern nation-
state, served by a centralized and well-informed bureau-
cracy of experts. Thus it led to a series of reform 
programs, based largely on drastic institutional changes. 
This phase of modernization was usually named as late Qing 
"New Policies" reforms from 1901 to 1911. The reforms 
aimed at changing almost every institutions. Three sectors 
were particularly affected: education, army and 
administration.^ 
0 
Educational reforms involved the abolition of the 
traditional examination system in 1905, the simultaneous 
creation of a Ministry of Education and establishment of a 
Western-style public school system. The immediate effect 
was a destruction of the base of gentry's power and status, 
as the gentry enjoyed their various privileges merely 
because they had passed the examinations. Abolition of the 
examinations meant the disappearance of their privileges 
and they must find a new way to preserve them. Some gentry 
became engaged in new activities provided by the reform 
1. For more detail on the reform programs, see Ichiko 
1980. 
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programs, such as establishing new-style schools or became 
leaders of the local self-government bodies and provincial 
assemblies. As we will shoiA/ in the following sections, 
Shanghai was usually the first one in establishing these 
New Policy institutions, making use of the legacy of elite 
activism cultivated in the last century, and so they 
represented the model to be followed by other areas. 
However, in opposite to the origin intentions of the 
government in creating a new group of educators with 
western knowledge and stay loyal to the court, the students 
always emerged as leaders of the anti-Manchu movement. 
This is especially true in those studying in Japan, whom 
became the nucleus of revolutionaries. Most of them stayed 
in Shanghai as centre of activities because of the presence 
of safety enclave provided by the foreign settlement 
areas 
Similar problems also occurred in the reforms of 
military system. In meeting local rebellions and wars with 
foreign countries, the regular army (the banner forces and 
the Green Standard troops) showed they were corrupt and no 
longer effective to cope with these challenge. Thus the 
aim of the reform was to build a new military forces (the 
New Army斯 事),trained in western style, which would be 
both strong enough to protect the nation and loyal to the 
2. For more detail, see Chapter Seven, the part of 
'Revolutionary Activities in Shanghai'. 
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emperor. However, some military officer candidates 
studying in Japan became imbued with revolutionary thought 
in there. As a result, when the Revolution of 1911 broke 
out, it was actually started by the New Army and most 
troops even sided with the revolutionaries. Their 
collaboration with the revolutionaries and local elite in 
Shanghai played a pivot role in the success of the 
revolution in there. 
What is more, as the government did not have enough 
參 
money to meet the cost of army building, it had to rely on 
provincial governors for financial support. Although the 
government attempted to centralize command over the armed 
forces, the actual control was still withheld in the hands 
of the governors. This laid out the seed of warlordism in 
the Republican period. 
If one can perceive many self-defeating contradictions 
in the educational and military reform plans, this is also 
certainly true in the preparation for constitutionalism. 
The failure experience in the first phase of modern-
ization and coupled with the expected resistance by the 
local officials as the new reforms would jeopardize their 
local interests, the central government then attempted to 
get around the resistance of provincial bureaucracies and 
"establish an alliance directly with those social forces 
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that were capable of contributing to m o d e r n i z a t i o n " . ^ This 
was done by establishing some new elite-run functional 
organizations in such areas as commerce, education, agri-
culture and local affairs. Although these organizations 
only formalized the functions already being performed by 
local elite, the institutional structure in which they 
operated was altered. Thus they could aggressively expand 
their previous initiatives and redefine their positions as 
quasi-official status. 
Associated with these reforms at the local level was 
the ireorganization and rationalization of the bureaucratic 
structure by replacing the Six Boards (liubu 六 都 ）in the 
central government with Western-style ministries and 
eliminating some outmoded official posts / 
Actually this represented a transformation in the 
traditional state-societal relationships and the role of 
state would change from merely concerned with coordination 
into assuming more active and managerial role by central-
izing control. The state would became more interventionist 
by bringing formal government structure down to lower 
administrative levels and attaching local elite to the 
bureaucracy. As Mary Rankin asserts that: 
Bergere 1985: 76. 
4 In addition to the Six Board (Boards of Civil 
Appointment, of Revenue, of Rites, of War, of Punishments 
and of Works), Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Commerce, 
of Police, of Education and of Posts and Communication were 
established. See Ichiko 1980: 389-96. 
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“ ^ h e government had succeeded in extending the 
fr^i^t structure in this way, the New Policies 
， ” ， i n effect, have increased state pene-
二ration into society, recentralized power on a 
denser institutional bases, and allowed officials 
ro mobilize the populace for government-defined 
national purpose 
These reforms also had more wider implications. For 
example, in the ares of commerce and industry, the govern-
ment organized a new Ministry of Commerce (or Shenbu|||雜)， 
launched branch bureaus in the provinces and encouraged 
merchants to form chamber of commerce in various districts. 
This symbolized an officially re-evaluation of the status 
of merchants, as the government now accepted the wealth of 
nation could attain through the promotion of commerce and 
industry. This was done by forming chambers of commerce, 
promulgating commercial laws, establishing commercial 
schools, protecting the monopoly rights of entrepreneurs 
and sending students abroad to acquire technical knowledge. 
What had been in traditional China regarded as pursing of 
selfish interests, was now seen as beneficial to the 
public. 
The adoption of a program to gradually establish 
limited constitutional government over a nine-year period, 
announced in 1906 and following the return of the five 
commissioners who had been abroad to study constitution-
alism, induced more profound changes. The purpose behind 
bringing in some features of a parliamentary system was, in 
^ Rankin 1986: 204. 
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one way, to distinguish between executive, legislative and 
judicial functions in the central government body in 
accordance with Western model of governmental structure, so 
as to increase the efficiency of administration. While in 
another way, was to draw the local elite closer to the 
government by providing new channels for the upward throw 
of information and opinion for policy-making, so as to 
strengthen the cohesion of the nation. Accordingly, a 
elected national assembly in the capital, provincial 
assemblies in the provinces and local self-government 
assemblies in the local districts of towns and villages 
were established at different levels. 
Nevertheless, these assemblies provided forum for the 
local elite to give sharp debate on national political 
issues and most of which were potentially revolutionary. 
Moreover, the elevated aspiration among the constitution-
alists as promised by the government to convene the 
parliament in 1917, also led to numerous campaigns, public 
meetings and demonstrations pressed for accelerating in 
reform timetable. The final refusal by the government only 
resulted in the alienation of the elite and they became 
sided with the revolutionaries/ 
In Habermas account of the public sphere, the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth- century notion developed 
6. More detail on the constitutional movement in 
Shanghai will be elaborated in chapter six. 
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alongside the rise and transformation of the modern states, 
as well as on the basis of capitalist economic activity. 
The development of the state bureaucracies as agents of 
permanent administration, buttressed by standing armies, 
creating a new sphere of public authority. This cost of 
state formation were met by a range of policies which 
penetrated and regulated the society and the economy to an 
unprecedented degree. “ in this way the zone in which 
public authority, by ways of continuous administrative 
acts, maintained contact with private people, was rendered 
problematic."7 To represent the newly conceptualized 
interests of civil society over and against this expanding 
state apparatus, the bourgeoisie gradually came, through 
its new institutions for articulation and discussion, to 
postulate the existence of a public as "the abstract 
counterpart of public authority"^ and thus led to the 
emergence of a public sphere. 
As we have examined, similar events also happened in 
the late Qing period. The intention of the imperial 
government was attempted to build a modern state by 
launching an assertive bureaucratic movement for modern-
ization and controlled social mobilization 'from above� 
This implied the granting of limited political concession 
and more considerable social and economic advantages to the 
local elite. It was hoped that in this way of centrally 
\ Habermas 1989: 24. 
ibid. : 23. 
98 
directed mobilization, the elite would subordinate their 
own activities to directives from the government and hence 
brought about national wealth and strength (fuqiang||@) • 
However, instead of advancing national cohesion, the 
reform programs produced both new social groups ( such as 
students and new army) and new institutions ( such as 
chambers of commerce and self-government assemblies)• They 
only accelerated elite social mobilization and expanded 
their previous initiatives. Their resulting aggressively 
demands for political participation brought out legitimate 
crisis to the government and finally led to its collapse. 
It was against this historical context that we should 
understand how the public sphere in Shanghai emerged, took 
shape and finally manifested its effect. 
B.Institutional bases 
For a public sphere to function and manifest its 
effect, a prime criteria is the presence of some legitimate 
institutions that represent the public to exert pressure on 
the state authority and appeal to rational and critical 
principles. According to Habermas, in the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century of the Western Europe, institutional 
bases for the emergence of a public sphere had already been 
developed. These ranged from meeting places, such as 
coffee houses and salons, to journals and even webs of 
social relationships. They gradually replaced the courts, 
publicity of representations and emerged as centres of 
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criticism. The critical debate ignited by works of 
literature and art at first and then extended to include 
economic and political disputes. They thus institu-
tionalized a form of rational-critical discourse about 
objects of common concern that could be carried over 
directly into political discussions. "The process in which 
the state-governed public sphere was appropriated by the 
public of private people making use of their reason and was 
established as a sphere of criticism of public authority 
was one of functionally converting the public sphere in the 
world of letters already equipped with institutions of the 
public and with forums for the discussion. 
David Strand, in an insightful article, identifies 
some similar institutions in the Chinese context: 
Although the Chinese capital lacked London's 
coffee houses, it had intellectual salons as well 
as locality inns (huiquan) with their locality 
clubs (tong xiang hui), merchant and craft 
guilds, bathhouses, restaurants, teahouses, 
brothels, public parks, pavilions and temples 
which functioned as mini-convention centres for 
guilds and political groups .i� 
However, it is too naive to equalize these as their 
Western counterparts, without examine their constituents 
and the functions they performed. Did they ( for example, 
bathhouses and brothels) provide channels for the public to 
express their opinions systematically? If yes, were they 
merely a place of chatting ( even if the participants 
9. Habermas 1989: 51. 
10. strand 1990: 5. 
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discussed national political issues), without arriving at 
any consensus? Or were the public strictly follow some 
procedures and through rational and critical means, to 
arrive at consensus? What were their effects on the public 
authority? If they had challenged the public authority, 
how could the latter response to their opinions, suggest-
ions or criticisms? Without any response or react to them 
in some ways ( though not necessary in positive sense)? 
For this reason, it is obviously the institutions that 
allow for a public sphere to emerge and perforin its 
function cannot be loosely applied in different social 
context. 
Recognizing this rigorous demand, we can still 
identify some institutions in Shanghai in the late imperial 
period that have similar natures to Habermas, notion, in 
accordance with their constituent, their functions and the 
roles they played. 
a. The Shanghai City Council 
The first one was the Shanghai City Council, 
established in 1905.u Its exact title was the "General 
Works Board" (chengxiang neiwai zhong gongcheng ju P l ^ ^ 
( 义 外 旁 ) 二 钱 局 ） w a s renamed as the "Self-government 
Office" (zizhi gongsuo 自 ; 谷 么 所 ) i n 1910-1911. It was 
praised by Mark Elvin as "the first formally democratic 
11. Data on the Shanghai City Council is adopted from 
Elvin 1969 and 1974; Li Dajia 1993; Wu Guilong 1983; Zhang 
Zhongli 1990: 628-36 and Zhu Ying 1991: 167-193• 
101 
political institution in China."- it was sprang from the 
self-government movement advocated by reformists such as 
Kang Youwei ( 雇 ) and Liang Qichao (淡馳)as a way 
to educate the public in preparation for constitutional 
government.13 Later, the central government launched 
constitutional reforms and promoted self-government at the 
local level. In 1909, it issued the “ Regulation for the 
Local Self-Government of Cities, Towns and Rural 
Communities". These gave rise to numerous self-government 
bodies in the township and county areas. 
However, the Shanghai City Council was established in 
1905, four years before the promulgation of regulations. 
We should not surprise when we examined the tradition of 
Shanghai merchants and gentry's cooperation in management 
of local affairs, utilizing the well-established guild and 
benevolent halls as organizational means, as we discussed 
in chapter three. The immediate precursor of the City 
Council was the South City Roadworks Board, founded in 
1895, for the purpose ofroad-building, was also based on 
societal initiatives. 
In addition, due to the flourishing printing industry 
in Shanghai, most new Western thoughts reached there first 
before relaying to the inland. Thus Shanghai became the 
centre of activities for both the constitutionalists and 
12. Elvin 1969: 41. 
13. zhu Ying 1991: 167-78. 
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revolutionaries. Numerous newspapers and journals, edited 
by these activists, were circulated among the literate 
circles in the city and exerted implicit influence upon the 
local gentry and merchants, not to mention the Westernized 
intelligentsia and students. Among various thoughts, 
�elf-government, represented one of the most practical way 
led to the national strength while coincidently enhanced 
the right and autonomy of citizens, and so were welcomed by 
the local elite. Moreover, after the abolition of imperial 
examination in 1905, the local gentry also wanted to find 
a new way of preserving their privileges and the local 
self-government provided a new channel.^^ 
Under this circumstances, an eminent local gentry, Li 
Zhongjue ( o r Li Pingshu蓬平書),suggested to the 
Shanghai 工ntendant. Yuan Shuxun (备套勢),to replace the 
South City Roadworks Board by a new self-government body 
and was permitted. ^^ 
With respect to the functions performed, --"to manage 
all matters connected with main roads, electric lightings, 
and police in the city and its suburbs to collect 
special taxes and to run its own police court"^^ ~ it 
could be regarded as an expanded version of the duty in 
which the gentry and merchants in Shanghai had already 
14. Li Dajia 1993: 183. 
Zhang Zhongli 1990: 630-1. 
16. Elvin 1974: 250. 
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performed. But this time, their autonomy was stipulated 
and guaranteed by law. 
What is more remarkable is its structure and the 
democratic procedures it practised, it "may well have been 
the first Chinese institutions of any kind in which the 
making of policy was formally separated from its 
execution.":?乂 Policy was made by a Consultative Assembly 
�乂(二ishi Hui 綠 奢 售 ) w i t h 33 consulting directors (yidong 
漆重）• They were selected by electoral procedure. Everyone 
who had resided in the city for more than five years and 
paid more than 10 yuan for local taxes annually have the 
rights to vote. Although only about two percent of the 
local residents could vote, and most elected directors were 
degree-holding gentry and merchant leaders of local 
guilds, 18 nevertheless this represented a democratic 
breakthrough to the traditional institutions or organiz-
ations in China, as the latter's directors were either 
appointed or selected by consensus only. 
Moreover, the affairs that the Council has to 
undertake will be discussed and approved by the consulting 
directors, before carried out by an Executive Committee 
(Dongshi Hui ‘ 看 ),the core of which consisted of 
five managing general directors (banshi 
17. Elvin 1974: 251. 
18. More detail on the constituent of the directors 
will be elaborated in later section of "The urban reformist 
elite". 
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Since it was not easy to arrive at agreed compromise on all 
iss'ues, the opposing parties would fight a 'battle of 
petitions'. And so "the Council Assembly was probably the 
first Chinese political institution in which open political 
struggle was regarded as a legitimate and even normal 
activity. "19 
In order to establish a rapport between the locality 
and the Council, some assistant officers were employed to 
collect public opinion of the local residents, so as to 
response to their demand. 
Although established as a self-government body, the 
local government bureaucracy could still exert control on 
the Council. The Shanghai Intendant had the authority to 
dissolve the Assembly and the resolutions of the Council 
could not be put into effect without the approval of the 
local officials. Nevertheless, without the cooperation and 
financial support from the gentry and merchants, most 
projects could not be implemented. Thus the authority 
devoted to the officials was usually appeared on paper 
regulations only and the directors attained high level of 
autonomy. 
Therefore, we have seen that a group of active urban 
elite-- gentry and merchants, now through the formalization 
19. Elvin 1969: 54. 
20. Elvin 1974: 253. 
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of their power by the City Council, assumed more public 
responsibilities and diversified tasks at a local level. 
These included philanthropy, the maintenance of public 
order, the upkeep of canals and dykes and even involved 
problems of city planning.^^ But the more important was 
the introduction of democratic procedures into the 
institution. Although only presented in limited f o r m s , 
"it neverthe^less testified to the urban elite's ability to 
evolve towards both democracy and administrative 
efficiency. 
Furthermore, the elite had to make use of the 
opportunity provided by this New Policies institution to 
increase their influence in a legitimate manner, win the 
support of the masses and also advance propaganda for 
constitutionalism and democracy. As we will examine in 
chapter seven, the strength of the elite consolidated in 
the local self-government also contributed to the success 
of the 1911 Revolution in Shanghai in relatively peaceful 
way. 
b. The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce 
Another institution, which has close ties to the • 
traditional merchant organizations (native-place 
21. For example, the demolition of the city walls in 
Shanghai and the related controversy, see Elvin 19 69: 55-6. 
22. This refers to the limited size of electorates. 
Bergere 1989: 54. 
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associations and guilds), was the Shanghai General Chamber 
of Commerce. 24 Through some community-wide services, 
traditional merchant organizations gradually transformed 
. i t s exclusive nature. But with respect to business 
affairs, the guilds still lacked any unity among them-
selves. This meant that each guild argued for its own 
interests and thus rendered consensus impossible. The 
competition among the Chinese merchants prevented them from 
cooperating in order to meet the threat of the foreign 
merchants. This circumstance aroused the concern of Sheng 
xuanhuai ( 盛 f f ^ ),when he was appointed as the 
Imperial Commissioner for Revision of the Coitimercial 
Treaties in 1902. He found that the foreign chambers, 
represented symbols of the unity strength of the Western 
merchants, regularly collected commercial information and 
supplied it to their government negotiators, so his rivals 
were better informed while he lacked any consensus from the 
Chinese merchants. In order to bring organizational unity 
to the Shanghai business cominunity, Sheng asked Yan Xinhou 
J ^ ), the leader of the Ningbo Guild and general 
manager of Imperial Bank of China in Shanghai, to prepare 
for the establishment of a commercial association. As a 
result, the Shanghai Commercial Consultative Association 
(Shanghai shanye huiyi gongsuo 上 ； 急 禽 嚷 看 議 么 所)，was 
formed in 1902 and became the forerunner of the Shanghai 
24. Data on the Shanghai General Chamber is adopted 
from Chan 1977; Fewsmith 1983 and 1985; and Xu Dingxin 
1991. 
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General Chamber of Commerce.- Yan himself was appointed 
as^h^ first president. His fellow Ningboese Zhou Jinbiao 
( M j 卷 J M ) was selected as vice-president. 
There were two prominent characteristics in the 
leadership structure. Firstly, most of them were directors 
or high-level officers of the local guilds and native-place 
associations. "Such a continuity in leadership personnel 
contributed imineasurably to a relatively smooth transition 
from late traditional to early modern merchant institu-
tions. Secondly, most chamber leaders were the Ningbo 
merchants. Until the 1920s, Zeng Zhu (§圣禽）， head of the 
Fujian Guild, was the only one non-Ningbo merchants to be 
president. The board of directors were also dominated by 
them. It appeared as the General Chamber with only limited 
base of support. However, with respect to the size and 
influence of Ningo merchants in Shanghai community,27 this 
nevertheless facilitated the chamber as a cohesive body in 
common actions, either for business interests or political 
purposes, instead of promoting factionalism. 
As we have examined before, the Ministry of Commerce 
was established in 1903 as part of imperial administrative 
reforms. Its' first task was to seek imperial approval for 
a national network of chambers of commerce under a uniform 
25. Fewsmith 1983: 630-6; Xu Dingxin 1991: 37-58. 
26. Chan 1977: 216. 
27. See Jones 1974. 
# 
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set of rules, so as to promote the unity among merchants 
themselves. It also served as a means of mobilizing the 
energies of the society in the service of a policy of 
economic modernization. But for more important reason, 
"the chamber of commerce was meant to operate as a 
mechanism of administrative and political control over the 
local commercial communities, and to serve as a supporting 
institution that by-passed the regular provincial 
bureaucracy and carried out the ministry's directives at 
the local level."28 it was hoped that in this way, the 
decentralization force of provincial authorities would be 
countered in some extent. 
After the imperial decree authorizing the founding of 
chambers of commerce, Shanghai was the first to follow. 
The Shanghai Commercial Consultative Association then drew 
up a new constitution and changed its name to the Shanghai 
General Chamber of Commerce (Shanghai shanwu zonghui 
勒 務 然 會 i n 19�4.29 一 ‘ 
There was only a slight change in the leadership 
structure. Democratic procedures was introduced in the 
selection of the Consulting Directors, and those two gained 
with the highest numbers of vote were elected as the 
president and vice-president respectively. 
28. Chan 1977: 225. 
A 
29. xu Dingxin 1991: 58-9; Chan 1977: 218. 
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in regard to its functions, the first one was to 
enhance the unity among local merchants, since the Chamber 
was a legitimized agency, and the directors had quasi-
official status, it could claim community-wide jurisdiction 
and arbitrate among disputed merchants and guilds. 
Secondly, to narrow the gulf between merchants and 
officials by presenting merchant opinions to the local and 
central government authority. Thirdly, and the most 
important one, was to enhance the competitive ability of 
the Chinese merchants against the threat of the foreigners. 
This purpose was achieved through the founding of merchant 
study groups, compiling statistical surveys on various 
trade and sponsoring commercial exhibitions. Thus the 
Chamber facilitated their dedication to the needs of 
modernization. 
Since its establishment, it had already expressed its 
viewed on important issues concerning the vital interests 
of themselves and the nation, for example, the drafting of 
commercial laws. It also proposed suggestions to the 
government in favour of constitutionalism, protection of 
local enterprises and against imperial aggression. 
However, the merchant leaders' commitment to the ideas of 
reform quickly plunged enthusiastically into other civic 
activities, and even political activities. The Anti-
American Boycott launched by the Shanghai merchants, which 
we shall elaborate in the next chapter, was a good example. 
They rejected the subsidiary role the central government 
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intended for the chamber. in an era of rising national-
istic affection and social instability, the i膽ediate 
consequence of this institutionalization and the 
formalization of the power only speeded up their 
development into political group. 
As a result, these New Policies institution (both the 
Chamber and the City Council) became the local elite's 
sources of legitimacy in assuming more independent 
strength. In some provinces, the chambers even cooperated 
with the governors and local officials to act against the 
imperial government. In short, the origin purpose of 
centrally directed mobilization on local economic and 
social force, through the establishment of new institu-
tions, in order to commit both modernization and 
centralized control, only mobilized elite into open 
confrontation with the existing system of government and 
enhanced state-societal struggles. 
c.Political Press and the formation of Public Opinion 
Press also played pronounced role in institution-
alizing public sphere by evoking a practice of rational— 
critical discourse on political matters. 
The first press founded in Shanghai was the North 
China Herald in 1850 by a British merchant and the first 
Chinese Press was Shanghai Xinbao (上省勒報）’founded 
in 1861. However, at that time, the press mainly carried 
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commercial information to facilitated the business 
activities in the treaty port. News on social affairs was 
only constituted as residual elements, and comment on any 
political issues was absolutely prohibited.30 
The Reform Movement launched by Kang Youwei and Liang 
Qichao after 1894 started the use of press to advocate 
their reform ideas. This brought a transformation in the 
function of the press. Since Kang considered Shanghai as 
"a focal link between south and north, where so many 
gentry — literati coiiverge"3i, Liang and other Kang's 
students published several newspaper in there. The most 
well known one was Shiwubao ( 骑 翁 ) • This also 
provoked a blooming period in the founding of newspapers. 
Among the 47 newspapers published before 1911, 28 of them 
were newly established between 1894 to 1911 
After the failure of Kang's One Hundred Days of Reform 
in 1898, the locus of challenging official power shifted 
outside of the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, critical reasoning 
entered the press, supplementing the news with learned 
articles and comments and quickly creating a new genre of 
political press. It became an important base of political 
opposition at the turn of the century. 
30. Hu Daijing 1934b: 947-8. 
31. Quoted in Chang Hao 1980: 294. 
32. Hu Daijing 1934a: 220-41. 
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Shibao 喊後),one of the most innovative represent-
atives of the late Qing political press, founded in 1904 by 
the exiled Liang Qichao in Shanghai, has been the focus of 
study by Joan Judge. ^^ According to her study, in the 
turbulent final years of Qing rule, public opinion or yulan 
(澳搞）rapidly evolved from a political construction 
into an organized force contesting government authority and 
became a key force in the late Qing political public 
sphere. The Shibao journalists and editors deliberately 
directed it as both a moulder and a mobilizer of public 
opinion. 
In this regard, they brought in a new role to the 
press of not simply relaying the information to the people, 
but also to educate, uplift and politicize the public. 
Political press thus developed a new mode of represent-
ation, as different from other three tradition modes of 
representation that formulate and express the thoughts of 
the cominon people: the imperial, official and elite modes. 
By empowering the people with knowledge, they would enable 
the public to give judgements on issues which had 
previously been the exclusive domain of the higher 
authorities. The journalists then took it upon themselves 
to put these judgements into becoming the source of a 
unified and strong public opinion and strengthen it as a 
political force. This reflected their sophisticated 
33. The following part is based on the study of Judge 
1994. 
113 
understanding of the roles of the modern press in forcing 
the transition from autocratic to public politics. 
Recognizing the important function of the modern 
press, the journalists and editors (most of them were also 
political activists as members of provincial assemblies, 
constitutional preparation associations and commercial 
railway companies) advanced bold new political claims such 
as establishing the national parliament and creating 
independent judiciary body to secure freedom of press and 
protect public opinion. 
As the sphere of public political space expanded after 
19 05 with the advancing of various political events^ 
creation of citizens organizations, 34 new arenas were 
formed where more issues were put forward in the press and 
could be discussed, and public opinion slowly disciplined 
into a political force. 
C. The Urban Reformist Elite 
After we have examined each of the institutions 
individually, we now discuss the actors that played leading 
roles in the tension-charged field of a developing public 
sphere. 
In here, we adopt a term proposed by Joseph W. 
Esherick -- the urban reformist elite -- to describe this 
34^  These will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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group Of actors. 35 In an attempt to define the urban 
reformist elite, one natural point is based on the 
membership of the institutions described above. But now I 
choose the membership of the Shanghai City Council, instead 
of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, as an example 
to illustrate the composition and the nature of the elite 
because the latter was only composed of merchants while the 
social basis of the urban elite groups dominated in the 
Shanghai society were more represented by the City Council, 
which composed of both gentry and merchant class. 
Wu Guilong has collected virtually complete data on 
the background of prominent consulting directors and 
managing general directors in the Shanghai City Council 
from 1905 to 1911.36 According to his data, in the forty-
five directors examined, 16 (36%) of them were gentry in 
origin, 21 ( 46%) of them were merchants in origin and 8 ( 
18%) of them have not any data on their background. 
For the gentry directors, most of them held official 
degrees and eight of them ( out of eleven) even belonged to 
the "upper gentry", in accordance with the criteria set by 
Chang Chung-li.^'^ Other directors obtained gentry status 
through their extra—bureaucratic leadership role in local 
35. See Esherick 1976: 66-105. 
36. Wu Guilong 1983 • 
37. See Chang 1955: 3-32. The upper gentry included 
jinshi ( 造 j ), juren ) � ) and gongsheng (类生）• 
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affairs, such as public welfare and education. But no 
matter they held official degrees or not, their influence 
were rooted in the educational and charitable establish-
ments and in their official connections. Li Zhongjue 
錄 : d ^ ) ' the General Director of the City Council, was a 
former xian magistrate, and also a pioneer of setting up 
Westernized hospitals and clean waterworks in Shanghai. 
Yao Wennan (^^^ ^ ^ ), the speaker of the Consultative 
Assembly, was chairman of the organization of the local 
educational bodies. Others, like Mo Xilun (复有资确) 
and Lu Wenlu (尸;J：又 1 ) , had made their careers 
in the 
administration of charities. • 
For the merchant directors, most of them were pre-
eminent in the local guilds and chambers of commerce. Two 
of them, Zeng Zhu (售童禽)and Zhu Baosan (^C/j^^ ), 
became president of the General Chamber of Commerce later, 
and Zeng was also the leader of the anti-American boycott 
in 1905. Zhang Jiannain ( ) and Gu Lugu ( 
肩奚 毛 ）were the guild leaders of soya bean and flour 
trade respectively. Wang Zhen ( 二 二 ) was a comprador, 
president of the south city chamber of commerce and later 
became revolutionary. Yu Huaizhi (我Ml智)had studied 
at the government's foreign language school in Shanghai and 
had become a merchant, head of the Clothes Guild, an 
advocate of improved methods of cotton cultivation and a 
philanthropist. These merchants made use of economic 
opportunities in Shanghai to produce huge wealth. 
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Typically, they had purchased degrees or been awarded 
honourary rank, but they also enjoyed prestige based on 
their business success. 
We noted that some of them, such as Zeng Zhu and Zhu 
Baosan, were also the leaders of the General Chamber of 
Commerce. Some were guild leaders. Some gentry leaders 
were chairmen of the educational associations. The fact 
that the same people headed the various organizations 
facilitated the development of direct contacts between 
these organizations and increased the influence over local 
affairs. Moreover, most directors, especially the merchant 
one, had established widespread interconnected horizontal 
networks mainly in the regions of the Yangtze Valley and 
southeast coast, through their business activities or 
native-place ties. This increased elite capacity to 
mobilize wide range of support in some national political 
events, as shown in the following chapters. 
Then, can we identify these merchants to bourgeoisie, 
as comparable to the French and English bourgeoisie of the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries that gave rise to the 
public sphere in the Western Europe? According to Marie-
Claire Bergere,s analysis, "if, by bourgeoisie, we mean a 
class which devotes itself to industrial development on the 
basis of free enterprise and in accordance with the laws of 
economic rationality, the answer must be no".38 Although 
38. Bergere 1989: 59. 
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some directors acted as managers of government-sponsored 
industrial enterprises (for example, Li Zhongjue was 
appointed as directors of the China Merchants, steam 
Navigation Company in 1907) or established industrial 
plants (for example, Gu Lugu established several flour 
mills factories from 1905 to 1910), the merchants earned 
their wealth mainly from traditional business activities. 
There is little evidence that the merchants had important 
economic interests in the modern sector of the economy. 
Modern sector and the profits from it was too weak to 
support the growth of bourgeoisie at that time. "It was 
not until the First World War that the new bourgeoisie 
really sprang into action. "39 
Then it is worth asking: What factors contributed to 
their participation in the City Council or more broadly, 
what factors unified them as a group? Actually, cooper-
ation between them was not started from, and also not 
limited to this self-government body. They had cooperated 
with one another in philanthropy education, other New 
Policies institutions as well as business and politics. 
That means the institutional bases for elite assertion of 
power was not suddenly interjected by the state but 
accumulated through decades of extra-bureaucratic 
initiatives. 
Actually, the major factor unifying the various urban 
Bergere 1983: 721. 
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groups was rooted in their common concern of community 
interests, and their commitment to a spirit of social 
reform and modernity. 
Since the elite regarded Shanghai as their working and 
living places, they became increasingly preoccupied with 
how to improve its conditions to facilitate their various 
community activities. The settlements thus was set up as 
a model upon which they could learn on. However, in 
addition to these institutional influence, the presence and 
collaboration with the foreigners brought about a much 
profound change. Some elite, especially the compradors, 
began to acquire with the Western style of life, spoke in 
pidgin English and wear jackets and trousers instead of 
thin long blue silk robes. Behind this superficial 
Westernization, was their ideology change and their 
adoption of a new values of urban society that was unique 
to the treaty ports. The core of this new values was 
modernism. Based on their experience in the treaty port, 
they recognised that the West was in a more advanced stage 
than China, and so they were not reluctant to borrow from 
the West, no matter whether this is modern education or 
democracy. They thus preoccupied with the question of 
modernization and treated Shanghai as a model upon which to 
encourage the emergence of a modernizing and cosmopolitan 
China. However, their business interests and conservative 
attitude made them more incline towards a stable social and 
economic environment. They preferred a more moderate way 
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of reform instead of radical revolutions. Therefore, they 
were both reformers and modernizers， 
D. Concluding Remarks 
The image of the urban reformist elite that emerge is 
of a gradually coalescing body of individuals, some with 
traditional gentry credentials while others were merchant 
in status. They moved to Shanghai to seek fortunes or a 
new way of life. Under the impact of Western presence, 
they became sincerely advocates of reform along Western 
lines. Their political ideology was reformist and 
modernism. The New Policy reforms launched by the 
government provided new institutions to legitimate their 
activities. Thus the combination of existing public 
activism and new institutions accelerated elite social 
mobilization at the end of the Qing era and contributed to 
its movement in more overtly political directions. A 
separate domain separated from the private domestic domain 
and the public authority was clearly formed and a public 
I 
sphere was said to emerge. "It turned the reproduction of 
life into something transcending the confines of private 
domestic authority and becoming a subject of public 
interest, that zone of continuous administrative contact 
between 'critical' also in the sense that it provoked the 
critical judgement of a public making use of its reason. 
40. Bergere 1989: 46-51. 
4 � Habermas 1989: 24. 
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However, the public sphere emerged was not totally 
autonomous, as the elite at the end of the Qing period were 
also not separated from the state. Relationships between 
the elite and state were complex. They would cooperate in 
some anti-imperialist movement (for example, the Anti-
American Boycott we shall depict in Chapter Five) but the 
usual relationship was in conflict and struggles (for 




Chapter F i v e ^ b l i c Sphere in A P H ^ ^ 
•The Anti-American Boycott in IQfK 
A. Background 
As the institutional bases and the actors were all 
prepared, it is necessary to give an account of how the 
public sphere manifested its function in the rising 
political turnmoil era of late Qing. Among various events 
arose in Shanghai, some were particularly worth attention 
not only on the widespread national influence exerted, but 
also on their appearance as brand new type of political 
discourse which were departed from traditional Chinese 
political behaviour. The anti-American boycott in 1905 was 
the first instance selected. 
A boycott is essentially an economic mean of bringing 
pressure on a foreign nation with the hope of altering the 
course of the nation's actions. It has already occurred in 
the conflict between the Ningbo Guild in Shanghai and the 
authorities of the French Concession in 1874 and 1898.^ 
But only beginning with the anti-American boycott in 19 05, 
boycotts became more national in scope and nationalistic in 
spirit, spread beyond the confine of guilds, trades or 
locality and assumed unique importance in twentieth century 
1. For detail on the Incident of the Ningbo Guild, 
please refer to Chapter Three. 
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China. 
The anti-American boycott in 1905^ was an important 
mass response to American i職igration regulations and 
procedures towards the Chinese. Restrictions on Chinese 
immigration were started in the I膽igration Treaty of 1880 
which gave the United Stares the right to regulate Chinese 
Labourers. In 1882, the U.S. Congress passed the Restric-
tion Act which excluded Chinese labourers for a period of 
ten years. After many supplementary Act and bill for 
further restrictions, another treaty was signed between the 
United States and China in 1894 that provided for the 
absolute exclusion of all Chinese labourers for a period of 
ten years. In 1904, this treaty expired and the Chinese 
government refused to renew it and insisted upon a revision 
of the whole exclusion policy. This was the immediate 
cause of the boycott in 19 05.3 
However, it seems strange that little public protest 
was voiced in China in the 1880s and the 1890s when the 
i 
treaties were first enacted. Only in the 1900s, after the 
exclusion treaties had already implemented for twenty 
years, the renewal of the treaty aroused nationalistic 
feeling. 
2. Data on this boycott is adopted from Zhang Cunwu 
1965; Field 1957; Reiner 1933 : 29-39; Xu Dingxin 1991: 67-
92 and He Zuo 1956. 
3. Remer 1933: 29-30; Liao 1990: 62-3; Zhang Cunwu 
1965: 1-25. 
123 
Actually, the first decade of the twentieth century 
can be identified as a period of rising nationalism and 
political temper. The defeat in the Boxer Uprising and the 
increased foreign encroachment on the sovereign rights of 
China led to a heightened resentment of foreigners and a 
new awareness of the weakness of the Chinese government. 
However, throughout Chinese history, the vast majority 
of the people lacked the level of literacy necessary to 
make public use of their reason and were therefore excluded 
from the realm of political debate. The barbarous and 
foolish ways adopted by the Boxers in responses to foreign 
aggression also stimulated a group of intelligentsia to 
launch a purposeful social movement known as the ‘lower 
class enlightenment' in order to educate the mass and 
disseminate modern knowledge. The instrument of enlighten— 
ment included vernacular newspapers, pamphlets, public 
billboards, reading clubs, libraries, lecture troupes, old-
style opera and new-style plays. The most exciting 
endeavour of popular enlightenment was the wide social 
J 
diversity of its participants, from beggars and singsong 
girls to the returned students and the traditional gentry. 
Contents of public enlightenment were turned to public 
issues related to the daily lives of the people一一 anti-
opium and anti-footbinding campaigns, discriminated by 
foreigners and etc/ its significant impact was ascribed 
4. For detail, see Li Xiaoti 1992. 
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to some social groups that were previously neglected, such 
as women, military men, workers, peasants and youth, and 
now became the enlightened mass and alerted to social 
issues. They gradually attained higher level of solidarity 
and were prepared as potential forces for any social 
mobilization. 
Meanwhile, the late Qing ,New Policies' reforms also 
provided channels for the new urban reformist elite to 
participate in many new institutions, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Thus, the elite and the mass, because of 
an increased understanding of the West and an awakening to 
the immediate danger faced by China, were progressively 
developed nationalistic sentiments. They sought protection 
for national interest and the restoration of national 
rights.5 
Perhaps another important influence was the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905. The victory of Japan, an Asian 
nation, over Russia, a Western power, triggered an upsurge 
I 
of nationalism throughout Asia, and China was no exception. 
In fact, during the boycott on 1905, Japan was setting as 
a powerful example of what an Asian nation could do. 
Therefore, it is inexorably that the boycott emerged 
in this ,period of tidal change,, as in Mary C, Wright 
Liao 1990: 59. 
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,felicitous phase/ but not in previous decades. 
B. The Development of Boycott 
In January 1904, the Chinese government notified to 
the State Department of the United States that because of 
to both the provisions of the American iiamigra-
tion treaties and the manner in which they were applied, it 
decided to revise the Treaty of 1894 when it was expired in 
December. This suggestion was refused by the United 
States. Instead, more restrictive treaty would be 
imposed.7 
When the news was first transmitted to Shanghai, it 
stirred agitation among the business community. since the 
treaty chiefly affected the Southern provinces such as 
Guangdong and Fujian, from which most Chinese emigrated to 
the United states, thus their guilds in Shanghai reacted in 
the most vociferous manner. As a result, a large group of 
merchants met in the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce 
on May 10. Through intense discussion, a compromise was 
I 
reached. In order to bring pressure to bear both on the 
United States and on the Chinese government so that the new 
treaty should provide for a more equitable treatment of 
Chinese entering into, and living in the United States, an 
economic boycott would be imposed on all American goods. 
6. Wright 1968. 
7. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 14-25. 
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The boycott would be started on July 20, so that a period 
of two months were allowed for the revision of treaty.« 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i t w a s d e c i d e d t o t e l e g r a p h t o t h e 
Foreign Ministry at Beijing. Telegrams were also sent to 
the various merchant guilds at twenty one trade centres, 
including Hankou' Tianjin, Zhongqing, Canton, Xiamen, 
Changsha and Hong Kong, explaining the intention of the 
Shanghai merchants to boycott American goods.^ 
Discussion and agitation continued throughout the 
month of June. Support for the boycott also spread 
throughout China. At that time, the American Minister, Mr. 
Rockhill, requested Prince Qing (乂曼见王），head of the 
Foreign Minister of the Chinese government, take steps to 
suppress the movement. In the reply to Rockhill, Prince 
Qing stated) "this movement has not been inaugurated 
without some reason, for the restrictions against Chinese 
entering America are too strong and American exclusion laws 
are extremely inconvenient to the Chinese. •“� Actually, in 
I 
the first stage of the boycott, the Chinese government 
sympathized with the merchants' action and came close to 
actual support of it. Some provincial governors even 
apparently encouraged the movement. For example, Cen 
8. Reiner 1933: 31-2; Zhang Cunwu 1965: 43. 
9. Field 1957: 65; Zhang Cunwu 1965: 43-4. 
10. Field 1957: 83; Zhang Cunwu 1965: 71; Reiner 1933 : 
34. 
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Chunxuan (J^秦後),the Governor-General of Guangdong and 
Guangxi, was accused by the American Consul to give support 
to the boycott and so repeatedly demanded the punishment of 
him. Under this favourable conditions, the boycott was 
definitely declared to be in effect after United States 
suspended still the negotiation on the treaty on July 20. 
C. Organization and Leadership 
In order to foster and maintain the boycott, so as to 
make it effective, organizational support is required. In 
the initial phase of the boycott, the Shanghai General 
Chamber of Commerce acted as the centre of movement because 
of its nature as representative of various guilds in 
Shanghai. Zeng Zhu, head of the Fujian Guild in Shanghai, 
emerged as the leader of the movement after he sent out 
telegrams asking for the cooperation of guilds in other 
cities on May 10 meeting. An informal organization, 
consisting of those merchants with most interests in the 
cause, worked during June and early July. Under Zeng's 
support, this group built up a propaganda machine to keep 
the issue in the public mind.^ ^ Nevertheless, no formal 
organization or committee was formed within the General 
Chamber to launch the boycott throughout the movement. 
At the same time, other committees, for example the 
Renj ing Study Society ( 义 凌 | � 學 孔 ) a n d the Gongzhong 
11. Field 1957： 67-8. 
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Lecture Troupe (�、沪 终）勤� ^ 
P ( "/�次[/笼）’were stablished by some 
scholars and gentry. Various guilds were also the centre 
of activities among residents from different native places. 
However, no attempt was made to merge these groups into one 
general organization. It was mainly sprang from the 
leaders of the General Chamber, such as Yan Xinhou, Zhou 
Jinbiao and Xu Run (才良激)refused to allow the Chamber 
taking any aggressive political role. They even repudiated 
to send telegrams in their names in asking for the coopera-
tions of guilds in other cities from the beginning. It 
became more apparent when the boycott brought about huge 
economic loss to the merchants and induced conflict and 
division among the Chamber's leaders. When the government 
started to take active steps in suppressing the movement on 
September, the Chamber then retreated from any involvement 
further. This led to the decline of the movement in 
Shanghai. 
To make a boycott effective, an organizational 
勺 jJ cLe. 
structure is indispensable to gui^ rd the whole movement and 
I 
pressure the merchants to follow. However, we need not 
blame too much on the Chamber. It was the first time for 
it to participate in such political action since its 
establishment in 1902, which was completely departed from 
its normal activities. Moreover, its involvement in the 
initial stage conducive the boycott attained such large 
scale and national influence, since the Chamber had 
established widespread networks among guilds in various 
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cities. It was demonstrated as an effective institution in 
the ongoing political mobilization. 
Later that year, Zeng Zhu was elected as chairman of 
the Chamber. This provided an illustration of how mass 
political issues could intersect internal Chamber politics. 
Thus it was inevitably the Chamber would slowly emerge as 
a political body. � 
D. Methods 
In order to make the boycott achieved a significant 
degree of success, the boycott spirit must be infused in a 
large segment of the public through various methods. The 
chief weapon employed was the pen. 
The press in Shanghai played substantial role in 
fostering and maintaining the agitation in June and July 
and in sustaining a high pitch of sentiment after the 
beginning of the boycott on July 20. Shenbao and Shibao ； 
I 
were the most active, not only in producing full reports on 
the progress of the boycott but also as a mouthpiece for 
the promoters.12 Accounts of meetings and announcements of 
the leaders were published and circulated among the reading 
public. Cartoons represented scenes of American abusing 
Chinese and boycott activities were published for those 
Zhang Cunwu 1965: 51-2. 
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illiterate and children. The significance of the Shanghai 
press lay also in the extent of its distribution. Even 
gentry in the countryside of Jiangsu were well informed 
about the boycott.i3 An American consular viewed that if 
the press was not allowed to publish inflammatory articles, 
the movement would not achieved such large s c a l e . ^ ^ 
Boycott literature was not only confined to the press. 
Fiction containing accounts of cruelties inflicted on 
Chinese by American, such as "The Sorrow Society" (Ku 
Shehui 碧 ; ) and "The Golden World" (Huangjing Shijie 
氣 令 i^f), were powerful in stimulating the popular 
sentiments on anti-American. ^^ 
Placards and circulars were widely employed. Placards 
announced meetings, listed tabooed goods and urged the 
Chinese not to buy or sell American goods. Most of them 
were moderate and merely stated “ don't buy or sell 
American goods." The circulars expressed lengthy reasoned 
appeals. For example, one of them remarked that "whether | 
1 
our people are to live or die and whether our country is to 
become strong or to remain weak depends absolutely upon the 
result of this movement". Some appealed to the nationa-
13, He Zuo 1956: 88. For the wide extent circulation 
of Shanghai press, especially on Shenbao, in the Yangtze 
Valley, see Rankin 1986: 141-2. 
14. Field 1957： 72. 
Zhang Cunwu 1965: 103-4. 
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listic sentiments, "a man ought to love his community and 
his country, he ought to protect his country just as he 
does his home". Obviously, such circulars were directed at 
the reading public. ^^ 
Mass meetings were another methods of uniting support. 
They were usually held at the Wuben School ( 孩 办 中 學 ) 
during July. In order to arise public sentiment, some 
Chinese immigrants were invited to illustrate how Chinese 
was being maltreated. The meeting on July 2 0 declared 
beginning of the boycott was attended by nearly 1500 people 
and the largest attendance reported was over 2 000 in late 
July .17 
In sum, the boycott movement could be characterized as i 
progress in peaceful manner. Throughout the boycott, no 
one was being killed or hurt. This was noteworthy when we 
compare with other popular movements, especially those 
related with anti—f oreignism, in the late imperial and 
early Republican era, not to mention the xenophobia that 
predominated the Boxer Rebellion. 
Actually, boycott is a civilized form of protest • 
against actions of foreign power. C. F. Reiner stated that: 
The boycott, or something like the boycott, has 
frequently been resorted to by groups who 
16. Quoted in Field 1957: 72-3. 
17. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 91-6; Field 1957: 73. 
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irlwht�he=selve= to be in a position of weakness = v ^ h o do not have access to the political machinery of the state.^^ 
in modern China, the weakness of the Chinese government in 
the international scene encouraged the Chinese people to 
adopt this form of passive resistance and could hope to 
influence the policy of the foreign nation. This is 
explicitly expressed by a promoter of the boycott that 
"since our government failed to oppose foreign encroach-
ment, we should act in our way to assist her weakness in 
foreign affairs. "19 
In order to avoid any bloody dispute and thus induce 
the interference of both the Chinese government and the 
United States in the boycott movement, the leaders 
emphasized the efforts should be resorted to non-violent 
coercion, mainly through economic sanction. This was 
achieved by two means: firstly, not to maltreat any 
foreigner, especially the American, in China. It was hoped 
that the foreigners would then sympathetic to their 
position and force a reconsideration of the U. S. 
I 
immigration policies .2� 
Another way was to appeal to reasoned rational 
arguments by the leaders of the boycott through press, 
18. Reiner 1933: 8. 
19. Quoted in Zhang Cunwu 1965: 47. 
20. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 75-80. 
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circulars and mass meetings that it was justified to use 
boycott as a method of retaliatory coercion in the inter-
national community when complaints confined to ordinary 
diplomatic channels were failed. Moreover, it was the 
individual rights not to use any American good and even the 




A successful boycott requires both firm adherence by 
merchants responsible for the importation of foreign goods 
and a well-organized opposition on the part of consumers. 
The role of Chinese merchants was apparently crucial 
to the economic effectiveness of this boycott. It was the 
Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce that exercised the 
initiative in convening the May 10 meeting and in tele-
graphing Beijing and other trade centres to support the 
boycott. 
After originally adopting the methods of boycotting 
American goods, some merchants in Shanghai were hesitant to 
enforce it. However, through the pressure of a few active 
merchants, students and the native press, with the leader-
ship of Zeng Zhu, the merchant community reaffirmed its 
2� Zhang Cunwu 1965: 73-5. 
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adherence. The rally on July 20 in Shanghai included guild 
leaders and leading merchants in various trade. They 
signed a pledge not to buy the American goods .22 
Moreover, means of enforcement, such as fines, 
ostracism, expulsion, black-listing and other group 
pressures, were based on guilds' control over their 
membership. For example, a merchant was found by an 
'inspector' that he ordered two hundred bags of American 
flour secretly after the beginning of boycott, and so the 
goods were confiscated by the guild and he was required to 
give apology on the press.^^ By late August, substantial 
merchant support had been achieved, so that the American 
consul-general at Shanghai considered the boycott to be 
a l m o s t t o t a l l y e f f e c t i v e . 2 4 
I 
Notwithstanding, a boycott is clearly a two-edge sword 
which also imposes economic losses on those who wield it. 
This was especially true for those dealing directly with 
American trade and thus contributed to a split among the 
leaders. Some merchants obviously preferred a less extreme 
stand and reduced their efforts accordingly. The early 
weeks of September witnessed a marked decline in activity 
in Shanghai. The merchant enthusiasm was on the wane due 
22. xu Dingxin 1991: 76-8. 
23. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 99. 
24. Quoted in Field 1957: 75. 
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to economic losses appeared to have been crucial. It is 
also true that an imperial edict against the boycott had 
been issued on August 31 and that the Nanjing Governor-
General had taken some measures to suppress it .25 
The decline in merchant participation resulted in a 
reduction in general boycott effectiveness. Although the 
sentiment among the public which had reached such a high 
pitch could not immediately die out and the leadership 
slowly transferred to other social groups, it is clear that 
the boycott as a strong, concerted force had ended. 
b. Non-mercantile 
Consumer participation in the boycott was requisite 
I 
for the boycott to succeed. The active participation of 
the consumer, including students, gentry and women, "do 
give evidence that a feeling of solidarity spread beyond 
the confines of merchant groups to an extent unusual in 
Chinese experiences" .26 
i 
Student groups were of extremely important in the 
boycott movement. They helped to keep the idea alive in 
the early stage, exerted pressure on some hesitant 
merchants, and even assumed leadership as merchant support 
declined. 
25, Field 1957: 74-8； Zhang Cunwu 1965: 91-9, 147-55, 
193-211. 
26. Field 1957: 78. 
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‘ The Shanghai Educational Association (Hu Xuehui 鬼學 
representing about twenty-four colleges and schools, 
was students' centre of activities. On May 27, the 
Association met to express its approval of the decisions 
reached in the merchant May 10 meeting and adopted four 
measures demonstrated the types of non-economic activity in 
which students can participate. ^^ After the beginning of 
boycott, they formed some pickets to monitor the degree of 
enforcement in every shop and published circulars 
describing the harsh treatment of Chinese in America. 
In early September, after the disaffection of Shanghai 
merchants became apparent, students assumed the leadership 
role. The boycott as an economic weapon was largely 
ineffective by this time, but student speeches, seconded by-
press reports, continued.^^ 
Actually, scholars and gentry were the real supporters 
behind the students. They acted as supervisors and 
suggested what steps to resist the ratification of the | 
treaty with the United States and ways to make the boycott 
effective. Among them, Wu Yanren ( 羡 厂 ） w a s a good 
example. As a famous writer and editor, he wrote numerous 
articles and fiction to support the boycott. He also held 
various speeches organized by students and merchants to 
27. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 51. 
28. Field 1975: 80. 
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agitate the public sentiments .29 
Women provided an additional source of support. In 
the July 20 meeting in Shanghai, over one hundred women 
were present. There were also boycott rallies organized by 
women in Shanghai, usually held at the Wuben School and the 
Chengdong School ( )； those attending were 
mainly female teachers and students. They adopted some 
measures showing the types of activity in which women could 
participate. Support evinced by women, though on a small 
scale, attracted considerable attention in the foreign 
press in China. Its significance is underlined by the 
！ 
later development of female activities outside the confines 丨 
of their home. ^^ 
A general pattern of support can be portrayed. The 
merchants were the most prominent in the early stage of 
boycott, with a marked decline of their participation 
occurring, once political pressure from the government and 
severe economic pressure had been felt. Students | 
enthusiasm was strong from the beginning and continued 
after the merchants retreated their efforts. 
Boycott sentiment also spread to other diverse social 
segments of Chinese society, such as gentry, women and 
29. Zhang Cunwu 1965: 101-4. 
气 Zhang Cunwu 1965: 128-34; Field 1957: 80. 
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workers. This was resulted from the popular enlightenment 
launched by some Westernized intelligentsia in the treaty 
ports that responsible for the diffusion of new, imported 
ideologies. Moreover, the prevalence of modern schools, 
especially the women schools, in shanghai also contributed 
a lot to their rising political awareness. 
We thus envisage a new characteristic in the political 
discourse that was in principle inclusive to the public. 
In address to the institutional bases for the development 
of the public sphere, Habermas regarded inclusive, as 
oppose to exclusive, is a prime criteria: 
However exclusive the public might be in any 
given instance, it could never close itself off 
entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for 
it always understood and found itself immersed 
within a more inclusive public of all private 
people, persons who ——insofar as they were 
propertied and educated ——as readers, listeners 
and spectators could avail themselves via the 
market of the objects that were subject to 
discussion. The issues discussed became 
'general' not merely in their significance, but 
also in their accessibility: everyone had to be 
able to participate .31 ‘ 
I 
I I 
It is the wide range of social support that distin-
guished it from other reform movements, such as those 
launched by Kang Youwei in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century, which was confined to the high ranked 
scholars only.32 In fact, such societal initiatives 
manifested by the Shanghai citizens during the boycott 
Habermas 1989: 37. 
32, For more detail, see Chang Hao 1980. 
139 
could be seen as the legacy of numerous mobilizations 
cultivated by the elite since the second half of last 
century. But only from this time, it led into political 
direction and so we can justify that the public sphere in 
Shanghai started to assume political functions. 
F. Effects of the Boycott 
As discussed before, while the central government did 
not overtly support the boycott or openly use it as a 
weapon in treaty negotiations, it was in sympathy with the 
aims of the movement. However, on August 31, as a result 
of American pressure and because of fears that the 
agitation might get out of control, an imperial edict 丨 
I 
against the boycott was issued.33 The general effect of 
the edict seemed to accelerate a decline in the boycott in 
Shanghai, where support was already on the wane. 
i j 
The boycott, of course, brought economic loss to the | 
American merchants, but its effect was fairly well 
restricted to the South China, Shanghai and some Yangtze 
ports. The goods chiefly affected were cotton piece goods, 
kerosene oil and wheat f l o u r H o w e v e r , it needed not 
take much time for the trade to reach normal level as prior 
to the boycott. 
33, Zhang Cunwu 1965: 193-205; Field 1957: 83-4. 
Remer 1933: 39. 
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In addition, while no substantial changes in American 
iimigration policy were achieved, the boycott did bring 
about a marked improvement in the treatment of Chinese 
immigrants and bring the problem to the attention of the 
American public. Even President Roosevelt informed 
immigration officials that no mistreatment of the 'Chinese 
exempt classes, would be tolerated. ^^ Thus the boycott 
cannot be regarded as completely failure. 
F. Concluding Remarks 
The final question is: in what aspect can we regard 
the anti-American boycott on 1905 as the political public 
sphere manifested its function? Our argument is based on 
analysis that some traits of the boycott movement that, in 
one way, construct a new type of political discourse as 
distinguished from the traditional mode of political action 
• j 
and, in another way, fulfil the criteria of the public 
I j _ 
sphere in Habermas notion. 
Firstly, "discussion within such a public presupposed 
the problematization of areas that until then had not been 
questioned. "36 The domain of 'diplomatic affairs' was the 
object in which the state authorities had the monopoly of 
dealing with in accordance with the interests of state. 
However, beginning from the second half of the nineteenth 
35. Field 1953: 86-8. 
气 Habermas 1989: 36. 
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century, the weakness of the Chinese government to oppose 
foreign encroachments and other diplomatic relations 
encouraged the Chinese people to act in its place. Thus 
the boycott was an important mass response to an inter-
national issue in China. They defined the issue as 
affecting on all the citizens in China and so they have the 
rights to participate. The government finally acted 
against the boycott, but only for fear of exciting more 
trouble and not because it was illegal. The boycott also 
marked the first time the Chinese public used their 
collective strength to try to influence national political 
issues. As a result, this paved the struggle against 
foreign domination and pressure for the restoration of 
mining and railroad rights.37 
Secondly, the use of rational-critical argument at the 
resolution of political dispute and not restored to 
violence. The boycott itself was peaceful and legally 
acceptable in the international community, unlike the Boxer 
Rebellion. Moreover, rational and reasoned arguments were 
expressed on the press as public opinion to justify the 
boycott action itself. This was explicitly expressed in 
one of the slogan of the boycott: ,Civilized Resistance, 
(wenming dizhi 乏明狐/划） 
• This will be examined in the next chapter. 
38. Xu Dingxin 1991: 85. 
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Thirdly, as discussed before, the boycott was 
inclusive in principle. The mobilization of diverse social 
groups including merchants, scholars, students and other 
people in the boycott was a great step forward in Chinese 
political movement. As notes by C. F. Reiner: 
[The boycott] reveals a willingness on the part 
of • the Chinese to make sacrifices in order to 
gain broad objectives, a willingness which marks 
a growing spirit of Chinese nationalism. 
Liang Qichao also praised that: 
The cooperation among the Chinese displayed, the 
high level of knowledge they attained and the 
civilized means they employed during the boycott 
movement have not occurred even five years 
before .40 
It is not an accident that Shanghai emerged as the 
centre of the boycott movement. The presence of settle-
ments and the daily encounter with the foreigners in the 
treaty port constituted an experience among the Chinese 
I 
residents that the West was both a threat and a model to 
them. The foreign intervention usually took the form of 
economic expansion in the treaty port, and it threatened 
China's general interest. This heightened their nation-
alistic affection. Instead of appealing to xenophobia that 
predominated in the inland area, they tried to cooperate 
with them to make personal profits for themselves. The 
boycott thus represented the dilemma of both protest and 
39. Remer 1933: 35. 
40. Quoted in Xu Dingxin 1991: 87. 
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.•； 
compromise.41 Nevertheless, the boycott was a turning 
point in the politicization of Shanghai merchants and the 
General Chamber, or more broadly, the Shanghai reformist 
elite and the representative institutions. 
Moreover, the presence of various institutions for 
activities (such as the General Chamber and the Educational 
Association), the wide circulation of press, the presence 
of both a group of urban reformist elite and politically 
aware public and the concentration of business activities 
also attributed to Shanghai as pivot of the boycott. 
1 
i 
I I ! 
41. Bergere 1989: 50-1. 
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Chapter Six. PiihliV Sphere in artinn TT. 
The Constitutional movement in 1Q10 
In the period between the anti-American boycott in 
1905 and the 1911 Revolution, two widespread national 
movements were worth mentioned. The first of these was the 
Rights Recovery Movement, which aimed at recovery of rights 
ceded to foreigners, chiefly mining and railway construc-
tion contracts, and reached high tide in struggle against 
the Shanghai—Hangzhou—Ningpo (Hu—Hang—Yong ) 
railway loan between 1907 to 1910• The second one was the 
Constitutional Movement, which reached high tide in the 
three petitions for the early convening of a parliament in 
1910. They were inter-related political mobilizations� 
involved the active participation of the elite activists in 
Shanghai and then led to the cumulative conflicts with the 
government. However, only the constitutional movement will 
be examined in here. It is because the Right Recovery 
Movement was anti-imperialist in nature, with character-
istics similar to the anti-American boycott examined in the 
previous chapter. In addition, it was a mobilization led 
by the elite sought for their economic rights while the 
constitutional movement was one that sought for their 
political rights, and so was more related to our main 
concern: public sphere functioned in political realm.‘ 
1 For more detail on the mutual reinforcement between 
these two movements, see Ceng Yunzhi 1992 and Rankin 1986: 
248-98. j 今5 
A. Background 
On September l, 1906, the Qing government issued an 
imperial decree on preparation for adoption of constitu-
tional government on the Western pattern, which was the 
main body of the New Policy reforms being implemented since 
1901. The elite activists in Shanghai thus responded 
enthusiastically. In December, Zhang Jian ( 從 雾 ） 
� 0 知、砍 ^ ^ & ‘ Tang Shouqian ( ； 匆 奇 ； 緊 ） ， Z e n g Zhu and others organized 
the first constitutional body -- the Constitutional Pre-
paration Association (Yubei lixian gonghui 覆 傷 ; ^ • 么 會 ） 
--in Shanghai. Its members included gentry and merchants 
from the Southeast provinces, but those from Shanghai were 
its core^. The association intended to promote the study 
and debate of the government‘s domestic and foreign 
policies. It also organized a society for the study of law 
and politics and a lecture club, so as to raise the level 
of understanding of the ordinary people and thus facilitate 
the introduction of constitutional rule. 
Meanwhile, the constitutional movement was rapidly 
taken shape after 1907. At that time, China was faced with 
serious threat from outside. The development of imperial-
ism by establishing spheres of influence upon China was not 
balanced enough. Japan, after the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905, had become an upstart strong imperialist country and 
was swelling her ambition to encroach upon China's 
2. see Zhang Yufa 1971: 365-70. 
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territory, especially the Three Northeastern Provinces. 
The united States, Britain, France, Russian and Germany 
were all carrying on their aggressive activities. However, 
they did not want to develop into open conflict and so they 
tried to readjust their relationships by sacrificing 
China's rights. This provided the background in which the 
agreements were made in the summer of 1907 between Japan 
and France, between Japan and Russia, between Britain and 
Russia^ This collective bargaining among the imperialist 
countries in their deal with China awoke the elite that 
China,s crisis of dismemberment was imminent. 
At the same time, the Rights Recovery Movement led by 
the local elite activists to retrieve the lost rights 
relative to the railway and mines, was originally protested 
against the foreigners' economic encroachment/ However, 
the weakness of the Qing government, especially the foreign 
ministry officials, in front of the imperialist powers and 
their indifference to the demand of people, made the elite 
activists realized that the best way of protecting national 
rights lay through the reforming of the Qing government. 
So it may be said that the constitutional movement was the 
combination of a response to the external threat and also 
a political development of the elite activists' struggle * 
for economic rights. 
3. Ceng Yunzhi 1980: 49. 
For the Rights Recovery Movement on railway in 
Zhejiang, see Rankin 1986: 248-98. 
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In August 1908, the Shanghai-based Constitutional 
Preparation Association cooperated with followers of Liang 
Qichao in the Political Information Society (Zhengwen she 
J^fflfc to call a meeting in support of constitutional 
government. Zhang Jian, Tang Shouqian joined with the 
Association's president, Zheng Xiaoxu ( 缴 • 邊 ），in 
sending two telegrams to the court calling for a parliament 
that would meet within two years .5 They also sent some 
representatives from Shanghai to Beijing with a petition to 
be delivered to the Qing court. Their actions received 
widespread support from various provincial elites. Even 
some high-ranking officials in Beijing memorialized the 
Emperor for a Parliament. So, the demand for constitu-
tionalism was all the rage throughout the country. 
In response to these pressures, an imperial edict was 
issued on August 27, allowing a Parliament to be convoked 
in nine years' time. At the same time, the Qing court 
promulgated the General Principle of a Constitution 
(Qinding xianfa daigang欽急；么火鋪 and a schedule on 
the steps to be taken within the preparatory period. The 
schedule called for popular elections of provincial 
assemblies (Ziyi hui|咨漆如 in 1909 in each provinces. 
These assemblies were to provide half the members of the 
National Assembly (Zizheng yuan,致 故 / 心 ） ，which would 
convene in Beijing in 1910; the other half was appointed by 
5. Zhang Yufa 1971: 384-5; Rankin 1986: 286. 
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the Emperor primarily from imperial officials and court 
members. Self-government in cities, towns and villages was 
to be completed in 1914 and in prefectures and districts in 
1915. Finally, a parliament elected by the people in 
special elections was to be convened in 1917.6 Thence-
forth, the elite activists were diverted their activities 
to prepare for the provincial assembly and caused a 
temporary hiatus in oppositionist political activity. 
B. Development 
The inauguration of the provincial assemblies on 
October of 1909 absorbed almost all the elite activists. 
As a district of Jiangsu, numerous Shanghai elite were 
elected into the Jiangsu Assembly. For instance, Zhang 
Jian was the Chairman of the Assembly; Yao Wennan, Mu 
Xiangyao ( 着 ； 逝 祷 ） ，Xie Yuanzhen ( 謝 ' ^^^ Xitian 
( 表 受 惑 ) , Zhu Zhiya (象/么7 ^ ^ ) —directors of the 
Shanghai City Council -- were now elected as councillors of 
the Assembly Their new status as members of the 
Assembly, with the provincial assembly functioned as a 
political forum, widened their basis of political support 
and also elevated their political aspirations. 
The provincial assemblies helped the councillors ( the 
original local elite activists) grasp more clearly the 
6, Fincher 1968: 190-1； Wei Qingyuan 1993: 252-70. 
7. Zhang Kaiyuan 1985: 116-7. 
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needs of their entire province, instead of their home 
counties or townships only. Yet invariably they found that 
the solutions to provincial problems were tied up with 
national political issues. Resolutions was referred for 
consideration to the National Assembly, which was to meet 
in the autumn of 1910. These made new issues arose as lack 
of action of previously resolution. For instance, the 
Jiangsu Assembly Standing Committee asked the governor why 
only five out of the 46 resolutions submitted had as yet 
been implemented.^ As a result, from late 1909, the 
councillors became indulge their interest in central 
politics by pressing for a quickening of the pace of reform 
set under the Nine Year Plan. This pressure focused around 
one goal: the opening of a parliament earlier than 
proposed. This unfolded the "Petition for a Parliament 
Movement" in 1910.9 
It was Zhang Jian who initiated a conference in 
Shanghai to discuss united action in speeding up the 
convocation of parliament. Over fifty representatives from 
sixteen provinces arrived in Shanghai after the first 
yearly assembly session in November 1909. In light of 
China's critical condition, they agreed to petition for the 
early convening of parliament, which seemed to them the 
Fincher 1983: 147. 
9. Data on this movement is adopted from Ceng Yiinzhi 
1980; Chang Peng-yuan 1968; Fincher 1983: 123-55; Zhang 
Kaiyuan 1985; Ding Richu 1985a; Wei Qingyuan 1993 and 
Rankin 1986: 248-98. 
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best means to achieve China's salvation. After consult-
at ion a delegation of thirty-three was chosen, headed by 
sun Hongyi ( l^Jf ), petition to Beijing.� 
On January 16, 1910, shortly after they arrived at 
Beijing, the delegation sent in the petition, signed with 
200,000 signatures, through the Censorate (Ducha yuan都琴 
梵 ) ‘ d e m a n d i n g that a Parliament should be opened within 
one year. "it argued that only a parliament and a 
responsible cabinet could save China from the threat of 
foreign partition, bankruptcy and divisive revolution, by 
forcing government officials to perforin their duties with 
due responsibility to the people. 
The Court responded on 10 February and rejected their 
demand by saying that "preparations were not yet completed 
and the people's level of political knowledge was not yet 
up to the standard of constitutional government 12 The 
first petition was in vain. 
On 22 June 1910, led by Zhang Jian and the Jiangsu 
Assembly, the delegation presented through the Censorate a 
similar but more urgently worded petition warning of the 
danger that the people might press their demands through 
气 Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 160-1• 
Fincher 1983: 149. 
12. Quoted in Ceng Yunzhi 1980: 43. 
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improper c h a n n e l s . These petitions were signed by 
representatives from chambers of commerce, the educational 
associations and overseas Chinese businessmen as well as by 
other provincial assemblies, members __ a claimed total of 
300,OOO. A edict rejecting the second petition came more 
quickly than before and warned the delegations against "any 
more impertinent petition. "14 
But the movement was not to be stopped. A third 
petition was presented on 3 October 1910. This time, it 
was characterized by the mass support of constitutionalism 
in all the provinces. Zhili, Henan, Sichuan and Fujian 
were alive with demonstrations and protest parades, 
demanding the governors transmit their written petitions to 
the Court• The returned students from foreign countries 
also staged demonstrations and they were reinforced by 
representatives of overseas Chinese.^^ The list of private 
signatories had lengthened to 25,000,000.^^ By that time, 
the National Assembly was about to convene and the rapidly 
changing political situation also induced the governors to 
endorse the petitioners' demands. As a result, the 
governors in 17 provinces sent a joint memorial to the 
Court, appealing for "governance by cabinet" and "fixing 
Fincher 1983: 149. 
Quoted in Zhang Kaiyuan 1985: 118. 
Ceng Yunzhi 1980: 44-5. 
Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 161 • 
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the next year as the time for the opening of a 
parliament. "17 This exercised great impact on the Court. 
Then the Qing government announced on November 4 to advance 
the date for the inauguration of a parliament by three 
years (in 1913), that means reducing the preparatory period 
from nine years to six years. A cabinet was also to be 
organized before that date. However, the edict claimed 
that: "Once proclaimed, this imperial decision is never to 
be discussed for a change again. Any persons who should 
engage in agitational activities on any pretexts shall be 
severely punished."" The implication was clear that 
thenceforth acts in connection with the petition movement 
were to be considered as threats to public safety. At the 
same time, another decree ordered that as their demands 
were satisfied, all delegations should be disbanded and the 
members go back to their home towns. The purpose of this 
decree, clearly enough, was to put an end to the "Petition 
for a Parliament Movement" • A vigorous movement thus ended 
abruptly. 
C. Organization and Leadership 
We can identify two types, of organizations (or 
institutions) during the constitutional movement, according 
to their roles performed. The first type, including the 
Constitutional Preparation Association and the Shanghai 
17. Quoted in Geng Yunzhi 1980: 45. 
18. Quoted in Geng Yunzhi 1980: 45. 
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City Council, prepared and initiated the movement while the 
second type, mainly the provincial assemblies, played more 
active role in participating the movement. 
The Constitutional Preparation Association, as 
mentioned above, was mainly composed of Shanghai elite 
activists. Its founder and vice-presidents, Zhang Jian, 
later became leader of the constitutional movement. The 
directors of Shanghai City Council, such as Li Zhongjue, 
Zhu Baosan and Wang Zhen were its core members. Its main 
function was to facilitate the introduction of constitu-
tional rule and fought for self-government before the 
adoption of a constitution. This was done by organizing 
some study clubs and issuing constitutional publications to 
the public. Moreover, two of its actions——sent telegrams 
and representatives to Beijing in August 1908, and held a 
conference between the representatives from sixteen 
provincial assemblies in November 1909一- played pivot role 
in initiating the "Petition for a Parliament Movement" in 
1910. 
After the Qing Government issued an imperial decree on 
preparation for adoption of constitutional government in 
1906, the activities of the Shanghai City Council were 
linked with the constitutional movement. For example, it 
invited speakers to lecture on law and politics in order to 
popularize the knowledge on constitution. After the Court 
announced the establishment of the provincial assemblies in 
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1907, it was instructed by the Shanghai Intendent to draft 
an organic law of the proposed provincial assembly, through 
collaboration with other eleven bodies, including the 
Constitutional Preparation Association and the Shanghai 
General Chamber of Commerce. In 1908, it was entrusted 
with the work of taking a census in Shanghai as a 
preparatory step toward a constitutional government. ^^ 
Although both these organizations and institutions 
performed important functions in the constitutional 
movement, the leading role in forcing the central 
government to accelerate its reform timetable was gone to 
another newly established representative institutions --
the provincial assemblies. 
As part of the reform programs, the Qing government 
decided to establish twenty-one assemblies for twenty-two 
provinces.20 The councillors were elected from February 
through June in 1909• Since there were strict require-
ments , t h e proportion of qualified voters to the whole 
population was extremely low and the average of only 
0.42%.^^ Nevertheless, it was the first representative 
institution in the national level, established according to 
19. Ding Richu 1985a: 60-1. 
20. The establishment of an assembly in Xinjiang was 
postponed because the educational standard of the provinces 
was too low to operate one. 
21^  For the requirements of voters and candidates, see 
Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 146-7. 
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the Western democratic system.22 it induced a breakthrough 
in the traditional Chinese political system. Previously, 
the legitimacy of the Emperor's rule was the most important 
component in the Chinese polity. The popular sovereignty 
implied in the Mandate of Heaven, though in theory can 
topple down the monarchy, was never instituted by some 
means. Thus the Emperor had merely been informally 
accountable to the Confucian bureaucracy and in the usual 
way he was the single unified authority. Similar to the 
kings in the Western Europe during the Middle Age, "he 
displayed himself, presented himself as an embodiment of 
some sort of ,higher' power" He represented his 
lordship not for but 'before' the people. 
This type of representation was shaken by popular 
sovereignty in the late Qing period. The creation of 
provincial assemblies in 1909 instituted and strengthened 
the popular elements and became the source of legitimacy. 
Though intended by the Court to enhance centralized control 
by mobilizing the resource of all localities, eventually 
these representative assemblies themselves threatened the 
throne's monopoly on legitimacy •对 The case of the 
"Petition for a Parliament Movement" was an good example. 
This was prophesied by a contemporary newspaper editor 
22 The Shanghai City Council, though could also been 
regarded as the first one, was only on a district level. 
23. Habermas 1989: 7.. 
24. Fincher 1968: 189-98. 
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that: 
The central government may have yet to learn that 
neithef secret societies nor foreign 'aggression' 
c，undermine the authority that it has so often 
，bused as effectually as the constitutional 
forces created by itself 
As we examined before, numerous Shanghai elite 
activities, especially directors of the City Council, was 
elected into the Jiangsu Assembly. With their experience 
in the self-government bodies and under the leadership of 
Zhang Jian, the operation of this Assembly became the model 
for other provinces.^^ This institution gave the Shanghai 
local elite an excellent opportunity to unit with activists 
from other provinces. Since it was a legitimate insti-
tution which the government dared not dissolve arbitrarily, 
the elected councillors then turned the assemblies into 
legal forums where they could express their opinions freely 
and the government must respond to their resolution. 
Therefore, the assemblies acted as legitiitiizers to support 
the delegation petition to Beijing in 1910 for the 
immediate convening of parliament. The central government 
was thus caught in a dilemma situation. 
D. Methods 
The activists involved in the "Petition for a 
Parliament Movement" enthusiastically appealed to the mass 
25. Quoted in Elvin 1984: 124. 
Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 148. 
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take part in the political activities, but insisted upon 
peaceful procedure and were reluctant to use force. They 
preferred this method instead of other radical means 
because there were hopes that, at least at the outset, the 
Qing government might be persuaded to listen to public 
opinion. 
Although most activists were also the councillors of 
the provincial assemblies by themselves and so were 
legitimate representatives of each provinces, they were 
still solicitous of the participation of the mass. They 
knew that without the backing of the mass, their demands 
for constitutionalism would go unheeded by the rulers. 
They hoped that the greatest possible number of people 
would join the movement. The mode they adopted of 
appealing to the mass included speeches, slogan-posters and 
propaganda pamphlets. Moreover, they held numerous 
meetings, parades and also campaign for funds and 
signatures. At that time, in many provinces, the numbers 
of people taking part in a single demonstration varied from 
several thousand to over ten thousands. In the third 
petition, the deputies to Beijing bringing with the 
petitions of an early convocation of a Parliament bearing 
the signatures of 25,000,000 citizens. This was the first 
time that large numbers of Chinese under the leadership of 
the elite activities or the constitutionalists had spoken 
out and so this constitutional movement was' an 
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unprecedented event in Chinese history.^^ 
In addition, in comparison with the anti-American 
boycott in 1905 in which the elite activists appealed to 
the nationalistic affection, the petition for an early 
convocation of a parliament was a rather abstract political 
demand to be understandable by the mass. Therefore the 
elite conducted an energetic campaign introducing the 
meaning of democracy and cognate political theories to 
China. Books, newspaper and magazines sprang up in all 
provinces and cities. For instance, the Preparation for 
Constitution Association published over ten kinds of books 
on constitutional rule, laws of parliamentary election, 
local self-government, elements of democracy, new 
citizenship and etc. The first volume of Meng Zhaochang's 
( 备 甲 ） " C i t i z e n s ' Manual" (Guomin Bidu 圖仏^^  凌 ） w a s 
reprinted twenty-seven times and sold more than 100,000 
copies.28 Some newspapers and magazines supporting 
reformist views like Shibao, Guomin Gongbao (国民么華 
Yubei Lixian Gonghuibao ( 豫 命 立 塞 极 ） a n d Dongfang 
Zazhi ( ^ ) published numerous articles on 
constitutional democracy and related subjects. Besides, 
the constitutional bodies and educational associations in 
different provinces ran schools, classes and speeches to 
convey knowledge of democracy and to train men for consti-
27, Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 161 • 
28. Zhang Kaiyuan 1985: 116. 
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tutionalism.29 as a result, though the movement did not 
attain the results the activists had expected, nevertheless 
it helped to spread the ideas of democracy among the people 
in all walks of life and produced far-reaching influences 
upon the Chinese society. 
E. Political Demands 
In Chapter Four, we have denoted the group of Shanghai 
activists as the "urban reformist elite" and proposed that 
they were both reformers and itiodernizers. Now we can 
examine their reform ideas and political demands pervaded 
in their written petitions. 
Of course, the main political theme was constitu-
tionalism, but nationalistic expressions also appeared 
throughout the petition literature. As we mentioned 
before, the constitutional movement was sprang from 
responses to foreign encroachment on national rights, and 
this justified their demand for a parliament: 
The rulers have alienated themselves from the 
people and the people are indifferent to state 
affairs. The nation thus has no strength to 
resist foreign aggression. In order to resist 
aggression, government and people must 
collaborate, and to this end the government must 
give the people a Parliament.^® 
They declared that as parliamentary rule was the crucial 
spirit of constitutionalism, if the Qing government was 
29. Geng Yunzhi 1980: 54. 
气 Quoted in Ceng Yunzhi 1980: 49. 
sincere enough to introduce constitutionalism, a Parliament 
must first of all be inaugurated. 
Actually, what motivated the reformist elite's intense 
desire for constitutionalism was that they would be elected 
as members of the Parliament and so could execute and share 
some political power. In this way, they could fulfil their 
political ideal of modernism and reformist based upon 
constitutionalism. We can see their motive through what 
they proposed as the powers of a Parliament to be enacted. 
Firstly, they held that a Parliament should be endowed 
with the power to supervise the governmental adminis-
tration. Based on Western theories, they claimed that: 
The Parliament in a constitutional country is the 
legal organ responsible for the supervision of 
the government, transforming the Emperor‘s own 
political instrument into an administrative organ 
responsible to the Parliament, which in turn 
responsible to the people's benefit itself 
The Emperor has only the right to endorse 
resolutions passed by the Parliament but no right 
to compel the Parliament to pass resolutions. 
The government cannot execute what the Parliament 
does not approve. ^^ 
The main political theme the reformist elite demanded was 
that the Emperor had no duties while the government 
exercised their duties subject to the supervision of the 
Parliament, which in turn was subjected to public opinion. 
31^  Text of the first petition is quoted irT Wei 
Qingyuan 1993: 306-9. 
32, Quoted in Wei Qingyuan 1993: 306-9. 
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Secondly, they held that a Parliament should be 
endowed with the power to supervise financial affairs of 
the state. According to a written petition by merchants: 
CKjT— to the absence of parliamentary super-
visio� central and local administrative 
expenditures are in serious disorder as they are 
manipulated at will by the bureaucrats while the 
merchants only have the duty to pay taxes but not 
enjoy any rights 
Therefore, the reformist elite, most of them were merchants 
in status, adopted the slogan of "no taxation without 
representation •” According to Western theories, they 
claimed that: 
In view of wrong financial policies which had 
caused social unrest, modern governments in 
European countries have vested their parliaments 
with the power to supervise finances, and they 
have evolved three indispensable constitutional 
rules for parliamentary supervision: 
1) discussion and resolution of a budget； 
2) endorsement of the final accounts, and 
3) retroactive endorsement of extraordinary or 
emergency expenditure. ^  
They believed that in this way their economic rights could 
be guaranteed. 
Apart from that, they also proposed that a Parliament 
should be endowed with the right of legislation, the right 
to participate in external affairs and strived for equal 
33 "Public Statement of Chinese Merchants together 
with overseas Chinese Merchants in their petition for 
Parliamentary rule in China", quoted in Ceng Yunzhi 1980: 
4 7 . 
34^  Text of the first petition, quoted in Wei Qingyuan 
1993： 306-9. 
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rights with foreign countries.^^ 
In short, we can see that the political demand of the 
elite activists was unanimous upon modifying the political 
system to make for societal initiatives to share the 
political power. In this way, the government would 
responsive to public opinion and the end of absolutist 
tyranny was deemed necessary to strengthen the nation to 
resist foreign invasion. 
P. Result and Effect 
As we have seen, the Qing government had promised to 
reduce the proposed period of preparation by three years on 
/ November 4, 1910, but simultaneously ordered that the 
petitioning organizations be disbanded and that no more 
petitions be presented. With respect to this result, we 
cannot claim that the elite's demand were totally turned 
down by the government. Some moderate elite, such as Zhang 
jian, considered that the movement had by now produced 
certain favourable results and feared any further advance 
might run into open conflict with the government and so 
they called a halt .36 
However, the forcible disbandment of the delegation 
distressed the representatives from several regions, 
35, see Geng Yunzhi 1980: 47-8. 
36. Zhang Kaiyuan 1985: 119-20• 
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especially those radical one. They also dissatisfied with 
the degree of throne's concession. They considered the 
government were insincere to give up old dictatorial means, 
listen to public opinion and be bound by law during this 
period of preparation for constitutional government. Some 
of them started to change their attitude and the 
possibility of violence was much on their minds.^^ "As the 
gap between government and the elite widened, the gap 
between non-violent reformist social mobilization and 
revolution n a r r o w e d . T h e r e f o r e what had begun as 
demands for political participation and popular rights 
ended up as a general questioning of the legitimacy of the 
imperial system. 
In June 1911, the government fulfilled its promise of 
making a 'responsible cabinet' which consisted of eight 
Manchus, four Han and one Mongol. Among the eight Manchu 
members, five were selected from the imperial clan and 
monopolized the political and military powers of the 
government. It showed that the real intention lay behind 
the adoption of monarchical constitutionalism was only to 
centralize control. Coupled with the announcement of plan 
for railway nationalization in May 1911 which induce huge 
economic loss of the elite as most of them invested funds 
to the railway companies, these resulted in their 
37, See Chang Peng-yuan 1968: 168-73• 
Rankin 1986: 293. 
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completely disillusionment with the government. They 
gradually gave up their hopes for a constitutional 
government and transferred their sympathy and support to 
revolution. The existence of revolutionary parties in 
Shanghai made their aspiration possible.^^ 
G. Concluding Remarks 
According to Habermas' account of the development in 
the political functions of the public sphere^ ® (especially 
the model case of British development), it seemed strictly 
similar to what we have analyzed on the constitutional 
movement in the late Qing period. As Habermas says: 
A public sphere that functioned in the political 
realm arose first in Great Britain at the turn of 
the eighteenth century. Forces endeavouring to 
influence the decisions of state authority 
appealed to the critical public in order to 
legitimate demands before this new forum. In 
connection with this practice, the assembly of 
estates became transformed into a modern 
parliament ——a process that was, of course, 
drawn out over the entire century/i 
In China, the establishment of the provincial 
assemblies represented a breach in the absolutist system 
for a public in the political realm. They should be 
regarded as the first emergence of political participation 
in China. Although we have not given a detailed account on 
39 The collaboration between the reformist elite and 
the revolutionaries in Shanghai will be elaborated in the 
next chapter• 
40. Habermas 1989: 56-73. 
41. Habermas 1989: 57. 
how the provincial assemblies were operated, yet Chang 
Peng-yuan indicated: 
IJ^，people (the representatives) were confident 
that they had the ability to represent their 
people. Sitting in the assembly chambers, they 
wer� polite and behaved with propriety. Their 
deliberations gave the impression that they were 
rational. Their pronouncements showed they 
realized China's needs 
In this formal system of political participation, 
instead of resorting to violence, ” now, through the 
critical debate of the public, it took the form of a 
permanent controversy between the government party and the 
opposition. "43 Thus a public sphere that functioned in the 
political realm was achieved its full maturity. The elite 
activists, now emerged as a critically debating public, 
gradually elevated their political aspirations. Similar to 
their British counterparts: 
A political consciousness developed in the public 
sphere of civil society which, in opposition to 
absolute sovereignty, articulated the concept of 
and demand for general and abstract laws and 
which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e. 
public opinion) as the only legitimate source of 
this law."^ 
This was their intention to organize mass petitions for the 
early convocation of a parliament. Through this informal 
way of political participation, they proclaimed their 
rights of policy-making and also tried to provide a check 
on the government by appealing to their critical debate on 
42. Chang Peng-yuan 1984: 26. 
43• Habermas 1989: 64. 
拟 .Habermas 1989: 54. 
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national political issues. Although they did not succeeded 
in their demand, this nevertheless marked a new stage in 
the development of the public sphere. 
m 
Shanghai and 
the Closiirp of Public Sphprp 
A. Revolutionary activities in Shanghai 
In Chapter Two, we have mentioned that the foreign 
settlements in Shanghai could be portrayed as "states 
within the states", because these enclaves were well 
protected by foreign troops and subjected to rule of laws 
free from any political interference. The existence of 
these favourable international enclaves not only attracted 
merchants from inland areas that looking for the safety 
business environment, but also those opposed to the rule of 
imperial regime. The latter composed of radical 
intellectuals and students, especially those returned from 
Japan. Among them, Cai Yuanpei (參丨多考)，Zhang Binglin 
( 萝 力 � / ^ f ) and Zou Yong ( ) were good examples. 
The suggestion by the Shanghai Municipal Council in 
1902 ——that no Chinese resident' should be handed over to 
the imperial authorities until he first been judged and 
found guilty by the Mixed Court (the Sino—foreign court in 
the International Settlement) -- further led to Shanghai as 
a hotbed of radicalism. The founding of the Chinese 
Education Association (Zhongguo jiao” hui'^l^ ) and 
the Patriotic School (Aiguo xueshe ) by Cai 
Yuanpei in 1902 marked the beginning of an era of revolu-
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tionary activities led by these radical intellectuals and 
students. These institutions were established ostensibly 
for educational purpose, but, in fact, they spread revolu-
tionary ideas for students and thus became a training 
ground for revolutionaries.^ They also made use of the 
already existing Subao ) to publish articles for 
anti-Manchu movement. The shielding effect of the settle-
merits from imperial authoriti， was signal illustrated in 
the well-known Su-bao case ( ^ if/l J ) in 1903, when the 
British consul in the Municipal Council put pressure on the 
Mixed Court to ensure that the radical anti-Manchu 
journalists and writers whose immediate extradition was 
being demanded by the governor of Jiangsu should be judged 
according to Western rules of law and they should be 
sentenced only to a short term to jail. Instead of death 
sentence, four of the defendants were discharged before the 
end of the year. Zhang Binglin, who was sentenced to three 
years' imprisonment, was released in June 1906 
The posture taken by the Settlement authorities in 
favour of oppositional activities, though in limited 
degree, encouraged the radicals to elevate their ambitions. 
This resulted in a general shift in the revolutionary 
movement toward active attempts to overthrow the govern-
ment. By the end of 1904, the Restoration Society (Guangfu 
1. Rankin 1971: 48-69. 
2. For more detail on the Subao case, see Lust 1964 and 
Zhou Jiarong 1979. 
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hul Xj/l^'f ), a secret revolutionary organization, was 
founded in Shanghai by radical students who had organized 
an assassination corps in Japan the year before.3 a 
nucleus of professional revolutionaries was thus formed. 
Although Cai Yuanpei was the nominal head of the society, 
Tao Chengzhang ( f峡奪 ) w a s the real leader. Since a 
number of the members had connections in Zhejiang, their 
centre of activities was moved to Hangzhou and they were 
not interested in being active in Shanghai/ They became 
active again only just before the 1911 Revolution in 
Shanghai. 
Another group of revolutionaries who would play major 
role in the Shanghai Revolution in 1911 were members of the 
Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui/^ 复 意 ）and looked to 
Chen Qimei ( 武装炎 )as their political leader. Chen 
Qimei "was indisputably the dominant figure, and he did 
much to shape the course of the Shanghai Revolution. "5 He 
was the son of a Zhejiang merchant, practised business in 
Shanghai and military studies in Japan. He joined the 
Revolutionary Alliance while in Tokyo in 1906 and there-
after became a professional party politician. After he 
returned from Japan in 1909, he became director of the 
regional organization of the Revolutionary Alliance. 
Because of his geographical links and the friendships he 
Wei 1987: 185-6. 
4. Rankin 1971: 103-12. 
Rankin 1971: 118. 
170 
cultivated during his business activities, he acquainted 
with a number of major elite groups and merchants in 
Shanghai. The latter not only gave financial support, but 
also formed a united front with the revolutionaries to 
facilitate the Shanghai Revolution• As we will shown 
later, it was the alliance between the revolutionaries and 
other groups — the reformist elite, police, soldiers --
which brought success to the revolution, since the 
revolutionaries were both too small in number and too weak 
in force to achieve their goals solely. 
B. The Merchant Militia 
Before we go into the detail on the cooperation 
between the Shanghai elite activists and the revolution-
aries, we now first turn to a political and armed 
organization controlled by the Shanghai reformist elite ~ 
the merchant militia/ It was originated in the physical-
education associations practised by the business 
communities and the earliest one was organized in the 
International Settlement. When the Incident of the Mixed 
Court took p l a c e , 7 the Chinese police went on strike and 
6. Data on this section is adopted from Ding Richu 
1985: 62-5; Sheng and Yang 1980; Elvin 1984: 140-4; Li 
Dajia 1993: 188-99 and Rankin 1971: 205-6. 
The^ncident of the Mixed Court (or Danao gongtang 
an M ) occurred in December 1905, when the British 
assessor a-^he Mixed Court in the International Settlement 
ordered a Chinese women, whom was accused of kidnapping, to 
be imprisoned. Since the case was purely a Chinese matter, 
it raised the whole issue of the proper jurisdiction of the 
Mixed Court. The British assessor,s handling of the case 
offended the Chinese community, which responded with 
demonstrations and violence, thus led to another outburst 
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their duties were taken over by the International Merchant 
volunteer Corps (Wanguo shangtuan ； | g | j ) , which 
composed of the foreign volunteer army and often 
disregarded the interests of the Chinese inhabitants. This 
led to Yu Xiaqiang (落部丨〜,an eminent Chinese comprador 
in the International Settlement, and other merchants to set 
up the Chinese Merchants Exercise Association (Huashang 
ticao hui ^ i k M i ^ P for self-defense.« 
Later, this was emulated by merchants in the Chinese 
city, and five similar associations were formed.^ Their 
leaders, including Li Zhongjue, Wang Zhen, Mu Xiangyao and 
Yu Huaizhi, were also the leaders of the Shanghai City 
Council or the General Chamber. Its members included 
workers, students, as well as shopkeepers, traders and 
other businessmen. These associations "were partly 
comparable to old-style militia and self-help organiz-
ations ,but were too influenced by new ideas to be strictly 
in the traditional mode. 
of nationalist feeling after the anti-American boycott 
occurred in the same year. For a brief account, see Wei 
1987: 191-3. 
8. Ding Richu 1985a: 62-3; Li Dajia 1993: 190-1. 
勿 的 厂 9 . They were the Shanghai Study Association (Hu xuehui 
) , the Merchant Spare—time Study Association (Shangyu 
xuehGi 翁 li 寧層 ） ' t h e Mgrph^te' Further Study 
Association^(lhaWue buxihui )' the Southern 
City Physical Education Association (Nanshi shangye ticao 
hui r^ h ) and the West Shanqhai Physical 
SicSliJL項Joha^ioS (Huxi ticao hui 勤後敏)• 
10. Rankin 1971: 205. 
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In 1907' the Shanghai officials requested the five 
associations in southern and western Shanghai to be ready 
to help the police if plans for suppression of opium dens 
led to serious rioting by addicts and dealers. The 
expected trouble was not developed, but the five associ-
ations soon united into a permanent Association of Merchant 
Militia (Shangtuan gonghui 為凰公嗜),with Li Zhongjue 
as the d i r e c t o r I t helped patrol streets and maintain 
order. Arms and ammunition were supplied by the Shanghai 
Intendent. 
In 1910 the British occupation of Pianma in Yunnan and 
the Japanese annexation of Korea aroused the nationalistic 
feeling of Shanghai citizens. Various trades and 
communities organized their own groups for the purpose of 
attaining a universal citizen army in China, so as to save 
the nation. Among these were jewellers, cloth merchants, 
bookmakers, grocers and Moslems. This resulted in the 
expansion of the Association of Merchant Militia and added 
reserved to its regular units. Then a National Association 
of Merchant Militia was created in Shanghai on 11 April, Li 
Zhongjue again was elected as its director, Shen Manyun ( 
；、?C)瘦裳）and Ye Zengmin (奪缚銘)its deputy-directors, 
and Yu Xiaqing was made an additional deputy director.^^ 
The militia forces were now greatly expanded to over two 
H. Shen and Yang 1980: 68; Rankin 1971: 205; Ding 
Richu 1985a: 63-4. 
12. Elvin 1984: 141-2. 
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thousand. How far these well-armed and disciplined members 
were consciously in favour of a revolution was not clear. 
However, most of them were young, enthusiastic and 
influenced by Western ideas. Their leaders also often gave 
radical speeches on current topics to them. Before the 
coming of revolution, the primary concern of this militia 
force was probably the preservation of local law and order. 
When the revolution arrived, the support of this militia 
force given to the revolutionaries was important to their 
success, as we will show later. Therefore, in addition to 
administrative and economic power, the local reformist 
elite also had the military force in hand and was deserved 
as the local power-holders. The public realms in which 
they could undergo various activities thus expanded 
accordingly. 
C. Cooperation between the Revolutionaries and the 
Reformist Elite 
The revolutionary movement in the Yangtze Valley was 
promoted by the establishment of the Central China Bureau 
of the Revolutionary Alliance in the summer of 1911, with 
headquarters in Shanghai. This represented a shift in the 
revolutionary strategy from the Southern provinces to the 
Yangtze provinces, following the failure of the Guangzhou 
uprising in that spring. Chen Qimei was elected as the 
General Secretary, thus strengthened his leadership role 
among the revolutionaries in the Shanghai region. 
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In order to seize control of the city, the primary 
concern for the revolutionaries was not so much to destroy 
the deteriorating imperial bureaucracy, but to win the City 
Council — the real power-holders in the city -- to their 
side. As they put it, "the central matter of the Shanghai 
uprising was to establish liaison with the merchant 
militia, and to obtain a favourable response from the 
scholars and gentry. 
In view of the environs, it was not a difficult job 
since most of the elite became estranged from the imperial 
regime after the latter refused their request for the early 
convening of a parliament in 1910. Some of them, such as 
Zhang Jian, remained loyal to their ideal of constitutional 
monarchy, but many of them now transferred their sympathy 
and support to the revolutionaries. Outstanding among them 
was Shen Manyun, manager of the Xincheng Bank , 
member of the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and 
director of the Shanghai City Council. Having joined the 
Revolutionary Alliance in 1909 through the contact of Yu 
Youren ( 乂 名 ^^ ) -- editor of the revolutionary news-
^ 少 
paper, Minlibao ( ^K^ ) — he was still actively 
campaigning in the constitutional movement. He took part 
in the second petition for the early convening of a 
parliament in July 1910, as a representative from the 
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. After he realized the 
insincerity of the government‘s 'constitutional 
13. Quoted in Elvin 1984: 124. 
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preparations he went further to sided with the revolution-
aries.i4 Actually, it was through Shen that other 
important reformist elite in the city, most notably Li 
Zhongjue, came into contact with the revolutionary 
movement. 
Some Chinese Marxist historians divided the elites 
into two groups. The first group is the national 
bourgeoisie (minzu zichan jieji M C ^ j i f t ^！^ ) which 
composed of lower and middle class merchants. They were 
more radical and revolutionary in character because of the 
repression they suffered in their encounter with both 
imperial regime and the foreign powers. Another group,七he 
upper bourgeoisie (shangceng zichan jieji 丄雇拿产淨 
composed mainly of compradors. Because of their dependence 
upon foreign employers for funds, they adopted the policy 
of compromise and the attitude of social conservatism. 
Most of them tried to maintain the status quo to preserve 
their interests while only some advanced elements were 
social reformists. However, in view of the situation in 
Shanghai, the line of separation between the 'national' and 
the 'upper' bourgeoisie and between the reformist and 
revolutionary was elastic and unpredictable. As shown by 
Ding Richu, the eight Shanghai elite that joined the 
Revolutionary Alliance as early as 1909-10 were all 
Ding Richu 1985a: 66-9. 
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belonged to the upper bourgeoisie •丨〗Most of them had 
played an active part in the constitutional movement and 
several of them were compradors. Marie-Claire Bergere 
asserts that: 
• t _ 'national' in theory refers to the 
导in of the entrepreneurs' capital, but in fact 
II IS applied to their political attitudes. It 
thus, turns out that the national bourgeoisie 
consisted of those who supported Sun Yat-sen and 
the Revolutionary Alliance before and durinq the 
1911 Revolution. 16 
This type of retrospective accounts give us nothing to 
predict the attitudes of the urban elite groups. Moreover, 
their move toward revolution could not regarded as 
incoherent to the reformist ideas they adopted. It was 
only a different road toward the same goals: to enhance and 
institutionalize the power of these elite groups, as 
opposed to the authoritarianism of central government, no 
matter whether the political programme was launched by the 
imperial authority or the revolutionaries. 
The cooperation between the revolutionaries and the 
Shanghai elite groups began well before the uprising. In 
April 1911, Shen Manyun founded a patriotic organization, 
the Chinese Citizen's Association (Zhongguo guomin hui態 
^ P. ) • It was organized under the agreement between 
Shen and Chen Qimei to sponsor military training for the 
They were Shen Manyun, Wang Zhen, Yu Xiaqing, Ye 
Huijun, Gu Xingyi, Li Weizhuang, Li Zhengwu and Li Houyou. 
See DiAg Richu 1985a: 66-74. 
16. Bergere 1989: 193. 
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revolutionaries, ostensibly for local defense. ^^ 
At the same time, as we mentioned in the previous 
section, the local merchant militia were reorganized under 
the name of the National Association of Merchant Militia in 
April and placed under the leadership of Li Zhongjue. It 
was important to win the support of these local power-
holders/^ who already enjoyed a substantial established 
authority. Equally important was the neutralization of the 
local armed force. There was no new army unit stationed 
near the city (it might be Shanghai was not an eminent 
administrative city)• The local defense forces and police 
were under the control of the City Council, which in turn 
under the local elite groups. Shen and Wang Zhen also 
undertook to introduce Chen Qimei and other revolutionary 
leaders to all quarters, but the progress was not smooth in 
the initial stage.^^ 
The Wuhan insurrection attracted almost all the 
attention of the Shanghai citizen. "After over a decade of 
demonstrations, meetings, and boycotts, the Shanghai 
populace was generally more nationalistic and politically 
17. Elvin 1984: 140. 
We should note that the same group of leaders were 
in charge of the City Council, the General Chamber and the 
merchant militia. 
Mo Yongming 1985: 43-66. 
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oriented than were people in the rest of China. 
However, after Hanyang (;、| f | ) had been retaken by Qing 
troops, it became clear that unless revolutionaries took 
control of another major centre, they would fail in the 
uprising in Central China. The seizure of Shanghai became 
an urgency task, since it was a vital source of money, 
supplies and weapons (because of the presence of the 
Jiangnan Arsenal)• Preparation of an uprising in Shanghai 
was thus speeded. 
The second stage in the cooperation between the 
revolutionaries and the elite groups took place in late 
October. Shen Manyun approached Li Zhongjue, now the head 
of the City Council and merchant militia, and asked him to 
support the revolution. Li agreed, and Shen organized a 
meeting between Li and Chen Qimei. Li then met with other 
local leaders and secured their supportTherefore a 
united front was formed and this paved the way for the 
success of the Revolution in Shanghai. 
D. The Revolution in Shanghai 
From 24 October onwards Chen Qimei, Li Zhongjue, Shen 
Manyun and other local elite and revolutionary leaders met 
daily to lay plans for the uprising. In view of the pro-
revolutionary feeling in the city, the Shanghai Intendent 
20. Rankin 1971: 204. See also Chen Sanjing 1983: 71-
4. 
21. See Shen Yunlong 1980: 10-16. 
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appealed to the City Council on 2 6 October to send out 
merchant militia and police patrols to maintain local 
order, so as to prevent the outbreak of revolution. Never-
theless, the merchant militia were in control of the city. 
The City Council leaders helped to neutralize the local 
police. The General Chamber of Commerce promised subsidies 
for the revolution.22 Then the only obstacle remained to 
an immediate takeover was the presence of numerous official 
troops in the Jiangnan Arsenal. Several attempts were made 
to subvert these armed forces but not success. This was 
mainly because the arsenal director, Zhang Chubao ( ^ ^ 容 
) , a nephew of Li Hongzhang ^ ) , was thoroughly 
loyal to the dynasty. A plan for the attack of the arsenal 
was launched. 
The revolution broke out on the morning of 3 November. 
Li Zhongjue made a declaration of independence of Shanghai. 
Li also persuaded Wu Tingfang ( 丫在老'A ) , the former 
Chinese Minister to the United States, to handle relation-
ships with foreign residents in Shanghai, so as to prevent 
the intervention of foreign power. Meanwhile, the Shanghai 
Intendent and other top officials fled to the International 
Settlement. 
At two o'clock the City Council assembled their 
merchant militia and made a joint parade with the forces 
recruited by the revolutionaries, which consisted of 
22. Elvin 1984: 146-7; Bergere 1989: 198. 
180 
students, actors , New Army officials and even members of 
local gangsters — the Red and Green Gangs. The merchant 
militia were in charge of occupying strategic points and 
patrolled in the city, while Chen Qimei led the revolution-
ary troops off to take possession of the arsenal.Though 
encountered with strong resistance and Chen was even caught 
by the arsenal soldiers, the revolutionaries finally 
resumed a successful attack. The arsenal director fled and 
the arsenal soldiers, many of whom had revolutionary 
sympathy, capitulated. Therefore, it was witnessed that 
support for the revolution was sufficiently widespread in 
Shanghai that the city fell with little fighting, A 
foreign newspaper editor said that it had been “ the most 
bloodless of successes • "24 
The seizure of Shanghai occupied a pivot role in the 
1911 Revolution because without this success, it is 
unlikely that Nanjing would have fallen and the revolution-
ary bases in the lower Yangtze Valley could not be 
established. In addition, it is even possible that the 
successes gained by the imperial forces at the origin 
centres of the uprising in Wuhan might have been pushed 
through to a decisive Manchu victory. The 'peaceful 
independence' in Shanghai also provided a model for the 
revolutionaries in other provinces to take over the 
imperial authorities through the cooperation with the local 
23. Elvin 1984: 152-3； Rankin 1971: 204-8. 
24. Quoted in Elvin 1984: 155. 
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elite groups .25 
E. Assertion of Political Power of the Reformist Elite 
After the Shanghai uprising, Chen Qimei organizecJ a 
provisional military government on 6 November. He was 
elected as military governor. Alongside activists of the 
Revolutionary Alliances, the military government included 
a number of local elite members. Li Zhongjue became 
Minister of civil Affairs and handled practically all 
matters except the military. Shen Manyun became Ministry 
of Finance and Wang Zhen as Minister of Communications. In 
less important posts, we also found Yao Wennan, Zhu Baosan, 
Yu Xiaqing and Shen Enfu. All of them were directors of 
the City Council and the General Chamber of Commerce.^^ 
As a result, we can see that this group of well 
organized and cohesive local elite, while freeing 
themselves from the restraints of the past, became a 
dominant political force and even the real power-holders of 
the city government. This was the apogee of the Shanghai 
self-government. “ A half century of growing organiz— 
ational capability, increasing economic important, struggle 
for recognition, expanding political consciousness, and 
widening participation in public affairs had brought 
merchants (and the local elite) to be, for one brief 
25. See Wang Laidi 1985. 
26. See Zhang Kaiyuan 1985: 122-3; Bergere 1989: 200 
and Wu^Qiandui 1983: 827-8. 
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moment, masters of their house."- They seized this 
opportunity to assert their political ambitions, both 
locally and nationally. 
According to Marie-Claire Bergere, since the treaty 
ports were closely linked with inland China, especially in 
economic aspects and not the enclaves completely cut off 
from the interior, these reinforced the elite's desire for 
nationally unity. "They wanted to take control of a vast 
hinterland and transform it in the image of the coastal 
fringe, so that there the buds of capitalism and democracy 
might blossom forth at last. 
Under these circumstances, they supported the founding 
of a Chinese Republican in Nanjing on 1 January 1912 and 
joined the national programme of Sun Yat-sen in striving 
for modernization. The revolutionaries collaborated with 
the reformist elite also enjoyed much advantage. In 
addition to their experience in managing local affairs and 
their wide range of social connections, they were also an 
important source of funds for the new government. 
However, this honeymoon period was not lasted for 
long. Firstly, the Nanjing government under Sun Yat-sen 
only remained in power for three months ( from January to 
March), which meant it was unable to go very much further 
27. Fewsmith 1985: 45. 
28. Bergere 1983: 738. See also Bergere 1989: 200-1. 
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for their national programme of reforms. Secondly, they 
soon fell into quarrel over financial matters. it was 
because in order to win the public support, the Shanghai 
military government remitted most taxes for a year. This 
in turn became a heavy burden for the local elite, 
especially the wealthy merchants, to bear.29 while most 
merchants refused to pay money in sufficient amount, then 
Chen Qimei increasingly resorted to illegal methods to 
extort the funds^the government needed. For example, Ying 
Guixing ( 應 招 爹 ） ， h e a d of the Green Gangs and under 
Chen's service, practised kidnapping and extortion on the 
business community in order to fill Chen's treasury. 
Shanghai thus fell into 'a reign of terror, .3� with their 
wealth and lives were in danger of being seized, most 
businessmen and financiers became disillusioned. 
Moreover, they found that the provisional republican 
government not only lacked adequate social bases, 
especially in financial matters, but also was not an 
effective apparatus to fulfil their modernization 
programme. This laid the background for their support of 
Yuan Shikai to be the presidency, since he embraced the 
vast majority of the regular military forces and enjoyed 
the support of the original Manchus officials and the 
foreign powers. 
29. Wu Qiandui 1983: 836-7. 
30. Elvin 1984: 158-9. 
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« 
However' their political reorientation was often 
blamed by the Chinese Marxist Historians as ,short-sighted' 
and were not supported the revolution wholeheartedly. This 
retrospective account, again, was invalid. Actually, 
Y u a n� r i s e to the presidency was supported by the whole 
country. "The single factor that best explains Yuan's rise 
during the Revolution is that many people, representing a 
wide range of opinion, in fact wanted him to bear 
responsibility for bringing China through the crisis 
precipitated by the Revolution. "3i in view of his record 
of successful reform programmes practised in Shandong and 
Zhili when he was a governor in there and also his 
commitment to introduce a number of modernization changes 
and encourage economic development, he was the only man 
that had both strength and experience to achieve national 
unity and prosperity at that time. 
Further, as disappointed by economic disorders and 
impracticable revolutionary experiment, "the group of 
modern entrepreneurs that was beginning to emerge from the 
local elites needed public order, national independence and 
legislative and institutional reforms if they were to made 
headway."32 This promise was provided by Yuan's reform 
programme and fitted with the reformist inclinations of the 
elite. The fragile coalition between the revolutionaries 
and the local elite was thus in vain. 
31. Young 1968： 420. 
32. Bergere 1989: 203. 
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F. The second Revolution in 1913 and the Demise of Elite 
The split up of the revolutionary coalition became 
fully evident in the failure of local elites in Shanghai to 
form a united front with the revolutionaries again during 
the middle of 1913, in the so-called 'Second Revolution', 
when they were faced with Yuan Shikai's attempt to become 
a dictator. 
In fact, as the conflict between Chen Qimei and the 
local elite became elevated, Chen's position in Shanghai 
gradually weakened. Meanwhile, owing to his deep 
commitment to revolution, Yuan Shikai had already marked 
him as a potentially dangerous enemy to his path to 
centralized control and so Yuan used various methods to 
undermine Chen's position .33 This resulted in Chen's 
giving up his title of military governor. Control over 
local troops was giving to Zheng Rucheng (愛 ;女 f ^ ) who 
was loyal to Yuan. Thus, local military units in Shanghai 
were finally under central control. 
When the conflict between Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen 
broke out in July 1913, some military governors (most of 
them were revolutionaries) of the Southern provinces 
declared their independence. Chen Qimei then Drew Shanghai 
into the movement and organized troops that still loyal to 
him so as to seize the control of the city again.^^ 
Rankin 1971: 212-3. 
34. Ding Richu 1985b: 178-9. 
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Although some local leaders, notably Shen Manyun and 
Wang Zhen, were sympathetic and gave support to the 
revolutionaries, most of them, either out of frustration to 
Chen Qimei化 rule and corrupt or out of a desire to avoid 
prolonged disorder, remained neutral or even sided with 
Yuan's rule. The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce 
refused to approve the declaration of independence or to 
supply the funds to the revolutionaries. ^^ When the troops 
of Chen Qimei attacked the Jiangnan Arsenal again, the 
local militia and police refused to assist the fighting, 
Li Zhongjue -- whose support was a decisive factor in 七he 
victory of 1911 Revolution in Shanghai -- refused for many 
days even to see Chen Qimei. He assumed the direction of 
a Defense Board that hoped to protect the city and remain 
neutral in the quarrel between Yuan and the revolution— 
aries.' 
After the failure of the 1913 uprising. Yuan directed 
his attack against the revolutionary opposition by forcing 
its leaders into exile and ordering the dissolution of the 
principal opposition party -- the Guomindang ( 艮 ) 
in November 1913 and then of the parliament in December 
1913. In order to consolidate central authority, Yuan's 
next target was the representative systems that had been 
35. XU Dingxin 1991: 166-78. 
36. Ding Richu 1985b: 183-6. 
37. Elvin 1984: 160. 
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set up to institutionalize the power of the local elites.^^ 
The Shanghai City Council, which had shown its power to 
influence the revolution in 1911, was now an object of 
suspicion to Yuan because of the rebellions activities 
performed by some of its directors. in March 1914, the 
City Council was dissolved and the merchant militia was 
disbanded. This was replaced by the Bureau of Public 
Works, Policing and Taxation (Gongxunjuan ju 工 纪 祸 J ] ) -
- a non-elective official board -- which was strictly 
controlled by the local bureaucracy.^^ The law of 1914, 
which strengthened government control over the chambers of 
commerce, also succeeded in depriving the merchants of 
their last means of political expression. 
For the Shanghai elite, this suppression marked the 
end of an exceptional experiment that lasted for a decade. 
These institutions played an important role for them to 
take part in political life of the nation. They 
"represented something which within the Chinese political 
tradition came very close to liberalism: the defence of 
local interests and social groups shut out or neglected by 
the mandarinate. "40 In these institutions' the urban 
reformist elite "had been able to give proof of its 
capacity for management, its aptitude for modernization, 
its comprehensive of democratic procedures, and its 
38. Bergere 1989: 204. 
39. Shanghai Tongshe 1936: 75-8. 
40. Bergere 1983: 743. 
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interest in major national problems• "4�They would never 
again recover this local administrative and political 
autonomy. 
In response to these repressive policies, they adopted 
a measure of withdrawal. They returned to their 
traditional political abstention. Some of them, especially 
the merchant group such as Zhang Jian, indulged into 
business activities. They made use of the economic boom 
provided by the opportunity of the First World War when the 
foreign powers turned away from China. Their economic 
harvests to a great extent compensated for their political 
disillusionment. Li Zhongjue, a representative of gentry 
group, fled to Japan because of his cooperation with the 
revolutionaries in 1911 and was ordered the arrest by Yuan 
Shikai. Disappointed by turbulent environs in China, he 
decided never engaged in political activities again and 
died in 1924. 
We can cite other elite, but their cominon 
characteristic was retreated from political forum. Their 
role was gradually taken over by a new group of urban 
notables: a true modern bourgeoisie. They took shape in 
the economic bloom during the First World War and after 
(1914-23) or the so-called the "golden age of the Chinese 
b o u r g e o i s i e " .42 This new generation of businessmen, in 
41，工 bid. 
42. See Bergere 1989. 
189 
comparison with the elders (the reformist elite), had 
usually carried out their studies abroad and participated 
in modern business. They had a better grasp on the modern 
technology and management skills and devoted to the 
ideology of industrial growth. They organized their 
business associations, such as the Chinese Cotton 
Millowners' Association and the Association of Modern 
Bankers, which was separated from the semi-official 
institutions of the chambers of commerce. They received 
the legacy from their elders in both ideology (a common 
ground of social conservatism, nationalism and mistrust of 
the power of the state) ^^ and practice ( enthusiastic in 
political activities)• The May Fourth movement represented 
the first political involvement of this bourgeoisie,似 
while their rallies to Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 marked the 
end of this second phase of urban elite activism in which 
the restoration of state power and bureaucracy, under the 
name of Nationalist Government, caused their decline/^ 
However, we do not extend our analysis further to this 
phase, as it only continued the main themes of the first 
phase with mounting intensity, and the dynamic of forces 
was clearly discernible in China fifteen years earlier. 
Moreover, this phase was usually marked as an era of 
warlordism, without unified state authority. Thus what we 
43 Bergere 1983: 758. 
44, See Chow Tse-tsung 1960: Ch. 6. 
45, For more detail, see Coble 1980. 
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can identify was only elements of civil society while the 
public sphere was poorly institutionalized and so hardly 
manifest its function and impact. 
G. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have witnessed the success of the 
1911 Revolution in Shanghai in relatively peaceful way. 
Rather than devoting the credit to the strenuous efforts of 
the revolutionaries, it was to a large extent attributed to 
the functioning of the public sphere in the past decade 
which in one way, successfully mobilizing the energies of 
society in the service of nationalistic and political goals 
in non—violent means, and in other way, facilitating a 
decisive shift of power to the reformist elite and so 
enjoyed a substantial established authority at the local 
level. However, in face of a new rival -- Yuan Shikai — 
who devoted much efforts to centralize authority and 
restrict societal autonomy, this expanding public sphere 
appeared faint and its framework for new political order 
was rapidly broken down. Thus this era of energetic 
political experimentation degenerated into a golden past, 
with hardly any influence on China's road towards 
modernization. 
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Chapter Eighi- Conclusion 
A. The Degeneration of the Public Sphere 
The next question that we should tackle is： why did 
the once flourished public sphere was finally closed with 
such rapidity. Of course, we can • attribute this to the 
intrinsic weaknesses inherited in the reformist elite 
itself, that they could not assume the responsibility for a 
movement to transform the traditional political structure 
of China. But the fact is that their intrinsic weaknesses 
may be the direct result of other more profound structural 
factors, rather than the cause of their failure. 
In below, three of these structural factors are 
elaborated to account for the early closure of the public 
sphere in Shanghai. These factors, instead of mutually 
exclusive, are better regarded as complementary to each 
other. 
Firstly, these representative institutions (such as 
the self-government bodies and the chambers of commerce) 
rested on the democratic model were easily suppressed 
because the reformist elite "had not succeeded in setting 
up the political structures that were indispensable to its 
development" It was possible for some autonomous social 
‘ 
1 . Bergere 1 9 8 3 ： 7 3 9 . 
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organizations and institutions to increase and take root, 
for authority to shift from the bureaucracy toward the 
reformist elite, and for the political opposition to 
develop under the centralized bureaucratic monarchy. 
Nevertheless, these elite-run institutions had grown only 
under the political approval and protection of the Qing 
regime. Once the protection was gone, the institutions 
were susceptible to any attack by militarists and other 
regime successors who regarded these institutions as 
threatened to their power base. Of course, if more time 
was allowed for the necessary long-term accretion of social 
and economic power by the reformist elite, a new 
autonomous, defensible political structure might be 
evolved. 
However, even if this was the case (that is more time 
was allowed for the full development of elite's power), 
could this democratic model of political development be 
easily or successfully transplanted to other inland cities 
or even in the rural area? As suggests by Rhoads Murphey, 
the answer is certainly no .2 Then this was related to the 
second factor led to the political failure of the elite: 
the impact of Shanghai and other treaty ports, were only 
limited to some privileged area and could not extend to the 
rest of the country. In other word, it only served to 
accentuate the dualistic structure of China, instead of 
helping to integrate China on the path of modernization. 
2. See Murphey 1974. 
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Rhoads Murphey asserts that: 
[T]he two systems, Western and Chinese, though 
competing in the same market at least within the 
treaty ports and their immediate environs, 
remained for most part separate. The commercial, 
technological, and institutional innovations that 
were, from a Western point of view, so strong and 
attractive a part of the Western system did not 
sp+11 over into the traditional Chinese system, 
which saw no need for them The treaty ports 
represented a new and exclusively urban pheno-
menon following Western models, whereas the rest 
of China remained not only predominantly rural 
t>ut characterized by cities of fundamentally 
different sort, bearing a close symbiotic 
relationship with their rural hinterland.^ 
Although some scholars try hard in proving that the 
economy of Shanghai was integrated to that of national 
market, by providing evidences such as the famine in some 
northern provinces led to the close down of flour mills in 
Shanghai or there was a degree of satellite urban develop-
ment with increased commercial and light-industrial base 
around the Yangtze delta hinterland of Shanghai, so that 
Shanghai was suitably regarded as a part of China, instead 
of the ‘other China' / But the point is that the economic 
progress in Shanghai, especially the modern sector, was too 
rapid that outrode other part of China which grew only 
within traditional economies (through an elaboration of 
traditional-improved techniques instead of technological • 
innovations imported from the West)• If there was 
separateness in the economic, technological structures 
Murphey 1974: 57. 
4. See for example Bergere 1981. 
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between the treaty ports and the inland China, this could 
also apply to institutional or other aspects of political 
structures since the latter were usually built upon the 
formers' infrastructures. So, "none of the treaty ports 
ever had any administrative or political role outside their 
own concession areas, even in the legally separate but 
functionally integrated conurbation at each port outside 
the concession l i n e s . T h e political experiment, 
practised by the reformist elite in Shanghai, that founded 
on commercial and technological, on free competition and 
the relatively harmonious attitudes of democracy, thus 
composed only a unique and specific model that failed to 
spread or graft onto the rural and bureaucratic society of 
the Chinese interior. 
The dualistic structure accentuated by the treaty port 
systems can explain the failure of the elite's political 
activism solely, but when this factor reinforced with the 
upsurge of nationalism in modern China, it becomes more 
plausible. Then we shall proceed into the third factor, 
that is the internal tension between nationalism and public 
sphere. 
B. Nationalism and Public Sphere 
As wrote by Mary Clabaugh Wright, nationalism was the 
'moving force' of the revolution in modern Chinese 
5. Murphey 1974: 57. 
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history.6 But in strictly sense, nationalism only arose at 
the turn of this century in China. Traditional China was 
usually dominated by a set of ideas characterized as 
'culturalism'. It rested on two prime elements. One was 
that Chinese civilization enjoyed unchallenged superior 
position because of the backwardness of non-Chinese people 
around China. The other element was that China's rulers 
must be educated in and govern according to Confucian 
principle which were of universal value and was not rested 
on ethnic standard. Aliens who accepted Confucian norms 
could be regarded as Chinese and even became the Chinese 
ruler. The political elite's loyalty was to Confucian 
principles and not to a particular regime or nation 
According to this image, China was a culturally-defined 
community while other identities such as language, 
ethnicity and religious contributed minor roles only. 
However, with the coining of foreign imperialism which 
not only demonstrate its formidable military power but also 
its cultural superiority, then Chinese culturalism was 
gradually rejected by the elite and was replaced by a 
nationalism that provided a new basis for China's defence 
and regeneration. 
By nationalism, in here we adopt the definition by 
John Breuilly that: 
^ Wright 1968: 3. 
\ Townsend 1992: 98-9. Set also Yu Yingshi 1988. 
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'nationalism' is used to refer to 
political movements seeking or exercising state 
and justifying such action with nationa-
li，<p arguments. A nationalistic argument is a 
political doctrine built upon three basis 
assertions: (a) There exists a nation with an 
explicit and peculiar character. (b) The 
interests and values of this nation take priority 
ove� all other interests and values, (c) The 
nation must be as independent as possible. This 
usually requires at least the attainment of 
political sovereignty 
The first assertion emphasizes that special identities 
or symbols composed as the essential characteristics of a 
specific 'nation, that bind it together and distinguish it 
from other nations. The second and third assertions 
concern the internal and external claims of a nation-state 
respectively. The latter emphasizes the political self-
determination goal of nationalism: to be separate, distinct 
and independent from other nation-states and equal to them, 
in the name of 'national-sovereignty� For the former (the 
second assertion) , we want to further the content of 
internal claims by incorporating the concept of 'popular 
sovereignty', rather than restricts its meaning to 
'national supremacy' only. In fact, many scholars on 
nationalism pointed out that the emergence of nationalism 
in Europe coincided with the rise of democratic structures 
in these countries. This was not merely an accident, as 
Rupert Emerson reveals that: 
The rise of nationalism is normally associated 
with deep-running social ferment and change which 
disrupt the old order of society and speed the 
processes of social mobilization As the 
people begin to come of age and to a new 
8. Breuilly 1994: 2. 
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consciousness of themselves, they demand a new 
P 丄 i n a society in a process of transfor-
mation. One of the characteristic forms which 
this demand has taken is insistence upon the 
centrality of the national community and upon the 
latterright to make the state the sovereign 
organ of its identity and will.9 
Thus a new kind of legitimacy was formed: "The concept of 
popular sovereignty replaces the concept of the divinely or 
historically appointed ruler; the concept of the citizen 
replaces the concept of the subject."^® Under this 
circumstance, individuals, as autonomous subjects, created 
a sense of identification with their nations and appealed 
to nationalistic self-determination. In this sense, 
nationalism and democracy were reinforcing forces, instead 
of antagonistic forces and so it is strange that Habermas 
neglects 'nationalism' in his construction the category of 
public sphere. However, as we will elaborate below, the 
reverse is true in modern China so that the upsurge of 
nationalism led to the early closure of the public sphere. 
According to the previous definition on nationalism, 
with strictly orientation toward the nation-state, it only 
took shape and attained political significance in the 
beginning of the twentieth century in China. The anti-
missionary movements pervaded in the rural area and the 
Boxer Uprising in 1900 were thus an expression of pri-
mordial sentiment (mainly the anti-foreignism) only and 
could not been regarded as the manifestation of 
Emerson 1960: 215. 
10. Kamenka 1973: 14. 
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nationalism. 
Although Shanghai was the beachhead of foreign 
invasion, the sentiment of anti-foreignism among those 
living in there was particularly low in comparison with 
other coastal cities. On the contrary, the Chinese and the 
foreigners lived together in the settlements quite peace-
fully. This could be shown in the fifty-anniversary 
celebration of Shanghai's opened up as treaty port in 1893, 
in which numerous Chinese merchants joined with the 
foreigners in the grand parade while the fifty-birthday 
celebration of Empress Dowager Cixi ( 趋 德 )in the next 
year only received a cool response from the local 
merchants.il The main reason was that Shanghai was an 
immigrant city and most sojourners came to here in seeking 
any opportunity of wealth, especially doing business with 
the foreigners. If they had any uneasiness towards the 
foreigner, they would not come to Shanghai from the very 
beginning. 
Nationalism in China in the early twentieth century 
was consciously produced by the elite class in the treaty 
ports, particularly in Shanghai. It was mainly sprang from 
the defeat in the Boxer Uprising and the afterwards 
increasing foreign encroachment on the sovereign rights in 
both political and economic areas of China. Western 
encroachment on China was not new, but its intensity had 
11. Ye Xiaoqing 1993: 22-3. 
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increased dramatically in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, joined by an ambitious and newly powerful 
neighbour, Japan. The Boxer Uprising was further evidence 
of the West's superiority over China and a lesson in the 
futility of old-style anti-foreignism. "The legacy of the 
incidence was the achievement of consensus among 
politicized Chinese that the main task was to develop 
sophisticated responses to the imperialist danger."12 
Against this background, nationalism, as a broad, modern 
movement, with anti-imperialism as its main content, was 
born. Anti-Manchuism, a strain of nationalism in modern 
China, was only a strategy of the revolutionaries and faded 
away rapidly after the success of revolution. It was far 
less important than the anti-imperialism.^^ 
The New Policies reform launched by the Qing regime 
could also found its origin and purpose in nationalistic 
concerns. While the government was seeking social support 
through the establishment of new institutions such as self-
government bodies, but in the process it opened the way for 
the local elite to undertake political roles beyond the 
local concerns. In this way, the upsurge of nationalism 
and the arise of public sphere could be regarded as 
occurring coincidentally in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. For instance, the anti-American boycott 
in 1905, which is illustrated as the first manifestation of 
12. Young 1970: 153. 
13. see Wright 1968: 21-3. 
200 
the public sphere in the political realm in Chapter five, 
can also be portrayed as the expression of the new sense of 
nationalism. At that point, nationalistic sentiment, 
political demand and particularistic self—interest among 
the reformist elite were powerful combined. 
This type of nationalism, which was initiated by the 
reformist elite and gained its momentum primarily in the 
treaty ports, was labelled as the 'colonial nationalism, or 
in Marie-Claire Bergere terms: the ,bourgeois nationalism,, 
with similar nature but refers to different periods (in the 
1920s).14 Colonial nationalism stemmed largely from the 
anti-imperialist feeling that was common to the whole of 
urban society and especially in the treaty ports. "The 
fundamental and lasting effect of the treaty port system 
was that it provided vivid and all-too-concrete evidence of 
the weaknesses of Chinese political rule and the apparent 
merits of foreign rule".^^ In fact, those elite motivated 
the nationalistic sentiments usually appreciated the 
advantages of foreign experience. Thus what they rejected 
was imperialistic encroachment, but not its successful 
experience of modernization or its culture. They believed 
that cooperation with the foreigners ought to be possible 
in the development of Chinese. As Marie-Claire Bergere 
asserts that: 
For the nationalism of Shanghai reflects a new 
14, Bergere 1989: 242-51. 
Pye 1993: 114. 
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li二ion of the place of China in the world (demand 
p^T equality) and of the role of foreigners in 
inina (desires for co-operation). Shanghai is at 
once more open to the outside world and more 
二w=�e of the place which China should have in it. 
i^ationalism and cosmopolitanism proceed in a 
parallel and complementary fashion.^^ 
Therefore, national independence coupled with modernization 
were the core doctrines of the colonial nationalism. 
Modernization was not only limited to economic aspect but 
also the political one: mobilize popular support for 
collective tasks and place constraints on the actions of 
the government so that it can act according to the wills of 
people. In this sense, nationalism and public sphere were 
reinforcing forces. 
However, the reformist elite were soon became the 
victims of nationalism initiated by themselves. In an 
elaborate investigation on the configurations of Chinese 
nationalism, Lucian W. Pye says that: 
The Chinese political class (dominant rulers), in 
spite of such a formless nationalism, has been 
able to exploit the mystique of patriotism to 
neutralize politically the very Chinese who have 
been the most successful in modernizing. 
Although initiated by the reformist elite in the treaty 
ports, nationalism as a political weapon was soon fell 
under the control of political class, that had its roots in 
parochial, interior China. Lucian W. Pye explains the 
reasons as follows: 
16. Bergere 1981: 2-3. 
Pye 1993: 108. 
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In China it was the environment of the treaty 
ports which produced the most successful 
communities of modernizing Chinese, but since 
t n ? consist of people who had chosen foreign 
ru^，over Chinese rule, they were not accepted as 
� t ? l a t o r s of Chinese nationalism. The roots 
2J the tension about nationalism in China can 
thus be largely traced back to the treaty port 
system which helped create the division between 
the enclave cultures of coastal China, which gave 
dynamism to the country's modernization, and an 
interior China with its claim of being the 
authentic China. This profound division has had 
enormous consequences in dictating what has been 
legitimate in the articulation of Chinese 
nationalism. The divide has fuelled decades of 
suspicion that modern, cosmopolitan ways are a 
threat to China's national spirit. It helped 
create the belief that intelligent, Westernized 
Chinese were somehow less patriotic, less worthy 
representatives of their country than the more 
parochial people of interior China.^^ 
Because of the dualistic structure of China created by the 
treaty port system (as a special way of China's response to 
the West)• the successful experience of the reformist elite 
and their political claims were not accepted as the proper 
way of development. 
Moreover, since many Chinese intellectuals have 
adopted a totally hostile view toward their own traditional 
culture, calling for the complete rejection of the past and 
a boundless adoption of Western culture, thus what composed 
as the specific identity of Chinese —the cultural ideals— 
was in void. Therefore, John Breuilly's first assertion of 
the nationalistic argument: "there exists a nation with an 
explicit and peculiar character", became an empty shell 
only and this is what by Lucian W. Pye means of "a 
18. pye 1993: 115. 
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relatively contentless form of nationalism. "i9 
In addition, foreign encroachment and the threat of 
imperialism evolved into more serious manner even after the 
1911 Revolution, national salvation thus became the primary 
concern of people and was adopted as the main thrust of 
nationalism. This demanded the organization of a 
centralized nation-state capable of forcing back the 
imperialism and mobilizing the necessary resources for 
modernization and national development. John Breuilly's 
second assertion of the nationalistic argument that "the 
interests and values of this nation take priority over all 
other interests and values" thus developed in full extent 
that suppressed the demand of popular sovereignty. This 
aspiration for ‘ strong state' in Chinese nationalism, as a 
response to the authority crisis and external threat in 
modern China, was antagonistic to the growth of public 
sphere. In the name of national salvation and in the 
interests of strengthening state, the principle of 
rational-critical discourse in public sphere as a way of 
making political decision, resolving political conflict and 
determining social organizations was suppressed. It also 
legitimated the politics of nations, however repressive or 
exploitative it might be. 
Seeing through this light, it can explain why there 
was no serious protest to Yuan Shikai's suppression of 
18. pye 1993: 115. 
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local representative institutions in 1914 but his 
capitulation in May 1915 when presented with the Japanese 
Twenty-One Demands resulted in the growing disaffection to 
his regime, since he could not provide people with the 
nationalistic satisfactions• This ‘strong state, 
aspiration also set for widespread receptivity to one-party 
rule, first by the Guomindang and then by the Communists 
because they could meet the requirements of penetrating 
more thoroughly into the society and mobilizing human and 
material resources more extensively, and so, advancing 
national development. This, again, was antagonistic to the 
emergency of pluralistic politics which is essential to the 
development of public sphere. Thus it can be asserted that 
this shallow version of nationalism pose threat for the 
public sphere to take root in modern China. And so Lucian 
W. Pye expresses sentimentally that: 
For all of their accomplishments, these 
modernized Chinese could not produce a nascent 
establishment which could represent society's 
interests and serve as a discipling check on 
China's parochial political leaders. 
C. Concluding Review of this Study 
The preceding chapters have sought to offer a picture 
of public sphere in Shanghai, according to the model 
suggests by Habermas, in the late imperial and the early 
Republican periods. It shows that the public sphere in 
Shanghai in this period shared a sufficient number of basic 
features with their Western counterparts and so the 
18. pye 1993: 115. 
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development of democratic rule in China cannot be seemed as 
impossible or without historical precedent. Of course, 
Shanghai was not a typical Chinese cities in that period by 
any standard, but it does not hinder our effort to learn 
froia its experience. In particular, we have paid attention 
to various structural factors that led to the formation and 
expansion of an autonomous public sphere in Shanghai and 
also the factors attributed to its degeneration, hoping 
that these can throw some light on our understanding of the 
shifting state-societal relationships in that period and 
also to those concern the continued appeal of an elusive 
goal in modern China -- a genuine democratic system. 
Several factors, from both domestic and foreign, came 
together in the late Qing to alter the social structure of 
Shanghai. The quantum increase in long-distance trade 
after Shanghai was opening as a treaty port in 1843, 
together with the overly low degree of bureaucratic 
restraints helped to release the energies of the merchants. 
The existence of islands of relative security and order --
the settlements, with the trend of rising social status of 
merchants in late traditional China, preserved the energies 
of the merchants. This blossoming of merchant communities 
led to a number of structural changes in Shanghai, 
including the demography, occupational structure, business 
practices and even ways of life. It also showed that the 
activities of Chinese merchants, foreign merchants' and 
ordinary people could regulate itself with little or even 
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without the intervention of government. Thus a civil 
society, based on urban autonomy and self-regulating 
market, was gradually taking shape in Shanghai. 
In addition, primary, parochial attachments to native 
place were attenuated among immigrants to Shanghai. The 
merchant organizations also shifted their orientations 
towards more inclusiveness in nature and extended their 
services towards community-wide• In this way, these 
organizations acquired a new character of public and helped 
to develop a sense of solidarity among Shanghai people. 
The numerous local and macro-regional mobilizations after 
the Taiping Rebellion, based on expansive societal 
initiative, engendered the activism of Shanghai elites whom 
were composed by both merchants and gentry. Meanwhile, the 
accomplishment of foreign municipal institutions in 
providing urban services in the settlements also acted as 
both a competitor and a model for those living in the 
Chinese city. These affairs facilitated the rise of a 
specifically civic consciousness and the emergence of the 
identity as 'Shanghai men'. As a result, Shanghai was 
emerging as an urban community at the end of the nineteenth 
century• 
The New Policies reforms launched by the Qing regime 
from 1901, as a mean to restore imperial power by building 
a modern nation-state, initiated a number of institutional 
changes in the Shanghai city. The eminent institutions 
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were the Shanghai City Council and the Shanghai General 
Chamber of Commerce. Although the functions of these 
institutions could only be regarded as an expanded version 
of the duty in which the gentry and merchants in Shanghai 
had already performed, these institutions nevertheless 
formalized and legitimated their power. The democratic 
procedures practised by these institutions also testified 
to the elite,s ability to evolve towards both democracy and 
administrative efficiency. The institutions also helped to 
integrate them together. They now were nominated as the 
urban reformist elite preoccupied with modernism and 
reformist, and tending to become a political group. An 
autonomous domain, represented by the New Policies 
institutions and the urban reformist elite, separated from 
both the private domestic domain and the public authority, 
was clearly formed. A public sphere was said to emerge. 
The Anti-American Boycott in 1905 was illustrated as 
the first manifestation of the public sphere in political 
realm. Initiated by the merchant community in Shanghai 
with the General Chamber as an organizational means, and as 
a protest against the racial discrimination against the 
Chinese that had been introduced by the American immi-
gration laws, the boycott thus assumed a political form. 
The successful mobilization of diverse social groups to 
participate, the use of rational-critical argument as the 
resolution of political disputes, and the involvement in 
the affairs once privileged by the state authorities: all 
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of these act as the indicators for the existence of a 
public sphere in Shanghai in that period. Though the 
reformist elite could not attain the goal of revising the 
immigrant policy, their capacity to organize open political 
discourse at the level of societal mobilization and outside 
state dominance was impressive. 
The Constitutional Movement in 1910 represented 
another manifestation of the public sphere in political 
realm. Through the newly established representative 
institution --the provincial assemblies-- as a forum for 
national debate, reformist elite from Shanghai in cooper-
ating with those from other provinces launched a movement 
for the early convening of parliament. They claimed that 
a constitutional government subject to the supervision of 
public opinion and hence more responsible to the people's 
benefit would be the best means to achieve China's 
salvation in face of the external threat. Therefore, they 
demanded for legally guaranteed representation at the 
national level through the early convening of a parliament. 
Again, the methods they used --petition, mass demonstration 
and collecting signatories-- and their political demands 
represented a new type of political discourse and a high 
level of political consciousness that were unprecedented in 
Chinese history. Thus a public sphere that functioned in 
the political realm was achieved its full maturity. |:he 
resultant rejection of the reformist elite's demand only 
made them more alienated from the imperial regime. 
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The 1911 Revolution in Shanghai sprang from the 
cooperation between the revolutionaries and the reformist 
elite. The latter, mainly the leaders of local inter-
mediary institutions, were deserved as the local power-
holders while the formers, mainly the outsiders of the 
city, were small in number and lacked any local bases. The 
resultant 'bloodless of successes' and 'peaceful inde-
pendence' was to a large extent attributed to the 
functioning of the public sphere in the past decade which 
successfully mobilizing the energies of society in the 
service of nationalistic and political goals. The 
aftermaths represented a period of elite's assertion of 
political power to pursue their ambitions of modernization. 
But their sided with Yuan Shikai, in desire for nationally 
unity, actually dug their own grave when Yuan sought to 
centralize state control. The once flourished political 
experiment of public sphere, practised by the urban 
reformist elite, thus declined. 
Their failure, instead of ascribed to their intrinsic 
weaknesses, are better regarded as 'the time was not yet 
ripe'. In face of mounting external threat and authority 
crisis, what the people demanded, as manifested in the 
content of their nationalistic aspirations, was a strong 
state, however repressive it might be. A new government 
that founded on democratic principle, subjected to the 
supervision of public opinion, and launched modernization 
programmes through cooperation with foreigners, thus 
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represented the aspirations (mainly cosmopolitanism in 
nature) of those elite in the treaty ports only, but were 
unable to graft onto the rural and bureaucratic society of 
the Chinese interior. 
D. Discussions 
After this striving search for public sphere in 
Shanghai, can we conclude that this historically specific 
concept is suitably applied in the very different Chinese 
historical contexts? Before we have any settled answer, we 
should remark any discrepancy between our research of 
Shanghai in late imperial era and Habermas‘s analysis of 
the historical origins and subsequent transformation of 
bourgeois public sphere in Western Europe. 
Firstly, the unit of analysis in Habermasaccount is 
country——England, France, and Germany-- while in our case, 
we focus on a city only. Thus we can be blamed as 
committing ecological fallacy. Although the vast size of 
China and varied local conditions can justify our position, 
we should notify that in our account of public sphere in 
Shanghai, it was predominantly oriented to the central 
government and national politics, while its relation to the 
local government and local affairs was usually in vein. 
Secondly, in Habermasmodel of European development, 
the autonomous public sphere was expanding at the same time 
that the state was undergoing its first phase of rapid 
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modern growth with increasing authority, while in modern 
China, the Qing regime was progressively losing its 
authority in face of domestic rebellions and foreign 
threat. After the 1911 Revolution, there was no legiti-
matized central government, and for more than a decade 
after 1916, there was not even the presence of central 
authority. in fact, it was the withdrawal of the formal 
state apparatus that provided space for the extra-
bureaucratic activities of local elite and hence nurturing 
an era of elite activism. Although the court intended the 
New Policies should increase state authority and centralize 
power through the establishment of numerous intermediary 
institutions to utilizing local energies� ^owever, "the 
mixture of governmental threat and governmentally created 
opportunity contributed to the politicization of the public 
sphere and state-societal conflicts • "21 
Of course, we can list more details to show how the 
bourgeois public sphere do not fit Chinese history, but the 
point is that these discrepancies do not impede its usage 
in Chinese contexts. As suggests by William T. Rowe: 
The use of extraneously generated categories to 
analyze a given culture may be not merely 
convenient but also unusually revealing, in that 
such a process can raise questions that the 
indigenous accounts would like to let sleep .22 
In proceeding sensibly and sensitively, we should find that 
the idea of intermediate arenas (or the third realm) in 
2� Rankin 1993: 173. 
22. Rowe 1993: 141. 
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which open, public political discourses are undertaken by 
officials (represent the state authorities) and the 
populace (represent the civil societies) seems useful in 
understanding relationships between the two, without 
collapsing them into either state activities or societal 
initiatives alone. Or to quote a passage from a scholar 
who prefers some middle ground in applying the category in 
the Chinese contexts: 
In reality, public spheres are often poorly 
bounded axsnas, betteir conceived as nuitieirous 
overlapping circles and interpenetrating state 
and social presences than as ,a segment of a line 
between state and private poles. Participants 
inevitably pursue mixtures of private and public 
interests, sometimes virtuously and sometimes in 
corrupt or unsanctioned ways. In part because of 
their ambiguous positions, these spheres were 
places where new power and relationships can be 
created. 23 
Moreover, in Habermas‘s meanings, these intermediate 
arenas were roots of democratic development in Western 
Europe. It is this seminal implication that made the 
knitting together of various cluster phenomena meaningful. 
In fact, what we have done is to show that some institu-
tions and political practices, with characteristics of 
public sphere, appeared in the late imperial China and 
these denote as the vital signs of China's potential for 
democracy, though we do not hope that our research fall 
into another version of the Chinese historians' debate on 
the ‘sprout buds of capitalism in China'. 
23. Rankin 1993: 160• 
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Then we should have a concluding remark on the 
characteristics of Chinese variants of public sphere. That 
means, apart from its main features we can identify as what 
Habermas describes as signs of public sphere, what other 
distinguish features we can recognize as unique to the 
Chinese variant only. 
In fact, we have already mentioned two points in the 
beginning of this section. The first one is that： although 
the public sphere emerged and developed in a coastal city 
only (Shanghai) , it was predominantly oriented to the 
central government and national politics. Its influence 
was also national wide. 
The second one is that it took shape in an era while 
the central state was progressively losing it& authority 
and even undergoing disintegration, instead of the presence 
of a strong modern nation-state. 
We supplement two more points in here. The third one 
is that its constituent was a mixture of old and new 
elements. For example, most reformist elite enjoyed their 
prestige through traditional means such as holding official 
degrees or business success, but also enthusiastically 
engaging in some brand new activities such as managing 
industrial enterprises or acting as leaders of the 
provincial assemblies. The cooperation of guilds 
(traditional merchant organizations) and chatmbers of 
commerce (founded on western organizational principles) in 
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launching the anti-Anfierican boycott movement was another 
good instance. Maybe this is a common feature for most 
• things in such transition period between traditional and 
modern China. 
The fourth point is that the public sphere in China 
was to a large extent the products of western influence. 
This ranged from its institutional bases (the self 
government bodies and the chanibers of cotnmerce) , the 
methods the reformist elite used during the mobilizations 
(such as petition, boycott and collecting signatories) to 
their political demands and reform ideas. All these were 
apparently borrowed from their western counterparts. These 
are the four main chairacteiristics of the Chinese variant of 
public sphere we identify. 
Lastly, we propose some lines for further investi-
gations of the public sphere in modern China. Firstly, 
although we argue that Shanghai was a model case for the 
study of the emergence and degeneration of public sphere in 
modern China, this does not mean Shanghai was the sole 
case. Actually, these intermediate arenas always exist in 
v^ arious societies to a ciiffeirent: extent but the prime 
matter is whether they perform similar functions as in 
Habermas‘s sense. For example, William T. Rowe‘s study of 
Hankou and David Strand's account of Beijing suggest that 
similar phenomena had occurred in some inland cities, other 
than the treaty ports, though with different configur— 
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ations.22 Thus it is possible to extend, our investigation 
into cities and areas in various part of China, so as to 
give a clear picture of a Chinese variant of public sphere 
for any cross-national comparison. 
Secondly, our research is based principally on 
secondary resources. It is justifiable if we only want to 
give a general macro-structural picture of the public 
sphere in Shanghai. However, when we want to give more 
detailed accounts on some areas, such as the political 
demands of the reformist elite, their relations with other 
strata of Shanghai society, the roles and operations of 
various representative institutions in social mobiliz-
ations, we always find that the information are either in 
vein or inadequately analyzed. Therefore, it is better to 
supplement our study by carefully targeted primary 
investigaitiorLS or even reiiwestigations. Local records 
such as newspapers ； especially Sheribao and Shibao, or 
archives on representative institutions store in museums 
are helpful for this effort. 
22 . These are Rowe 1989 and Strand 1989. 
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